United States v. Lydecker, 2510.

• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Western District of New York
• Citation: 275 F. 976
• Decision Date: 02 August 1921
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. LYDECKER et al.
• Docket Number: 2510.

275 F. 976

UNITED STATES
v.
LYDECKER et al.

No. 2510.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

August 2, 1921

[275 F. 977]

Francis E. Kerwin, Assistant United States Attorney, of Buffalo, N.Y.

Frank C. Ferguson, and Andrew B. Gilfillan, both of Buffalo, N.Y., for petitioner.

HAZEL, District Judge.

On the petition of the defendant Lydecker the United States was required to show cause why the indictment against the defendants should not be quashed on the ground: First, that books and papers were illegally seized from the custody of the petitioner by Post Office Inspector Mulherin; and, second, that an incriminating confession was extorted from him prior to his arrest. It is demanded that the illegally seized papers and documents, together with the confession, should be returned to the petitioner, or the confession suppressed, and inspection of the grand jury minutes had by the defendants.

The affidavit of the petitioner tends to show that a confession or written admission of a conspiracy to defraud the United States, signed by him, was procured by intimidation, promises of leniency, force, and under duress, in violation of his constitutional rights, and that such confession and seizure of papers was and is the basis of the indictment.

It is claimed that the affidavits in opposition show that the petitioner confessed and admitted his participation in the fraud of the United States freely and voluntarily, without any threats or promises to induce the confession.

If the petitioner's version of the restraint and cross-questioning and promises is true, his constitutional rights unquestionably were [275 F. 978] flagrantly violated. There is no doubt that when a defendant freely and voluntarily confesses or admits his complicity in crime, with knowledge that he is not required to do so, his confession and admissions may be used as evidence against him. The paramount question always is whether a defendant freely and voluntarily confessed or admitted his crime or participation therein.

On the theory that the moving affidavits disclose a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights it is insisted that under the doctrine of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385, 40 Sup.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A. 1915B. 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177, Adams v. N.Y., 192 U.S. 585, 24 Sup.Ct. 372, 48 L.Ed. 575, Wiggins v. U.S. (C.C.A.) 272 F. 41, and Gouled v. U.S., 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. . . ., the confession must be returned to the petitioner or suppressed before trial. But the authorities cited do not so hold. In them the court dealt with the unlawful seizure of books and papers or other subjects of evidence illegally taken, but they do not, either expressly or by implication, require the return of a signed confession, even though made in violation of constitutional rights. Although it is true that seizing one's books and papers and extorting a confession of crime to be used on the trial are both violations of fundamental rights, yet these personal rights and guaranties are not controlled by the same evidential rule. The principle of return of documents and property illegally taken from the accused is based upon the assumption that their seizure was due to an unreasonable and unlawful search and seizure, made without due process of law, while a confession or the admission of crime is usually an oral narration or...