United States v. Lindsay

Decision Date26 February 1953
Docket NumberNo. 4686.,4686.
Citation202 F.2d 239
PartiesUNITED STATES v. LINDSAY et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Melvin Richter, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Holmes Baldridge, Asst. Atty. Gen., George F. Garrity, U. S. Atty. and Stanley Wisnioski, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Boston, Mass., and Paul A Sweeney, George F. Foley and John G. Laughlin, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellant.

Edward C. Park, of Boston, Mass. (Withington, Cross, Park & McGann, Boston, Mass., on brief), for appellees.

Before MAGRUDER, Chief Judge, and WOODBURY and HARTIGAN, Circuit Judges.

WOODBURY, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on motion dismissing an action brought by the United States on a claim of its wholly-owned agency, Commodity Credit Corporation (chartered by Congress June 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1070, 15 U.S.C.A. § 714 et seq.), to recover from a wool handler named Lindsay, his sureties, and Draper and Company, Inc., a warehouseman, for damage to wool owned by Commodity and stored while under Lindsay's control in Draper's warehouse.

It is alleged in the complaint that the agency named above is the "successor in interest" of another wholly government owned agency of the same name previously chartered by the United States under the laws of Delaware; that the latter corporation entered into a so-called "wool handler's agreement" with Lindsay in 1944; that pursuant to that agreement Lindsay had in his possession wool belonging to Commodity which he stored with Draper; and that on or about February 26, 1945, the wool was "returned to Commodity in a wet and damaged condition" caused by failure "to provide proper storage for the wool and to take such action as might be necessary to keep the wool in good condition." This action was filed on February 29, 1952, and the several defendants each seasonably moved for its dismissal on the ground, among others, that it appeared on the face of the complaint that the right of action set forth therein had not accrued within six years next preceding the bringing of the action. The court below granted the motions on the ground stated above and in consequence entered the judgment of dismissal from which this appeal is taken.

There was no federal statute putting a period of limitation upon suits by or against the original Commodity Credit Corporation — the one organized under the laws of Delaware. But in the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of June 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1070, creating the new federally chartered corporation of the same name, it was specifically provided in § 4(c) that "No suit by or against the Corporation shall be allowed unless it shall have been brought within four years after the right accrued on which suit is brought." In June 1949 the four-year time limitation for bringing suits was extended by amendment to six years, 63 Stat. 154, 156, and the time limitation was specifically made applicable to suits such as this by the last sentence of § 4(c) of the 1948 Act wherein it is provided: "Any suit by or against the United States as the real party in interest based upon any claim by or against the Corporation shall be subject to the provisions of this subsection (c) to the same extent as though such suit were by or against the Corporation." The question for decision, therefore, is whether the six-year period of limitation began to run on February 26, 1945, when the wool was returned to original Commodity in damaged condition, or whether it did not begin to run until midnight June 30, 1948, when new Commodity came into being and the statute of limitations included in its Charter Act went into effect.

Giving the statutory language its literal meaning, there can be no doubt that the action brought by the United States is barred, for the cause of action sued upon came into existence, that is to say "accrued," as that word is ordinarily used, when the wool was returned in damaged condition on February 26, 1945, almost exactly seven years before this suit was brought. But counsel for the United...

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3 cases
  • United States v. Lindsay
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 18, 1954
    ...delivered, the District Court dismissed the case. 105 F.Supp. 467. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed on the same ground. 202 F.2d 239. However, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that a Government claim arising prior to the 1948 Act 'accrued' not when the ......
  • State ex rel. Brady v. Pettinaro Enter.
    • United States
    • Court of Chancery of Delaware
    • March 22, 2005
    ...v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n, 781 F.2d 186, 189 (Fed.Cir.1985) (noting that "the Sohn rule has often been followed"); U.S. v. Lindsay, 202 F.2d 239, 240 (1st Cir.1953) (referring to Sohn as "the leading case" on the application of newly-enacted statutes of limitation to pre-existing causes o......
  • State v. Pettinaro Enterprises, C.A. No. 297-N (DE 3/22/2005)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • March 22, 2005
    ...v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n, 781 F.2d 186, 189 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that "the Sohn rule has often been followed"); U.S. v. Lindsay, 202 F.2d 239, 240 (1st Cir. 1953) (referring to Sohn as "the leading case" on the application of newly-enacted statutes of limitation to pre-existing cause......

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