United States v. Lujan
| Decision Date | 03 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | CR 12-0268 JB |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. OSCAR LUJAN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
Fred Federici, Stephen A. White Attorneys for the Plaintiff
LeRoy Duarte and Timothy M. Padilla & Associates and Margaret Katze, Aric G. Elsenheimer Attorneys for the Defendant.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant's Petition for a Writ of Coram Nobis, filed June 23, 2020 (Doc 57)(“Petition”). The Court held a hearing on November 6, 2020. See Clerk's Minutes, filed November 6, 2020 (Doc. 73). The primary issues are: (i) whether the Court may consider the Petition, because Defendant Oscar Lujan, in his plea colloquy to plead guilty to being a felon-in-possession, waived his collateral-attack rights under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; (ii) whether Lujan is entitled to a writ of coram nobis, because his federal conviction would be lawful today. The Court concludes that (i) Lujan's collateral-attack waiver does not bar the Court from considering his Petition, because the waiver does not mention expressly coram nobis relief, and because enforcing his collateral-attack waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice; and (ii) Lujan is not entitled to a writ of coram nobis, because, although United States v Reese, 2014-NMSC-013, 326 P.3d 454, [1] states a settled rule and Lujan may take advantage of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), on collateral review there is no factual error in Lujan's federal felony conviction and Lujan was not duly diligent in bringing his Petition. The Court, therefore, denies the Petition.
On December 9, 2005, Lujan pled no contest to one count of larceny, in violation of N.M.S.A. § 30-16-1. See State of New Mexico v. Lujan, Case No. D-1329-CR-2005-00302 at 1, Register of Actions, filed June 23, 2020 (Doc. 57-1)(“State Docket”). Lujan pled guilty to larceny over $250.00. See State Docket at 2. Today, larceny over $250.00 but less than $500.00 is a misdemeanor and any larceny over $500.00 is a felony, see N.M.S.A. § 30-16-1, but Lujan pled to a violation of N.M.S.A. § 30-16-1 before it was amended in 2006, see State Docket at 2. When Lujan pled guilty, larceny of something worth between $250.00 and $2500.00 was a fourth-degree felony. See 1987 N.M. Laws Ch. 121 § 1 ( 2006 N.M. Laws Ch. 29 § 2). Lujan received a deferred sentence. See State Docket at 2. The case was dismissed on October 12, 2007. See State Docket at 2.
On August 3, 2012, Lujan pled guilty in federal court to one count of being a felon-in-possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). See Plea Agreement at 3, filed August 3, 2012 (Doc. 45)(“Plea Agreement”). The Plea Agreement specifies:
Plea Agreement at 6. The Plea Agreement also contains a waiver of collateral-attack rights: “In addition, the Defendant agrees to waive any collateral attack to the Defendant's conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, except on the issue of counsel's ineffective assistance in negotiating or entering this plea or this waiver.” Plea Agreement at 7. The Honorable Lorenzo F. Garcia, United States Magistrate Judge for the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, accepted Lujan's plea on August 3, 2012. See Plea Minute Sheet at 1, filed August 3, 2012 (Doc. 43). The Court sentenced Lujan to 18-months' imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release. See Sentencing Minute Sheet at 1, filed November 20, 2012 (Doc. 50).
Almost two years later, on May 2, 2014, the Supreme Court of New Mexico decided United States v. Reese. In United States v. Reese, the Supreme Court of New Mexico answered a question that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified to it:
If an otherwise-qualified person has completed a deferred sentence for a felony offense, is that person barred from holding public office without a pardon or certificate from the governor, as required by N.M. Ann. § 31-13-1(E), or is that person's right to hold office automatically restored by Article VII, §§ 1, 2 of the New Mexico Constitution and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-13-1(A)(1)?
United States v. Reese, 2014-NMSC-013 ¶ 1, 326 P.3d 454, 454. The Supreme Court of New Mexico concluded that “dismissal of the criminal charges upon satisfaction of the conditions of deferment automatically restores a convicted felon's civil rights by operation of law.” United States v. Reese, 2014-NMSC-013 ¶ 50, 326 P.3d at 465. Although satisfying the conditions of deferment restores a felon's civil rights, it “does not require that the record of the conviction be erased.” United States v. Reese, 2014-NMSC-013 ¶ 49, 326 P.3d 454, 465. In other words, United States v. Reese does not hold that satisfying conditions of deferment will erase an adjudication of guilt. 2014-NMSC-013, 326 P.3d 454. See Green v. Clingman, No. CIV 18-0817, 2020 WL 5630400, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 21, 2020)(Parker, J.).
While in prison and on probation, Lujan did not file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Petition at 2. Lujan never appealed his sentence. See Petition at 2. On July 26, 2015, Lujan's term of supervised release ended. See Petition at 2.
On June 21, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States of America decided Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191. In Rehaif v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)'s requirement that someone “knowingly violates” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) --which provides that it “shall be unlawful” for certain people to possess firearms -- applies both to a defendant's conduct and a defendant's status as someone prohibited from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. at 2194. Section 922(g) lists nine categories of people, including felons and “alien[s]” who are “illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The question before the Supreme Court was, therefore, does “knowingly” mean that the United States must prove that a defendant “knew both that he engaged in the relevant conduct (that he possessed a firearm) and also that he fell within the relevant status (that he was a felon, an alien unlawfully in this country, or the like)?” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. at 2194.
In Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. at 2194, a university dismissed Hamid Rehaif after he received poor grades, which rendered him ineligible for his nonimmigrant student visa. See 139 S.Ct. at 2194. Rehaif neither entered a new university nor left the United States. See 139 S.Ct. at 2194. Rehaif later visited a firing range in the United States, where he shot two firearms. See 139 S.Ct. at 2194. Rehaif was charged with being an alien in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). See 139 S.Ct. at 2194. At Rehaif's trial, over Rehaif's objection, the trial judge instructed the jury that the United States does not have to prove that Rehaif knew he was “illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. at 2194. Rehaif was convicted and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment. See 139 S.Ct. at 2194.
The Supreme Court overturned Rehaif's conviction. See 139 S.Ct. at 2200. Writing for the majority, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court Stephen Breyer concluded that, to convict someone of a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), the United States “must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. at 2200. In other words, the Supreme Court decided that “knowingly” in 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2) attaches both to the firearm possession and to the defendant's status as a prohibited person. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. at 2200. Because the United States did not prove that Rehaif knew he was an alien as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) defines the term, he was unlawfully convicted. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. at 2194.
Lujan contends that, like Rehaif, he was convicted unlawfully because the United States did not prove that he knew he was a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) -- here, a felon. See Petition at ¶¶ 18-19, 7. Lujan, therefore, asks the Court to vacate his 2012 felon-in-possession conviction. See Petition ¶ 7, at 3. The United States does not oppose Lujan's coram nobis Petition. See United States' Response to Petition for a Write of Coram Nobis at 1, filed August 31, 2020 (Doc. 69)(“Response”)(emphasis in original).
1.The Petition.
Lujan asks the Court to grant a writ of coram nobis that would vacate his 2012 felon-in-possession conviction, because the Magistrate Judge who accepted Lujan's guilty plea did not tell Lujan that the United States must prove that Lujan knows he was a felon. See Petition ¶¶ 11-17, at 5-6. According to Lujan, Rehaif v. United States 139 S.Ct. at 2194, requires that Lujan have been told before pleading that the United States must prove that Lujan knows he is a felon. S...
To continue reading
Request your trial