United States v. Lott

Decision Date08 December 2021
Docket Number2:21-cr-00275-RAH-SRW
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JOHNNIE PAGE LOTT and CARMEN BROOKE LOTT Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SUSAN RUSS WALKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court are Defendant Johnnie Page Lott's motion to suppress (Doc. 49) and Defendant Carmen Brooke Lott's motion to suppress (Doc. 50). For the reasons set forth below, the court concludes that the motions to suppress are due to be denied.

I. Introduction

Defendant Johnnie Lott is charged in the indictment with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and both he and Defendant Carmen Lott are charged with money laundering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). (Doc. 1). Defendants move pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to suppress the evidence found in the search of the residence at 2661 Dawes Court, Mobile, Alabama on June 3, 2020, as well as any fruits of that evidence or statements made as a result of the search. (Doc. 49, at 1; Doc. 50, at 1; Doc 54-1).[1], [2] Specifically, Carmen Lott contends that the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant failed to establish a nexus between her, the residence, and the criminal acts alleged, and that the communications between her and Johnnie Lott are protected by the marital communication privilege. (Doc. 50. at 4, 7). Johnnie Lott contends that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause that he committed the crimes charged in the indictment, that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found at the residence, that the affidavit omitted the fact that drugs were seized from codefendant Maurice Sanders four days prior to the issuance of the search warrant, and that the affidavit lacked corroborating evidence. (Doc. 49, at 2-4, 6). Defendants ask the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this matter. (Doc. 49, at 1; Doc. 50, at 1).

II. Background

On May 28, 2020, James Ranson, a Task Force Officer (“TFO”) of the United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (“HlDTA”) Task Force, [3] applied for and obtained a search warrant for the residence located at 2661 Dawes Court, Mobile, Alabama. (Doc. 54-1). In the sworn affidavit submitted in support of his application for a search warrant, Ranson stated that his investigation had revealed that Carmen Lott and Johnnie Lott, and others, were participating in a drug trafficking organization that distributed various quantities of synthetic cannabinoid (“Flokka”), marijuana, and methamphetamine from Mobile, Alabama to various Alabama correctional facilities, including Kilby Correctional Facility (“KCF”') located in Montgomery County, Alabama, and Fountain Correctional Facility located in Escambia County, Alabama. Id. at p. 2. Ranson attested that in March 2020 he was provided recorded telephone conversations captured by the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”). Id. at p. 3. According to Ranson, the telephone conversations were recorded by the ADOC, consistent with its policy of recording the phone conversations of its inmates, and that prior to any telephone conversation's commencing, both parties to the call are advised by a voice recorded message that their conversation is being recorded. Id. Ranson states in his affidavit that the “telephone conversations in question were located by performing a search for Carmen Lott's telephone number.” Id.

According to Ranson, after he obtained the recorded telephone conversations, he analyzed them and determined that Carmen Lott and Johnnie Lott discussed the distribution and sale of controlled substances. Id. Ranson further attested that Carmen Lott and Johnnie Lott also openly discussed financial transactions related to proceeds from the sale of controlled substances, and monies obtained through other illegal activity. Id. Ranson set forth in his 45-page affidavit an excerpt of a transcript of a series of telephone calls between Carmen and Johnnie Lott that occurred between March 8, 2020 and April 27, 2020, along with Ranson's analysis of each excerpted call. Id. at pp. 3-41.[4] Based upon the facts set forth in his affidavit, and his training and experience regarding investigations involving organized crime and narcotics activities, Ranson concluded that probable cause existed to believe that the residence located at 2661 Dawes Court, Mobile, Alabama, contained evidence of drug distribution and laundering of drug proceeds. Id. at p. 42.

Finding probable cause to issue the search warrant, United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of Alabama Sonja Bivins signed the warrant on May 28, 2020. Id. at 1-2.

III. Legal Standard

The Fourth Amendment guarantees [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, ” and that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In issuing a warrant, a judge is “simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). The court must find only that the judge had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed to uphold the warrant. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984). The validity of the warrant is reviewed based on the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Brundidge, 170 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). [P]robable cause is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts[.]' Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232).

Courts reviewing the legitimacy of search warrants should not interpret supporting affidavits in a hypertechnical manner; rather, a realistic and commonsense approach should be employed so as to encourage recourse to the warrant process and to promote the high level of deference traditionally given to magistrates in their probable cause determination.” United States v. Miller, 24 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994). Suppression of evidence is only required where the affidavit supporting the warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975).

[T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” Upton, 466 U.S. at 734 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. Discussion
A. Carmen Lott-Probable Cause[5]

Defendant Carmen Lott argues that probable cause did not exist for the issuance of a search warrant for the residence in question because Ranson's affidavit failed to demonstrate a nexus between the place to be searched, the alleged criminal activity, and Defendant. (Doc. 50, at 4).

A warrant affidavit ‘should connect the place to be searched with the defendant and the criminal activity.' United States v. Donaldson, 558 Fed.Appx. 962, 968 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002)). However, a specific allegation that illegal activity occurred at the place to be searched is not required. See United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009) (“There need not be an allegation that the illegal activity occurred at the location to be searched, for example the home, but ‘the affidavit should establish a connection between the defendant and the residence to be searched and a link between the residence and any criminal activity.') (quoting Martin, 297 F.3d at 1314). As the Eleventh Circuit has observed,

[t]he justification for allowing a search of a person's residence when that person is suspected of criminal activity is the common-sense realization that one tends to conceal fruits and instrumentalities of a crime in a place to which easy access may be had and in which privacy is nevertheless maintained. In normal situations, few places are more convenient than one's residence for use in planning criminal activities and hiding fruits of a crime. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d at 1310. Moreover, an allegation that illegal activity occurred at the place to be searched, such as the home, is not necessary, but the affidavit . . . should link the defendant to the home and connect the home to any criminal activity. Id. In establishing the link to criminal activity, it is not necessary that the home be the “locus” of criminal activity. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011). “Evidence that the defendant is in possession of contraband that is of the type that would normally expect to be hidden at [his] residence will support a search.” United States v. Anton, 546 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir.2008); see also United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1080-81 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the affidavit was supported by probable cause because of the combination of the defendant's theft, the fact that the contraband was capable of being hidden in the home, and the statement of an experienced FBI agent that individuals who steal money often hide it in their homes).

Donaldson, 558 Fed.Appx. at 968. See also United States v. Hamda, 647 Fed.Appx. 1004, 1009 (11th Cir. 2016) (same); United States v....

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