United States v. Limber

• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Hood
• Citation: United States v. Limber, 192 A.2d 530 (D.C. 1963)
• Decision Date: 27 June 1963
• Docket Number: No. 3305.,3305.
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Clyde L. LIMBER, Appellee.

Page 530

192 A.2d 530

UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Clyde L. LIMBER, Appellee.

No. 3305.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 3, 1963.

Decided June 27, 1963.

Paul A. Renne, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Edmond T. Daly, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellant.

Donald B. Gentry, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QUINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.

HOOD, Chief Judge.

The basic facts in this case are quite similar to those in Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211, and this appeal by the Government challenges the trial court's interpretation of the Lynch decision.

Limber, appellee here, was charged with petit larceny and committed to D. C. General Hospital for a period of thirty days to determine his competency to stand trial. A psychiatrist on the staff of the hospital reported to the court that Limber was of "unsound mind, unable to understand the charges against him, and incapable of assisting counsel in his own defense," and also that the alleged offense was a product of his mental illness. Finding that Limber was unable to understand the charges against him and incapable of assisting counsel in his own defense, the court committed him to Saint Elizabeths Hospital. About three and one-half months later the Superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital informed the court that Limber was then competent to assist counsel in his defense and asked that he be returned to stand trial, noting, however, that he was still suffering from a mental illness — Schizophrenic Reaction, Chronic Undifferentiated Type — and that the alleged offense was the product of his illness.

The following month Limber appeared in court and demanded trial by jury. This demand was later withdrawn and trial by the court was had.

Prior to introduction of any evidence defense counsel advised the court that the defense of insanity would not be raised, that the defendant maintained he was suffering from no mental disease at the time of the alleged offense and that he objected to any evidence which the Government might introduce relating to his mental condition. After Government counsel stated that in view of information contained in the official court papers, the Government felt obligated to present psychiatric testimony for the court's consideration, the court overruled defendant's objection.

In the course of trial the Government offered testimony as to the commission of the offense by Limber, and also testimony by a lay witness and a psychiatrist relating to defendant's mental condition. It was the opinion of the psychiatrist that Limber was suffering from a major mental disorder, that the crime was a product of this disorder, that Limber continued to suffer from the disorder, was dangerous to himself and to others, and needed further psychiatric care.

Limber took the stand, denied taking the property, and denied that he was suffering from any mental illness either at the time of the alleged offense or at the time of trial.

The trial court found (1) that Limber was competent to stand trial, (2) that he committed the act of petit larceny, and (3) that the court had a reasonable doubt concerning Limber's ability to form the required criminal intent at the time he committed the act; and then ordered judgment of not guilty on the ground that defendant "was insane at the time of the commission of the offense."

The situation then was the same as in Lynch. Limber, although refusing to raise the issue of his sanity and objecting to the issue being raised by the prosecution, had been found not guilty by reason of insanity. And, as in Lynch, the question arose as to the next step.

In Lynch the trial court followed the mandatory provision of Code 1961, 24-301 (d) and ordered Lynch committed to Saint Elizabeths. In habeas corpus proceedings in the United States District Court, it was held that Lynch's commitment was illegal and he was ordered released unless civil commitment proceedings were entered against him. On appeal this ruling was reversed, the United States Court of Appeals holding that Lynch was properly committed under § 24-301(d). Overholser v. Lynch, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 404, 288 F.2d 388. This ruling was reversed by the Supreme Court which held that if a defendant, "despite his own assertions of sanity, is found not guilty by reason of insanity, § 24-301(d) does not apply." Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719-720, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1072, 8 L.Ed.2d 211.

It is clear under Lynch that in the present case Limber could not be committed under § 24-301(d). It is also plain that civil commitment proceedings could be commenced against Limber. The question here is whether, as an alternative to civil commitment, the trial court had jurisdiction to conduct a hearing and order commitment under § 24-301(a). The Government moved for such a hearing but the trial court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hold a hearing under § 24-301(a). This appeal is from that ruling.

Prior to Lynch it was held that § 24-301(a) was limited in its application to the question of competency to stand trial and provided for confinement to a mental institution if the trial court "finds that because of unsoundness of mind or for any other reason he [the accused] is mentally incompetent to stand trial." Williams v. Overholser, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 18, 19, 259 F.2d 175, 176. But in Lynch the Supreme Court, referring to § 24-301(a), said the...