United States v. Madden

• Decision Date: 19 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–6072.,10–6072.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael Shane MADDEN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

682 F.3d 920

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Michael Shane MADDEN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 10–6072.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

June 19, 2012.

Francis R. Courbois, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant–Appellant.

Edward J. Kumiega, Assistant United States Attorney (Sanford C. Coats, United States Attorney, and Jonathon E. Boatman, Assistant United States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Before MURPHY, HOLLOWAY, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

I. Introduction

Michael Madden pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motions to suppress and to quash the indictment for excessive delay. He argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his detention and the subsequent search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. He argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to quash the indictment because a preindictment delay of four years violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

The district court properly denied both motions. Neither Madden's detention, nor the search of his vehicle, violated the Fourth Amendment. Madden's investigatory detention was justified by articulable and reasonable suspicion and his subsequent arrest was supported by probable cause. Moreover, the search of Madden's vehicle falls within the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In addition, the preindictment delay did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. Madden failed to show the requisite prejudice to establish a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. Furthermore, because the delay occurred prior to Madden's indictment, his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the district court's rulings.

II. Background

On March 3, 2005, Sergeant Juan Balderrama, an Oklahoma City police officer, noticed Madden's vehicle parked in the loading dock area of Grider's grocery store.¹ The engine was off and Madden was sitting in the driver's seat, drawing on a sketch pad. Officer Balderrama approached the vehicle because cars did not usually park in that location. He also thought the vehicle was illegally parked on a pedestrian walkway and in a no-parking zone. He asked Madden what he was doing and requested Madden's driver's license. Madden explained that his car had run out of fuel and he was waiting for a friend to bring him gasoline. Madden did not have his driver's license with him. Because it is a violation of both state law and city ordinance for an individual to drive without a license in his immediate possession, Officer Balderrama asked Madden to step out of his vehicle so Balderrama could investigate further. Officer Balderrama then asked or directed Madden to sit in the back of his patrol car for “investigative detention” while Balderrama obtained Madden's personal information and ran it through his computer.

Once Madden was in Officer Balderrama's patrol car, Balderrama asked Madden if he had any drugs or weapons in his vehicle and if Balderrama could search the vehicle. Madden denied having drugs or weapons in his vehicle and refused to allow the officer to search it. Officer Balderrama asked Madden if he had ever been convicted of a felony; Madden admitted he had an armed robbery conviction and had recently been released from the state penitentiary. Officer Balderrama ran a driver's license check and learned Madden had a valid Oklahoma driver's license, but also learned Madden had two outstanding municipal misdemeanor traffic warrants from 1995. Upon learning of these outstanding warrants, Officer Balderrama arrested Madden and handcuffed him.

At some point another officer arrived and he and Officer Balderrama inventoried and impounded Madden's vehicle. The search yielded a firearm and two magazine clips. After the search, Officer Balderrama transported Madden to the Oklahoma County jail.

Madden was charged in state court with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1283. On September 20, 2005, at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing on the charge, the state trial court concluded that, while Madden's arrest was proper, the search of his vehicle was invalid because the vehicle was improperly impounded and inventoried. Thus, the court sustained Madden's demurrer, suppressed the evidence found during the search, and the state felon-in-possession charge was dismissed.

On February 1, 2006, Madden pleaded guilty to two unrelated state felony drug charges. He was released from state custody on December 18, 2008. Based on the March 3, 2005 incident in Grider's parking lot, Madden was indicted on March 3, 2009 by a federal grand jury on one count of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Madden filed motions, inter alia, to quash the indictment for a speedy-trial based claim of excessive delay and suppress the firearm and ammunition as fruit of an illegal seizure and search. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued an order denying Madden's motions. Madden subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, reserving his right to appeal the district court's rulings on his motions to suppress and to quash.

On appeal, Madden asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, arguing his detention was unjustified at its inception. He also argues the subsequent search of his vehicle was not warranted as an inventory search and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. He asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to quash because the government deliberately deprived him of his right to substantive due process and a speedy trial by waiting until his release from state prison—four years after the date of the firearm offense—to seek an indictment in this case.

III. AnalysisA. Motion to Suppress

In reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, this court considers the totality of the circumstances and views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir.2004). The district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. The ultimate determination of reasonablenessunder the Fourth Amendment, however, is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id.

Madden argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his detention was not justified at its inception. Specifically, he argues he was seized the moment Officer Balderrama approached his car and Balderrama lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure. The district court concluded the encounter between Officer Balderrama and Madden began as a consensual one; by the time it evolved into an investigatory detention Balderrama had reasonable suspicion justifying the detention; and Madden's eventual arrest was supported by probable cause. We agree.

This court has previously identified three categories of police-citizen encounters: (1) consensual encounters which do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative detentions which are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration and must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures and reasonable only if supported by probable cause.

United States v. Ringold, 335 F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted). As part of a consensual encounter, an officer may approach an individual, ask a few questions, ask to examine the individual's identification, and even ask for consent to search “as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). “So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.” Id. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (alteration omitted). “[T]o determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Id. at 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382. Officer Balderrama approached Madden's parked vehicle, asked Madden what he was doing, and requested Madden's driver's license. There is no evidence suggesting Officer Balderrama conveyed a message that compliance with his requests was required. See Ringold, 335 F.3d at 1172. A reasonable person in Madden's position would feel free to decline Officer Balderrama's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. See United States v. Angulo–Fernandez, 53 F.3d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir.1995); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217–18, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). Thus, the initial encounter between Madden and Officer Balderrama was consensual and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

“Of course, the nature of the police-citizen encounter can change—what may begin as a consensual encounter may change to an investigative detention if the police conduct changes and vice versa.” United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 756 n. 3 (10th Cir.1993). In this case, what began as a consensual encounter became an investigative detention when Officer Balderrama asked Madden to step out of his vehicle and then asked or directed Madden to sit in the back of his patrol car while he obtained Madden's personal information and ran it through his computer. The district court...