United States v. Linnas, 79 C 2966.

Decision Date30 July 1981
Docket NumberNo. 79 C 2966.,79 C 2966.
Citation527 F. Supp. 426
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Karl LINNAS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edward R. Korman, U.S. Atty., Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y., Rodney G. Smith, Martha Talley, Trial Attys., Office of Special Investigations, Criminal Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff; Leonard A. Sclafani, Asst. U.S. Atty., Brooklyn, N.Y., of counsel.

Ivars Berzins, Babylon, N.Y., for defendant.

Memorandum of Decision and Order

MISHLER, District Judge.

The United States of America commenced the instant action on November 21, 1979 pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), to revoke the Certificate of Naturalization (No. 7641679) of defendant, Karl Linnas, and to vacate the order of the New York Supreme Court (Suffolk County) admitting defendant to United States citizenship. The Government seeks to upset defendant's naturalization obtained in February of 1960 on the theories that his citizenship was (1) "illegally procured" and (2) "procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." Either of these theories, if proven by "`clear, unequivocal, and convincing'" evidence which does not leave "`the issue in doubt,'" Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 1336, 87 L.Ed. 1796 (1943) (quoting Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 381, 7 S.Ct. 1015, 1028, 30 L.Ed. 949 (1887)),1 would provide the court with no alternative but to enter a judgment of denaturalization against defendant. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 737, 752-53, 66 L.Ed.2d 686 (1981).

The Government's case turns on the legality of defendant's entry into this country in 1951 under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub.L.No. 80-774, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended (the "DPA"). The Government's five-count complaint alleges, inter alia, various heinous acts on the part of defendant during his residence in Tartu, Estonia between August 1941 and May 1943. In Count 1, the Government alleges that defendant was never lawfully admitted into the United States, a condition precedent for naturalization under Section 316(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1427, because (1) his activities during World War II precluded him from obtaining lawful entrance into the United States as an eligible person under the DPA, and (2) his willful misrepresentations made for "the purpose of gaining admission into the United States" under the DPA made him ineligible for admission under that Act. Counts II and III seek defendant's denaturalization based on the contention that his citizenship was procured by the concealment or misrepresentation of facts material to his eligibility for citizenship during the process leading to his naturalization in 1960. Contrary to defendant's sworn statements made for the purpose of acquiring citizenship, it is claimed that (1) he had committed crimes of moral turpitude, and (2) he was not a person of good moral character. Count IV alleges that defendant's citizenship was illegally procured since he in fact was not a person of good moral character. Finally, Count V states that, as a statutory matter, defendant was not a person of good moral character since he had given "false testimony for the purpose of obtaining ... benefits" under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 101(f)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6).

I. Pre-Trial Proceedings

On September 24, 1980, the court granted the Government's motion pursuant to Rule 37(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., to compel defendant to answer certain enumerated interrogatories. Defendant expressly defied the court's order by failing to fully answer the Government's interrogatories. The Government's subsequent motion for sanctions, wherein it requested that all relevant facts pertaining to the Government's unanswered interrogatories be deemed established, was granted. However, because of the peculiar nature of denaturalization proceedings, and in view of the "severe and unsettling consequences" which might ensue from the loss of citizenship, Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S.Ct. at 747, the court left defendant with the opportunity to rebut the facts which we would otherwise "deem established beyond a reasonable doubt...." (Memorandum of Decision and Order dated October 14, 1980 — findings of fact found at Appendix A). Following our imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) for the failure to answer interrogatories, defendant failed to answer certain questions at his deposition continuing his earlier claim rejected by the court of a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court again ordered defendant to provide the Government with discovery, this time through his deposition testimony, and defendant once again refused. Consequently, the Government's proposed findings of fact sought to be proved through defendant's deposition testimony which he failed to provide was deemed to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, subject to rebuttal by defendant at trial. (See Memorandum of Decision and Order dated January 12, 1981 — findings of fact found at Appendix B).

Though the Government had established the facts necessary to prove its prima facie case prior to trial, thereby relieving the Government of the need to offer evidence concerning many crucial facts pending the defense's offer of contradictory evidence at trial, the Government's pre-trial memorandum provided defendant with notice that it would present evidence on its direct case that would support its claims independent of the court's pre-trial fact findings made pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A), Fed.R.Civ.P. (Government's Pre-Trial Memorandum mailed to defendant June 12, 1981).2 Because the Government's offer of proof at trial overwhelmingly supported the allegations stated in its complaint, our decision today is based upon findings of fact established solely through the evidence adduced at trial.3

The case was tried before the court without a jury.

II. The Trial

The defendant, Karl Linnas, was born on August 6, 1919 in Tartu, Estonia. He married his wife Linda on July 7, 1944 in Haapsalu, Estonia and entered the United States on August 17, 1951 for the purpose of establishing permanent residence. (Government Exhibit 31, K. Linnas Petition for Naturalization).4

During the years 1940 through 1943, defendant resided in Tartu, Estonia. (GX-31, K. Linnas' Application for Immigration Visa and Alien Registration). In part, the trial focused on the activities of the German military forces, and the assistance provided them by an organization of Estonian nationals known as the "Home Guard" or "Self-Help" forces (referred to as the "Selbstschutz" by the Germans and as the "Omakaitse" by the Estonians) during the German occupation of Tartu which began in the summer of 1941. Specifically, the Government's case established clearly, unequivocally, and convincingly defendant's involvement as an active and voluntary member of the Selbstschutz starting in July of 1941. However, the information defendant had provided to immigration officials represented that he was a university student in Tartu during the period 1940-1943. Defendant failed to testify at trial on his own behalf,5 and moreover, failed to appear at the trial.

A. Historical Background

The Government called Dr. Raul Hilberg to comment on the German military movement into the Soviet Union following the German invasion on June 22, 1941 and to describe various German policies and the implementation of those policies during their initial assault.6 Professor Hilberg testified that the German invasion into Estonia occurred in mid-July 1941. The invading German forces that swept through Tartu included the mobile killing units known as the "Einsatzkommandos." These units formed battalions, referred to as "Einsatzgruppen," which were charged with carrying out Nazi policy aimed at the annihilation of Jews and other groups found inimical to the Reich. (Record at 50-51, GX-2 through 10). Professor Hilberg described the operation of the Einsatzgruppen in one of his publications as follows:

"When the German Wehrmacht — the armed forces — attacked the USSR on June 22, 1941, the invading armies were accompanied by small mechanized killing units of the SS and Police which were tactically subordinated to the field commanders but otherwise free to go about their special business. The mobile killing units were operating in the front-line areas under a special arrangement and in a unique partnership with the German Army.
* * * * * *
The geographic distribution of Soviet Jewry determined to a large extent the basic strategy of the mobile killing units. To reach as many cities as fast as possible, the Einsatzgruppen moved closely upon the heels of the advancing armies, trapping the large Jewish population centers before the victims had a chance to discover their fate.... In accordance with the agreement, units of Einsatzgruppe A entered the cities of Kaunas, Lepaya, Yelgava, Riga, Tartu, Tallin, and the larger suburbs of Leningrad with advance units of the army."
(GX-1 at pp. 177 and 191).

The Einsatzkommandos executed their duties in Tartu, Estonia, with the assistance of the Estonian "Home Guard," the Selbstschutz.7 (Record at 52-57; GX-2 through 10). Dr. Hilberg's testimony was uncontroverted and is supported by captured German war records contained in the library of the United States National Archives. (GX-2 through 10).

Einsatzgruppe A, aided by the Selbstschutz, was successful in achieving one of its major objectives. By mid-January 1942, the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service was able to report that Estonia was "judenfrei" (free of Jews) and that the execution of the Jews had been handled in such a manner so as to minimize public attention to the fact of the German extermination...

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