United States v. Lohman
| Decision Date | 28 December 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 11540.,11540. |
| Citation | 228 F.2d 824 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America ex rel. E. A. SIMMONS for and on behalf of Delores GRAY, also known as Delores Ray, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Joseph D. LOHMAN and Irwin J. Blazek, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Edward A. Simmons, Chicago, Ill., pro se.
John Gutknecht, Rudolph L. Janega, Chicago, Ill. (Irwin D. Bloch, John T. Gallagher, William L. Carlin, Robert E. Bryant, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellees.
Before DUFFY, Chief Judge, and MAJOR and LINDLEY, Circuit Judges.
This is a proceeding wherein appellant Delores Gray (sometimes referred to as Delores Ray) sought by habeas corpus to obtain her release from custody of respondents Joseph D. Lohman, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, and Irwin J. Blazek, Warden of the Cook County Jail. The writ was directed to issue, appropriate pleadings were filed by the parties and, after a hearing, the court, on May 5, 1955, entered an order discharging the writ and remanded the petitioner to the custody of respondents, to be delivered to an officer or agent of the State of Michigan. From this order the appeal comes to this court.
Petitioner, in April 1951, commenced the service of an indeterminate sentence of 1½ to 4 years, imposed by a Michigan court for the crime of larceny, in the Detroit House of Correction, a Michigan penal institution. On October 6, 1952, she was released on parole from that institution for a period of 18 months, which upon compliance with its terms by petitioner would have expired April 6, 1954. Among the conditions of the parole was that she proceed to Chicago, Illinois, where she was to reside with her father, Theodore Ray, and where employment awaited her. It was also a condition that petitioner while in Chicago be under the supervision of an Illinois parole officer. It was provided that petitioner would obey the parole regulations of Illinois and Michigan, would return to Michigan when instructed to do so during the term of her parole, and agreed that for violation of her parole she could be returned to Michigan without extradition proceedings and that she would not contest any proceeding by the State of Michigan instituted for the purpose of obtaining her return.
On February 19, 1954, Michigan issued a Parole Violation Warrant for the arrest and imprisonment of petitioner for failure to comply with the conditions of her parole. In the meantime, however, petitioner was convicted in the Municipal Court of Chicago of the crime of larceny and, on March 4, 1954, was sentenced to the Cook County Jail for a term of one year, from which imprisonment she was entitled to be released on February 2, 1955. Prior to her release from this imprisonment, respondents were notified by Michigan officials to hold petitioner for return to that State as a parole violator. Respondents, awaiting the arrival of Michigan officers, held petitioner in their custody for two days after she was thus entitled to be discharged from the Cook County imprisonment. This detention was challenged by petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding instituted in the Criminal Court of Cook County which, after hearing, quashed the writ. Subsequently the instant proceeding was instituted, which culminated in the order under attack.
Admittedly, respondents' sole justification for retaining petitioner was the Parole Violation Warrant issued by the State of Michigan, with the request that she be returned to that State under a so-called "compact" existing between the two States. This compact, like those existing between numerous States, was entered into by authority granted by Congress under an Act of June 6, 1934. Title 4 U.S.C.A. § 111. We think it unnecessary to set forth this compact in full but that it is enough to note that it authorizes the officials of one State to permit a person on probation or parole to reside in any other State which is a party to the compact. It also authorizes the officers of a sending State to enter the receiving State for the purpose of apprehension and retaking any person thus released on probation or parole. The compact provides that no formalities are required other than establishing the authority of the officer and the identity of the person to be retaken. The compact then provides:
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