United States v. Lopez

• Decision Date: 14 August 1979
• Docket Number: No. CR 79-484-RMT.,CR 79-484-RMT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jose LOPEZ and Nicolas Santiago-Quintana, Defendants.

474 F. Supp. 943

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jose LOPEZ and Nicolas Santiago-Quintana, Defendants.

No. CR 79-484-RMT.

United States District Court, C. D. California, Criminal Division.

August 14, 1979.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Andrea Sheridan Ordin, U. S. Atty., Robert L. Brosio, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chief, Crim. Div., Nancy Wieben Stock, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.

Joseph Reichmann, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant Lopez.

Milton Kerlan, Jr., Pasadena, Cal., for defendant Santiago-Quintana.

OPINION

TAKASUGI, District Judge.

At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing occasioned by defendants' motion to suppress certain specified evidence, this court granted the motion, finding that the conduct of the law enforcement officers surpassed the permissible boundaries envisioned by the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment, United States Constitution.

This court's reasoning necessitates a detailed recitation of the facts surrounding this case.

At approximately 1:00 a. m., two California Highway Patrol ("CHP") officers, from a distance of about a quarter mile, observed a tractor-trailer rig slowly climbing a steep grade. A late-model Datsun pickup with an attached camper unit was then seen overtaking the rig. As the pickup came upon the rig, the pickup began to jerk, finally stalling in its lane of travel on the public highway. The CHP officers decided to render assistance to the distressed vehicle. As the officers were approaching, they observed defendant Jose Lopez ("Lopez"), a passenger, exit the vehicle, walk around it and reenter on the driver's side, which was occupied by defendant Nicolas Santiago-Quintana ("Santiago") prior to and during the vehicle stall. No evidence was presented as to how Santiago moved from the driver's seat to the passenger seat or whether either defendant noticed or was aware of an approaching police vehicle. By the time the CHP officers reached the pickup and activated their overhead warning lights, Lopez had successfully restarted the pickup and had proceeded in its operation.

Although the peril facing the distressed vehicle had apparently subsided, one of the officers ordered Lopez to drive onto the shoulder portion of the highway. Following the vehicle stop, the officers asked for and received Lopez's valid California operator's license. The officers then proceeded to question him concerning the ownership of the pickup, but never asked him to produce any proof or questioned him as to where the vehicle registration might be located. Meanwhile, one of the officers began to run a computer "check" on Lopez and on the license number of the vehicle.¹

When Lopez did not answer to the satisfaction of the questioning officer, and before the computer data was available,² that officer, without securing anyone's consent, entered the vehicle and searched the contents of the glove compartment. No registration card was found there. The officer then searched the dashboard and the visors, but failed to observe a car dealer's receipt of sale which was taped to the inside of the windshield just above the glove compartment.³ He then spied a crumpled white Jack-in-the-Box restaurant bag partially under the seat. Testifying that the bag could have contained the registration card,⁴ the officer opened it and discovered instead some $2700.00 in Mexican pesos and money orders. Perceiving that "crime was afoot," he continued his search and found a brown bag filled with additional cash.

Then, for reasons never articulated, the officer spread open a louvered shade covering the window to the camper and observed a number of people sitting in the back. He immediately advised his partner that the individuals in the back of the pickup were undocumented aliens. Sometime later, the officer reentered the cab portion and found a list of names, a so-called "pollo"⁵ list, laying on the dash that had been folded and clipped with a pen. The defendants were then arrested and charged with transporting undocumented aliens. They claim that the search violated their fourth amendment rights, and that any evidence found as a result of the search and seizure should be suppressed.

I.

Before reaching the merits of the controversy, a determination must be made that the defendants have properly asserted a violation of their individual rights in order to properly challenge the legality of the search. Under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1979), occupants of a vehicle are not granted an automatic right to object merely because they are present while a search, later found illegal, is being conducted. Rather, the inquiry focuses on each individual, because fourth amendment rights are personal rights which cannot be asserted vicariously. The question is "whether the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it." Id. at 138, 99 S.Ct. at 429.

The opinion outlines three interests, one of which must be asserted in order to challenge illegal police procedures: The defendant must claim either a property or possessory interest in the automobile, or an interest in the property seized. Id. The propriety of allowing the driver who was also the owner of the searched vehicle to challenge the search was not questioned. Because the passengers could claim neither a property nor a possessory interest in the vehicle or its contents, the Court said that no violation of their individual rights had occurred and denied the motion to suppress.

While in the present case neither of the occupants owned the car, Santiago had been granted permission to use the vehicle and had exclusive control over its operation. This fact clearly distinguishes this case from Rakas. Santiago was not merely a guest of the owner of the vehicle, rather, he had exclusive control over the vehicle, dictating how the vehicle was to be used. Whether a nonowning driver has the requisite expectation of privacy was not squarely addressed in Rakas, and as Justice White noted in his dissenting opinion, the question remains unresolved. Id. at 167, 99 S.Ct. 421. It is this question that must now be confronted by this court.

In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), the petitioner established the requisite degree of interest in an apartment which was searched although he was neither its owner nor leasor. The court found that the fact that the owner of the apartment had given the petitioner permission to use the apartment and a key to it, combined with the fact that he had made exclusive use of the apartment, having slept there "maybe a night," persuasive evidence of a sufficient interest. This reasoning was duly noted in Rakas:

Jones not only had permission to use the apartment of his friend, but had a key to the apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of the search and kept possessions in the apartment. Except with respect to his friends, Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it.

Id. at 149, 99 S.Ct. at 433. The Jones holding was approved in Rakas, which viewed the holding as standing for the "unremarkable proposition" that one can establish a sufficient interest in a place other than that person's home.

The Jones holding is equally applicable in the present case where defendant was given use of a vehicle rather than an apartment, bringing this court back to the question of whether Santiago had the requisite "legitimate expectation of privacy." This court holds that he does. Having been given permission to use the vehicle along with the keys to that vehicle, and having made use of the vehicle to a substantial degree, Santiago possesses the requisite interest to legitimately challenge the propriety of the search. This court reaches this conclusion through use of the principles laid down in Jones, Rakas, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). However, this court finds additional support in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Rakas. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, noted that a proper distinction could be made in the fourth amendment rights between mere passengers and those individuals having exclusive control over the vehicle or its locked compartments. 439 U.S. at 154, 99 S.Ct. 421. He later stated that "none of the passengers is said to have had control of the vehicle or the keys," id. at 155, 99 S.Ct. at 436, suggesting that had they had such control, they could have had the requisite degree of interest.

Under a similar analysis, Lopez could also assert a legitimate expectation of privacy because exclusive control of the vehicle had been turned over to him. That conclusion need not be reached under these facts, however, since Lopez has properly pleaded his privacy interest by claiming possession of objects seized during the search.⁶

II.

This court does not address the question of the propriety of the initial detention of the defendants. Focus will instead be directed at the events that subsequently occurred. Those events were, in brief, the entry of the officer into the vehicle...