United States v. M. M.
| Decision Date | 02 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-2788,20-2788 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. M. M., Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Quin M. Sorenson ARGUED, Frederick W. Ulrich, Office of Federal Public Defender, 100 Chestnut Street, Suite 306, Harrisburg, PA 17101, Counsel for Appellant
Michelle L. Olshefski ARGUED, Bruce D. Brandler, Acting United States Attorney, Office of United States Attorney, 235 North Washington Avenue, P.O. Box 309, Suite 311, Scranton, PA 18503
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge,* MATEY and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
We generally "look with disfavor upon changes to a judgment after the fact."
United States v. Bennett , 423 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2005). Appellant M. M. pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful distribution of fentanyl resulting in death, a crime that carries a statutory mandatory minimum sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The District Court sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment and then, in response to the Government's motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), amended the sentence to 180 months. M.M. appeals, arguing the District Court improperly applied Rule 35(a). We agree. Because we hold the authority to amend a sentence under Rule 35(a) to be very narrow and conclude there was no clear error in the original sentence, we will vacate the revised sentence and remand.
In 2017, a man was found dead on the bathroom floor of his grandparents' house. Next to his body were his cell phone and twenty-two small wax bags containing fentanyl-laced heroin, stamped "WI FIGHT?" J.A. 66. An autopsy report later showed that the victim overdosed on fentanyl
and heroin.
After further investigation, police officers determined that M.M. was the victim's drug dealer. A search of the victim's phone revealed an exchange of text messages between the victim and M.M. from the day before the overdose about a delivery of "one to two bundles" or "ten to twenty bags of heroin" to the victim from M.M. Id. Additionally, the victim told his grandfather, who confronted him about his drug abuse a few days prior to the overdose, that he was getting the drugs from M.M. Lastly, in 2017, police officers arrested M.M. and found in his possession fifteen drug bags that were identical to the ones found next to the victim's dead body, each stamped with "WI FIGHT?" Id.
A grand jury indicted M.M. on one count of intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of distribution of a controlled substance resulting in death, id. § 841(b)(1)(C). He pleaded not guilty.
A few months later, M.M. agreed to cooperate and entered into a plea agreement with the Government. In return, the Government, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), agreed to recommend a departure below the applicable mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months if M.M. provided "substantial assistance" in the Government's investigation of others. M.M. then pleaded guilty to distribution of a controlled substance resulting in death.
Based on its agreement with M.M., the Government moved for a downward departure of 24 months from the mandatory minimum, asking for a 216-month term. At a closed hearing prior to sentencing, the District Court granted the downward departure motion after evaluating factors related to M.M.'s cooperation with the Government. The District Court did not specify the extent of the departure.
Later the same day, at an open sentencing hearing, M.M. argued for a term below the adjusted departure proposed by the Government. He invoked § 3553(a) factors, including his addiction and psychological issues related to his upbringing. He also suggested the Government's recommended sentence was greater than necessary. The District Court noted its obligation to impose an individualized sentence, and it discussed § 3553(a) factors such as M.M.'s drug and alcohol dependence, his mental and emotional condition, and the quantity of drugs involved in the distribution resulting in the victim's death. It then stated it would "vary below the guideline range due to a holistic consideration" of these factors, but it did not mention M.M.'s cooperation or the mandatory minimum. J.A. 67. The District Court then sentenced M.M. to a term of 120 months.
Eleven days after the sentencing, the Government filed a motion to correct the sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a), arguing that § 3553(e) does not allow the District Court to reduce a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum based on considerations unrelated to the defendant's substantial assistance to law enforcement authorities. The District Court agreed that clear error had occurred and that it improperly considered the § 3553(a) factors by reducing the sentence further than M.M.'s substantial assistance warranted. It clarified that M.M.'s substantial assistance entitled him to a departure to 180 months' imprisonment, not 120. The District Court stated that reducing M.M.'s sentence any further would violate our holding in United States v. Winebarger , 664 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2011).
M.M. timely appealed.
M.M. contends the District Court erred by granting the Government's Rule 35(a) motion to amend his sentence. He argues there was no clear error at the original sentencing that would justify amendment. "The legal question of whether the District Court had the authority to amend its sentence is subject to plenary review." United States v. Bennett , 423 F.3d 271, 274 (3d Cir. 2005).
Generally, a district court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 819, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ). "The principle of finality underlies the rule that a court may not substantively alter a judgment." United States v. DeLeo , 644 F.2d 300, 301 (3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam). That is why "we look with disfavor upon changes to a judgment after the fact." Bennett , 423 F.3d at 276. However, a district court may amend a sentence in certain limited circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One circumstance is under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which provides that "[w]ithin 14 days after sentencing, [a] court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error."
There is no issue as to whether the District Court committed "arithmetical" or "technical" error by using factors unrelated to M.M.'s substantial assistance to reduce the sentence below the mandatory minimum. Neither party argues that it did. Rather, the parties dispute whether the District Court committed "other clear error" in imposing M.M.'s original sentence. We conclude it did not. Rule 35(a) offers an exceedingly narrow basis to correct a sentence. Although the District Court may have erred in applying the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to M.M.'s sentence, this error was not clear.
To answer the question of what can be considered "other clear error" within the meaning of Rule 35(a), "we begin, as with any interpretive exercise, with the text of the rule." Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y. , 682 F.3d 213, 225 (3d Cir. 2012) ( Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). This approach holds true for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Impounded , 277 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2002) (); accord United States v. Owen , 500 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
In its entirety, Rule 35(a) reads: "Within 14 days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error." The Rule does not define "other clear error." The Advisory Committee's notes, although "not authoritative," offer "insights into the proper interpretation of a Rule's text." Black v. United States , 561 U.S. 465, 475, 130 S.Ct. 2963, 177 L.Ed.2d 695 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A. , 560 U.S. 538, 557, 130 S.Ct. 2485, 177 L.Ed.2d 48 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). Here, they explain that clear error would "extend only to those cases in which an obvious error or mistake has occurred in the sentence" that "would almost certainly result in a remand of the case to the trial court." Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee's note to 1991 amendments. The Rule is "intended to be very narrow" and "is not intended to afford the court the opportunity to reconsider the application or interpretation of the sentencing guidelines or for the court simply to change its mind about the appropriateness of the sentence." Id. ; see also United States v. Arroyo , 434 F.3d 835, 838 (6th Cir. 2006) (). Moreover, the Committee "explicitly cautions that [ Rule 35(a) ] was not intended to be used as a method for reopening issues already decided, or to address questions related to the district court's discretion" during sentencing. United States v. Higgs , 504 F.3d 456, 462 (3d Cir. 2007).
The notes further describe the Rule as codifying the holdings of two courts of appeals decisions: United States v. Cook , 890 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Rico , 902 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1990). Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee's note to 1991 amendments. In Cook , the Fourth Circuit dealt with a patently illegal sentence; a district court had sua sponte corrected a sentence that was not authorized by the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. 890 F.2d at 674–75. And in Rico , the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's correction of a sentence that mistakenly deviated from the court-accepted plea agreement. 902 F.2d at 1066–68. The sentence was illegal because it effectively rejected the...
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