United States v. De Lucia, 12093.

Decision Date18 June 1958
Docket NumberNo. 12093.,12093.
Citation256 F.2d 487
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul DE LUCIA, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

William Scott Stewart, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Robert Tieken, U. S. Atty., Edwin A. Strugala, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., John Peter Lulinski, Asst. U. S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., of Counsel, for the United States.

Before SCHNACKENBERG, HASTINGS and PARKINSON, Circuit Judges.

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.

In a denaturalization proceeding in which § 340(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 19521 was invoked to sustain the jurisdiction of the district court, a decree was entered on June 11, 1957, revoking, setting aside and making void an order of said court, entered September 27, 1928, admitting Paul De Lucia, also known as Felice De Lucia, to citizenship. From that decree De Lucia has appealed.

In the denaturalization proceeding, appellee, sometimes hereinafter referred to as the government, filed its complaint on October 10, 1956 against De Lucia, and there was attached thereto an affidavit by Charles Gordon, Regional Counsel for the Northwest Region, Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice, dated August 9, 1956, as required by said § 340(a). In his affidavit Gordon deposed and said that, as said Regional Counsel, he had access to the official records of said Service, "from which the following facts appear: * * *." There follows a recital of pertinent facts as to De Lucia.

Relying on United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 76 S.Ct. 671, 100 L.Ed. 964, De Lucia contends that an affidavit showing good cause is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a denaturalization proceeding, and, while the affidavit was submitted under the pretense that it shows good cause, affiant's assertions therein are not dependent upon his knowledge, and that, although he swears that he has access to the official records of the Service, he does not claim he is the custodian thereof or that the files were complete, but he merely states his "opinion as to what may be shown by some files."

The question of the sufficiency of this affidavit has been resolved by Nowak v. United States, 78 S.Ct. 955, 963. In accordance with that decision, we hold the Gordon affidavit sufficient.

The complaint alleged that on or about April 10, 1928, pursuant to the Immigration and Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, De Lucia, who was born in Naples, Italy, on or about November 14, 1897, filed in the court below a petition for naturalization in the name of Paul Maglio, and therein prayed that his name be changed to Paul De Lucia; that on September 27, 1928 that court admitted him to citizenship.

The complaint further alleged that in his declaration of intention dated January 9, 1925, attached to and made a part of his petition, De Lucia alleged under oath that his name was Paul Maglio and that he had been born in Apricena, Italy on July 10, 1898; that in the preliminary form of the petition for naturalization dated February 21, 1928 he stated that his full, true and correct name was Paul Maglio; that he had used the name of Paul De Lucia because he "got married on that name"; that his mother's name was Torelli Nunzia Maria; that he was born July 10, 1898, in Apricena, Italy; that he arrived in the United States at New York August 10, 1920, on the SS Ryndam; and that he further alleged under oath that he had never been arrested.

The complaint further alleged that De Lucia, in his petition for naturalization aforesaid, alleged under oath that his name was Paul Maglio; that he was born on July 10, 1898 in Apricena, Italy; that he had arrived in New York at the port of New York City on August 10, 1920 on the vessel Ryndam.

The complaint charged further that the aforesaid allegations of De Lucia were false and known by him to be false in the following particulars:

(I) His name was Felice De Lucia and not Paul Maglio;

(II) He was born November 14, 1897 in Naples, Italy and not on July 10, 1898 in Apricena, Italy;

(III) His mother's name was Maria Annunziata and not Torelli Nunzia Maria;

(IV) He had been arrested and convicted of voluntary homicide under his true name of Felice De Lucia on May 18, 1917 in Naples, Italy;

(V) De Lucia's entry into the United States at New York City on August 12 (sic) 1920 was unlawful and there was not attached to his petition for naturalization a certificate of arrival for a lawful entry into the United States for permanent residence.

The complaint further charged that De Lucia assumed the identity of Paul Maglio in order to conceal his true identity, to hide from the immigration officers at the time of his arrival and from the naturalization examiners and the naturalization court the fact that he previously had been arrested and convicted for voluntary homicide in Naples, Italy; and that he had fled from Italy in order to escape arrest for a subsequent prosecution.

The complaint further charged that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, relying upon the foregoing false and fraudulent representations by De Lucia, did issue a certificate of arrival in the name of Paul Maglio, which De Lucia appended to his petition for naturalization; that the concealments and misrepresentations of De Lucia heretofore set forth were deliberately, wilfully and intentionally made in the proceedings leading to his naturalization in order to deceive the naturalization examiners and the court, and further to conceal material facts from them by failing to reveal his true identity and his record of criminality prior to entering the United States; that the concealments were further made to conceal his lack of good moral character and the defendant's lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, to prevent the making of a full and proper investigation of his qualifications for citizenship, to induce the Immigration and Naturalization Service to rely upon the false representations and concealment of the material facts, to make the unconditional recommendation to the court that his petition for naturalization be granted, and, further, to preclude inquiry by the court concerning his qualifications and eligibility for citizenship and to procure naturalization in violation of the law; that the naturalization of the said Paul De Lucia formerly known as Felice De Lucia was procured by concealment of material facts and by wilful misrepresentation, in that he deliberately and intentionally made false statements in the proceedings leading to his naturalization as set forth above.

The complaint prayed for a decree revoking and setting aside the order of the court admitting De Lucia to citizenship, and for general relief.

Defendant filed an answer denying every allegation in the complaint.

Following a trial before the court, the trial judge filed a memorandum which was ordered to constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law. De Lucia's motion for a new trial was overruled and the decree of denaturalization, from which this appeal is taken, was entered.

To establish its case the government introduced evidence, consisting of documentary exhibits, the oral testimony of various witnesses and the deposition of another. De Lucia offered no evidence.

In its memorandum, after a detailed recital of the relevant evidence, the court found (1) that defendant is the Paul De Lucia to whom a certificate of naturalization was granted September 27, 1928 and that he used the name Paul Maglio when he entered this country and when he applied for a certificate of naturalization; (2) that the government has conclusively shown that the defendant, Paul De Lucia, was not Paul Maglio, born July 10, 1898 in Apricena, Italy; (3) that he falsely assumed the name of Paul Maglio to enter this country; (4) that he committed perjury when he stated his name was Paul Maglio in the preliminary papers for citizenship and (5) thereby committed a fraud on the court, and also (6) that the evidence clearly establishes that Paul De Lucia and Felice De Lucia are one and the same person. The court further found (7) that in an application for citizenship it is indispensable that true identity be disclosed, and (8) that the unexplained use of an assumed name by this defendant thwarted investigation as to his eligibility for United States citizenship.

The court pointed out that De Lucia was present in the courtroom throughout the trial and had opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf.

The court stated as a conclusion that De Lucia had not disclosed to the Designated Examiner all the facts material to his application for citizenship and that such failure and misrepresentation foreclosed any further inquiry on the part of the naturalization office.

The court held that the use by De Lucia of a name other than his own, his failure to disclose his true identity, and the concealment of other material facts vitiates the certificate of citizenship granted to him.

While the court did not expressly indicate what it meant by the words "the concealment of other material facts", it is apparent to us from the context of the memorandum that the court had in mind De Lucia's failure to reveal his convictions for homicides in Italy prior to his coming to this country, to which the court had referred in its memorandum.

We are aware that, when the government seeks to deprive a naturalized citizen of his citizenship, it has a burden which must be met with evidence of a clear and convincing character. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 123, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796. From our examination of the record in this case we are convinced that the government has here met its burden. The district court's findings of fact are fully supported by the evidence and, therefore, we are bound by those findings.

Its conclusions of law and the decree...

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