United States v. Littlejohn

• Decision Date: 22 April 1971
• Docket Number: No. 521-70.,521-70.
• Citation: United States v. Littlejohn, 441 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1971)
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene Leroy LITTLEJOHN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

441 F.2d 26 (1971)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Eugene Leroy LITTLEJOHN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 521-70.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 22, 1971.

Stephen K. Lester, Asst. U. S. Atty., Wichita, Kan. (Robert J. Roth, U. S. Atty., Wichita, Kan., with him on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

C. Warner Eisenbise, Wichita, Kan., on brief for defendant-appellant.

Before LEWIS, Chief Judge, and JONES^* and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.

PICKETT, Circuit Judge.

Littlejohn appeals from a conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas for the crime of escaping from the lawful custody of a United States marshal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751.The principal question presented is whether the trial court erred in not sustaining Littlejohn's motion to suppress statements made by him to an arresting officer prior to being advised of his rights as formalized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694(1966).It is agreed that the Miranda warnings were not given prior to the statements.

While being held in the Sedgwick County, Kansas Jail awaiting sentencing following conviction in federal district court for a Dyer Act violation, Littlejohn and a group of other prisoners escaped from jail and were at large.Kansas state authorities immediately set up roadblocks in the area and began a search to apprehend the escapees.Acting on a report that an individual was seen on a highway some distance from one of the roadblocks, a deputy sheriff drove to that area and observed a young man walking along a state highway.The deputy did not know Littlejohn or the names of the escapees.He stopped the individual, identified himself, and asked for his name, age, and where he was going.The individual gave his age, his destination, and stated that his name was Drake.He advised the deputy that he had been checked by officers two or three times.Upon request of the deputy, the individual agreed to return with him to the roadblock for the purpose of verifying his statement.While the deputy was attempting to communicate with the sheriff by car radio, Drake intervened and told the deputy that if he would turn off the radio, "he had something to tell me."He then said that he was Littlejohn and that he had escaped from the Sedgwick County Jail with the others.¹This information was not in response to interrogation by officers.

Assuming that Littlejohn was in legal custody when the incriminating statements were made, it is quite clear that the statements were not the result of interrogation by officers and were made voluntarily while the deputy sheriff was trying to reach others by radio.The record discloses no impelling influences by the deputy to bring about Littlejohn's admission that he was an escapee.Under these circumstances, the statements were admissible.In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1630, it was said:

"* * * Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated."

Apparently because he was sick, Littlejohn left his hiding place and went to the highway for the purpose of being apprehended.We have held that strictly voluntary incriminating statements are not necessarily excluded by the Miranda rule.United States v. Bourassa, 411 F. 2d 69(10th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 235, 24 L.Ed.2d 192(1969);United States v. Godfrey, 409 F.2d 1338(10th Cir.1969);Anderson v. United States, 399 F.2d 753(10th Cir.1968);Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d 713(10th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966, 88 S.Ct. 2038, 20 L.Ed.2d 880(1968).

It is next contended "that the trial court submitted his instructions to the jury immediately upon the close of Appellant's case without having afforded Appellant's counsel an opportunity to examine said instructions or even have time to reflect upon them thus denying Appellant the opportunity to make a studied objection to said instructions or any portion of them."The defense offered no instructions and there were no objections to those given by the court.Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 requires the trial...