United States v. La Luz-Jimenez

• Decision Date: 18 January 2017
• Docket Number: CRIMINAL NO. 14–719 (GAG)
• Citation: 226 F.Supp.3d 79
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Christian LA LUZ–JIMENEZ [3], Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

226 F.Supp.3d 79

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Christian LA LUZ–JIMENEZ [3], Defendant.

CRIMINAL NO. 14–719 (GAG)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed January 18, 2017

Julia Diaz–Rex, United States Attorneys Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Victor A. Ramos–Rodriguez, Victor A. Ramos Rodriguez Law Office, Carolina, PR, for Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GUSTAVO A. GELPI, United States District Judge

Magistrate Judge Camille Velez Rivé's Report and Recommendation on Defendant Christian La Luz Jimenez's Motion to Suppress (Docket No. 352) is hereby ADOPTED in its entirety. The undersigned has reviewed the Government's objection (Docket No. 355) and Defendant La Luz's opposition thereto. (Docket No. 361), as well as the transcript of the hearing. (Docket Nos. 344 & 345).

Applying a de novo standard of review, I hereby accept and adopt as my own Judge Velez Rivé's factual findings. Further, I find that her legal conclusions are indeed correct.

In sum, I hold that Defendant La Luz's proffer is protected by the FED. R. CRIM . P. 11, and hence, cannot be used against him at trial. Defendant La Luz's Motion to Suppress at Docket No. 248 is hereby GRANTED .

SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CAMILLE L. VELEZ–RIVE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

On August 13, 2015, a federal Grand Jury returned a three count Indictment against defendant Christian La Luz–Jiménez [3] ("Defendant La Luz"), and two other co-defendants, charging them with aiding and abetting, in interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of Title 18, United States Code , Sections 1951 and 2; aiding and abetting in the use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of Title 18, United States Code , Sections 924(c) and (j) and 2; and aiding and abetting in the theft of a firearm, in violation of Title 18, United States Code , Sections 924(I) and 2. (Docket No. 221).

On October 15, 2015, Defendant La Luz filed a Motion to Suppress moving the Court to suppress all post-arrest statements made by Defendant La Luz because they were given pursuant to use immunity under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 or what is commonly known as a "proffer letter." In essence, Defendant La Luz posits that everything that he said after his attorney Víctor Ramos–Rodríguez orally agreed with the Government to submit to debriefings, whether video recorded or not, is covered by the protections of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 and they cannot be used against Defendant La Luz in the government's case in chief, regardless of whether the verbal agreement was received in writing during the course of the interviews. (Docket No. 248).

On October 26, 2015, the government filed its Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress arguing Defendant's statements are admissible because Defendant understood his rights, waived them and made a confession statement while aware the proffer was not in effect and in the presence of counsel. (Docket No. 252).

On the same day, the presiding District Judge referred Defendant La Luz' Motion to Suppress to this United States Magistrate Judge for hearing and report and recommendation. (Docket Nos. 254 and 255).

On November 4, 2016, Defendant filed a Reply to the Government's Response re-asserting the arguments he made in his Motion to Suppress and moving the Court to suppress all post-arrest statements as inadmissible. (Docket No. 261).

After several motions to continue, on January 14, 2016, the suppression hearing was held. The direct examination of FBI SA Devin Kowalski ("SA Kowalski") began. Several exhibits were admitted. Due to some mistakes in the transcript and translation of the video, the suppression hearing was continued to make the necessary corrections. (Docket No. 285).

On January 28, 2016, the suppression hearing was called but not held. Defense counsel and the prosecutor met in chambers to discuss the status of the transcript. The parties requested the continuance of the suppression hearing in light of the issues with the transcript. (Docket No. 291).

After some procedural matters, a Status Conference was held on April 4, 2016 with defense counsel and AUSA Jeanette Mercado, who was the new AUSA assigned to the case. The status of the transcript was discussed. The parties requested additional time to meet and reach an agreement as to the portions of the transcript in dispute. (Docket No. 304).

After several continuances were requested and granted, on October 19, 2016 the suppression hearing was held. The testimony of SA Kowalski continued on behalf of the government and the government then submitted its case. Defense counsel called attorney Ramos–Rodríguez to testify. Direct and cross-examination conducted. Defendant submitted his case. The Government called SAUSA Normary Figueroa–Rijos ("SAUSA Figueroa") as a rebuttal witness. Arguments were heard from the parties. (Docket No. 340).

On November 3, 2016, an Order was issued requesting the parties to file post-hearing briefs in thirty (30) days, including the applicability to this case of United States v. Deantoni , 171 F.Supp.3d 477 (E.D. Virginia 2016). (Docket No. 341). Both parties timely complied. (Docket Nos. 346 and 350).

APPLICABLE LAW

The government did not present any case law contrary to the case law submitted by Defendant La Luz in his Motion to Suppress and subsequent motions, which is applicable to proffer letters. The government briefly mentioned some of the case law submitted by Defendant on proffer agreements and cited other case law on Miranda warnings and the voluntariness of statements. Finding the case law submitted by Defendant La Luz in the Motion to Suppress to be on point, and not to re-invent the wheel, the relevant portions of the same are incorporated herein below from Docket No. 248, pages 2–5.

The government may offer a defendant use immunity in exchange for his proffered statements, and statements made by defendants during proffer sessions or pursuant to proffer letters or agreements are inadmissible at trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 ; Fed.R.Evid. 410 ; United States v. Vélez , 354 F.3d 190, 194 (2d. Cir. 2004). "The underlying purpose of Rule 410 is to promote plea negotiations by permitting defendants to talk to prosecutors without sacrificing their ability to defend themselves if no disposition agreement is reached." United States v. Barrow , 400 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2005). It should go without saying that, once the government requests and agrees to debrief a suspect or a defendant under Rule 11, it must dutifully honor its obligation not to use the defendant's statements against him in its case in chief at trial.

"It is well-settled that proffer and plea agreements are construed according to principles of contract law." United States v. Pollack , 91 F.3d 331, 334 (2d Cir. 1996). "[O]nce a defendant's good-faith compliance with the terms of the agreement is established, the state must perform on its side and any attempt by the state to breach the agreement is per se a bad faith prosecution." Rowe v. Griffin , 676 F.2d 524, 528 (11th Cir. 1982). In determining whether a plea agreement has been breached, we look to the reasonable understanding of the parties and resolve ambiguities against the government. In re Altro , 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999).

To establish entitlement to relief from prosecution on this basis, "the defendant bears the burden of proving that there was a mutual manifestation of assent—either verbally or through conduct—to the agreement's essential terms." United States v. Jiménez , 256 F.3d 330, 347 (5th Cir. 2001). Such an agreement may be unwritten, based upon oral statements. Id . It may also be implied from the circumstances. Hercules v. United States , 516 U.S. 417, 424, 116 S.Ct. 981, 134 L.Ed.2d 47 (1996) ; United States v. Barford , 2004 WL 5645086 (E.D. Missouri).

Even assuming arguendo that there was some flaw in the ironing out of the circumstances under which a defendant's post-arrest statements would be taken, the defendant would still be entitled to relief. "Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 6001 –6005, a formal grant of testimonial immunity in the federal system can only be made by the Attorney General of the United States, with approval of the court, pursuant to express statutory authorization. However, courts have developed the concept of "nonstatutory" immunity whereby the courts will enforce informal or procedurally flawed grants of immunity on equitable grounds. Rowe v. Griffin , 676 F.2d at 524 ; United States v. Weiss , 599 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1979) ; United States v. Calimano , 576 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1978) ; United S t ates v. Sanderson , 498 F.Supp. 273 (M.D. Fla. 1980) ; United States v. D'Apice , 664 F.2d 75, 78 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981). These cases indicate that, where the government has entered into an agreement with a prospective defendant and the defendant has acted to his detriment or prejudice in reliance upon the agreement, "as a matter of fair conduct, the government ought to be required to honor such an agreement." Rowe v. Griffin , 676 F.2d at 527." United States v. Carpenter , 611 F.Supp. 768, 775 (N.D. Georgia 1985).

In United States v. Melvin , 730 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2013), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had occasion to review the parameters which apply to the use immunity provisions contained in the standard government proffer letters. "Informal immunity agreements, such as proffer agreements, ‘are shaped by the language of the contract conferring the immunity.’ United States v. Hogan , 862 F.2d 386, 388 (1st. Cir. 1988). The meaning of the proffer agreement presents a question of law, which engenders de novo review. See, e.g. , United States v. Atwood , 963 F.2d 476, 478 (1st Cir. 1992). In performing this interpretative task, we are guided chiefly by contract law principles. See United States v. McLaughlin , 957 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1992) ; Hogan , 862 F.2d at 388." See also , United States v. Jiménez–Benceví , 788 F3d. 7, 15...