United States v. Mackenzie

Decision Date27 October 2021
Docket NumberCRIMINAL ACTION 3:00-cr-04-DJH-HBB
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. BRUCE C. MACKENZIE, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SENTENCE REDUCTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (COMPASSIONATE RELEASE)

David J. Hale, Judge.

Upon motion of Defendant Bruce C. Mackenzie for a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and in light of recent Sixth Circuit decisions that directly address arguments identical to the ones raised by the defendant, the Court will deny Mackenzie's motion for compassionate release.

I.

Mackenzie pleaded guilty in March 2000 to five counts of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) and two counts of using a firearm while committing a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).[1] (Docket No. 18; D.N. 74, PageID # 208-09) Mackenzie was sentenced to 471 months in prison.[2] (Id., PageID # 209) Eighty-seven of those months were for his five armed-robbery convictions. (D.N. 20) As for the other 384 months, the then-applicable version of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) required the district court to impose a consecutive sentence for each of Mackenzie's two convictions for using a firearm during a crime of violence; his first § 924(c) conviction triggered an eighty-four-month mandatory sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000) (mandating a sentence of “not less than 7 years” if a “firearm is brandished” during the commission of a “crime of violence”), and his second such conviction triggered a 300-month mandatory sentence, see Id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2000) (amended 2018) (mandating a separate twenty-five-year consecutive sentence for each “subsequent conviction” under § 924(c)). (D.N. 20) Mackenzie's sentence was later reduced by the district court to 447 months pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). (D.N. 35; D.N. 74, PageID # 209)

Mackenzie now moves for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A).[3](D.N. 89) Given recent changes made to § 924(c)'s penalty provisions by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403, 132 Stat. 5194 5221-22, Mackenzie notes that if he were convicted of two violations of § 924(c) in the same prosecution today, he would not be subject to a mandatory, consecutive sentence of 300 months for the second such conviction. (Id., PageID # 261-62) And he argues that this “disparity” between his current sentence and the sentence he would receive under the amended version of § 924(c), “combined with [his] significant post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts, support[s] a reduction in [his] sentence to time served.” (D.N. 99, PageID # 382)

The United States disagrees with Mackenzie's contention that the First Step Act's amendments to § 924(c) warrant compassionate release. (See D.N. 94, Page ID # 353) It argues that because these amendments are non-retroactive by their express terms and because Mackenzie was sentenced well before the First Step Act's enactment in 2018, any changes made by the Act to the minimum sentences mandated by § 924(c) are “inapplicable to . . . Mackenzie.” (Id.) As a result, the government contends, Mackenzie's sentence is “neither extraordinary nor compelling, ” and allowing him “to secure retroactive application” of an expressly non-retroactive change in sentencing law would “defy” Congress's “explicit . . . intent.” (Id., PageID # 362) Furthermore, the United States maintains that in light of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), compassionate release is “improper” in Mackenzie's case because reducing his sentence would, among other concerns, fail to “reflect the seriousness of [his] crimes, deter hi[m] from criminal activity, or protect the public.” (Id., PageID # 365) The United States concedes that Mackenzie has exhausted his administrative remedies as required by § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Id., PageID # 356-57), and his motion is therefore ripe for review. See United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833-34 (6th Cir. 2020) (describing § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement as a “mandatory claim-processing rule[] that must be satisfied by a prisoner seeking compassionate release on his or her own behalf).

II.

A court considering a compassionate-release motion “must engage in a three-step inquiry.” United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 518 (6th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). It must first determine “whether ‘extraordinary and compelling circumstances warrant' a sentence reduction.” United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1107-08 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Second, the court must “find whether ‘such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.' Id. at 1108 (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)) (internal alterations omitted). Third, the court must consider “any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by [steps one and two] is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” Id. (quoting Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010)) (alterations in original); see § 3582(c)(1)(A). Given the “absence of an applicable [Sentencing Commission] policy statement for inmate-filed compassionate-release motions, ” Elias, 984 F.3d at 519, federal judges considering such motions “may skip step two of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry and have full discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling.' Jones, 980 F.3d at 1111. If each of § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s requirements is met, “the district court ‘may reduce the term of imprisonment,' but need not do so.” Elias, 984 F.3d at 518 (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Alternatively, district courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the others.” Id. at 519.

A.

Here, Mackenzie and the United States disagree about whether Mackenzie has established that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction in his sentence, see § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (See D.N. 89, PageID # 261-62; D.N. 94, PageID # 353, 359) Mackenzie asserts that [t]he extraordinary and compelling circumstances presented in his case “are the significant sentencing disparit[ies] created” by the First Step Act's amendments to the penalty provisions in § 924(c), the statute under which Mackenzie was convicted and sentenced in 2000. (D.N. 89, PageID # 261-62) The United States argues, however, that these non-retroactive amendments are inapplicable to Mackenzie and therefore cannot constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” rendering him eligible for compassionate release. (See D.N. 94, PageID # 353, 359)

Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides that “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). And the mandatory minimum sentence increases to seven years “if the firearm is brandished.” Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Before 2018, § 924(c)(1)(C) provided that [i]n the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, [a defendant] shall . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2012) (amended 2018). The Supreme Court had interpreted that provision as requiring that “the 25-year mandatory-minimum sentence attach[] when a defendant is convicted of multiple § 924(c) counts in the same proceeding.” United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733, 745 (6th Cir. 2020) (describing the holding in Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993)). Consequently, when a defendant was convicted in the same prosecution on two separate counts of using or carrying a firearm while committing a “crime of violence, ” § 924(c)(1)(A)-as Mackenzie was in 2000 (D.N. 74, PageID # 208-09)-the first conviction triggered a minimum prison sentence “of not less than 5 years” (or “not less than 7 years” if the “firearm [was] brandished”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), and the second conviction triggered a minimum sentence of “not less than 25 years, ” id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2012) (amended 2018). And the minimum sentences mandated by § 924(c) must run consecutively both to each other and to the sentence imposed for the underlying crime of violence. See § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).

The First Step Act of 2018 amended § 924(c)'s penalty provisions, however, such that “the escalating mandatory-minimum sentences for a second or subsequent § 924(c) conviction apply only to defendants who have a prior final § 924(c) conviction.” United States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755, 759 (6th Cir. 2021); see First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221-22 (2018) (codified at § 924(c)(1)(C)). In other words, under the amended law, a twenty-five-year mandatory sentence is triggered only if a defendant is convicted under § 924(c) after already having been convicted under that statute in a prior proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) (2018) (providing that a “person shall” receive a twenty-five-year minimum sentence only [i]n the case of a violation of this subsection that occurs after a prior conviction under this subsection has become final”). Mackenzie therefore correctly points out that if he were sentenced today for the same crimes to which he pleaded guilty in 2000, he would not be subject to a twenty-five-year mandatory sentence for his second § 924(c) conviction, and his prison sentence would be substantially shorter than the one he is currently serving.[4] (D.N. 89, PageID # 262)

Importantly the First Step Act's amendments to § 924(c)'s penalty provisions...

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