United States v. Lynch
| Docket Number | 16-12638 |
| Decision Date | 01 August 2023 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMUEL LEE LYNCH, REO THOMAS NANCE, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
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Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cr-00171-SCB-JSS-1 Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and TJOFLAT Circuit Judges.
A jury in the Middle District of Florida convicted Appellants Samuel Lee Lynch and Reo Thomas Nance of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of § 1951(a); discharging or brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii); and being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court sentenced Lynch to life in prison and Nance to 624 months in prison.
Lynch and Nance both argue on appeal that their Hobbs Act robbery convictions are not predicate crimes of violence for purposes of their § 924(c) convictions. Lynch also argues that his previous Florida felony convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon are not predicate offenses for his sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G § 4B1.1 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e) and 3559(c). After careful review, we affirm.
We review de novo whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c). Steiner v. United States, 940 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). However, an argument raised for the first time on appeal is reviewed only for plain error. United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2014). Similarly, where a defendant fails to clearly state the grounds for his objection in the district court, we review only for plain error. United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2014). To establish plain error, a defendant must show "(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights." Rodriguez, 751 F.3d at 1251-52 (quoting United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005)). Plain error review is discretionary, but "the court of appeals should exercise its discretion to correct the forfeited error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 195, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
To satisfy the plain error rule, an asserted error must be clear from the plain meaning of a statute or constitutional provision, or from a holding of this Court or the Supreme Court. United States v. Morales, 987 F.3d 966, 976 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 500 (2021). Even if an error was not "'plain' at the time of sentencing, . . . it is enough that the error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997)).
A plain error affected a defendant's substantial rights if it was prejudicial, meaning the error actually made a difference in the defendant's sentence. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300. If the appellate court would have to speculate that the result would have been different, the defendant has not met the burden to show that his substantial rights have been affected. Id. at 1301.
In this case, neither Lynch nor Nance argued in the District Court-in their motions for judgment of acquittal or otherwise- that their convictions for Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as crimes of violence under § 924(c). Instead, they maintained throughout the proceedings below that they were innocent of the underlying crimes. And while both objected to the entirety of the relevant offense conduct in their respective presentence investigation reports ("PSR"), they did so only on the broad grounds that they were factually innocent on all counts of conviction. Accordingly, Lynch and Nance have not properly preserved this issue for appeal, and so we review only for plain error.
Id. § 924(c)(3). We refer to § 924(c)(3)(A) as the "elements clause," and § 924(c)(3)(B) as the "residual clause." See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 924 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2019).
Lynch and Nance were convicted under § 924(c) for brandishing a firearm during the commission of a Hobbs Act robbery. Lynch was also convicted for discharging a firearm during the commission of a Hobbs Act robbery. They maintain that those convictions are invalid because Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). In United States v. St. Hubert, we rejected a similar challenge to a defendant's § 924(c) conviction and held that Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of violence under both the elements clause and the residual clause of § 924(c)(3). 909 F.3d 335, 344-46 (11th Cir. 2018), abrogated in part by United States v Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019); see also In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2016) ("Hobbs Act robbery . . . clearly qualifies as a 'crime of violence' under the [elements] clause in § 924(c)(3)(A).").
The Supreme Court subsequently held in United States v. Davis that the residual clause of § 924(c) was unconstitutionally vague, thus abrogating that portion of our holding in St. Hubert. 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). But the remaining St. Hubert holding-that Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of violence under the elements clause-remains unaffected, and we are bound by it.
Because our binding precedent forecloses Lynch and Nance's argument that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)'s elements clause, their argument fails the second prong of plain error review. The District Court, then, did not plainly err and their § 924(c) convictions are affirmed.
Turning to Lynch's second argument, we review a district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Perez, 943 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). In particular, we review the legal standard de novo, the district court's findings of fact for clear error, and the district court's application of the legal standard and Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo. Id. at 1332-33. But if a defendant fails to object to the PSR and his sentence with the requisite "specificity and clarity" to alert the government and the district court to the mistake complained of on appeal, we review only for plain error. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d at 824. As explained above, Lynch objected to the allegations in the PSR only on the broad ground that he was not guilty of any of the crimes of which the jury convicted him. And at sentencing, he reiterated only his "general global denial" to the factual allegations in the indictment and the PSR. As such, Lynch did not properly preserve his sentencing challenges for appeal, and we review only for plain error.
Lynch challenges his sentencing enhancements under the "career offender" enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1,[1] the Armed Career Criminal Act (the "ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1),[2] and the federal "three strikes" statute, id. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i).[3] The District Court found that Lynch was a career offender and an armed career offender, and additionally that the counts for Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and discharging and brandishing a firearm all carried mandatory minimum life sentences, based on his three previous Florida convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon, and robbery.
The Court thus sentenced Lynch to (1) concurrent life sentences on the Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery counts, pursuant to § 3559(c)(1)(a)(i); (2) 15 years to life imprisonment on the felon-in-possession counts, to run concurrently with the life sentences, pursuant to § 924(e)(1); and (3) two additional life sentences for brandishing and discharging a firearm in connection with the Hobbs Act robberies, to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to the other sentences, pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(ui) and § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). We first consider the District Court's application of the career offender enhancement and the ACCA to Lynch's sentence; we then turn to the Court's application of the three strikes statute.
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