United States v. Maddox
| Decision Date | 29 April 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 11880.,11880. |
| Citation | 394 F.2d 297 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Raymond MADDOX, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Benjamin L. Brown, Baltimore, Md. (John R. Hargrove, and Howard & Hargrove, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellant.
Paul M. Rosenberg, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Stephen H. Sachs, U.S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.
Before SOBELOFF, BRYAN and CRAVEN, Circuit Judges.
Primarily on the strength of the testimony of a confessing accomplice, defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 659 of the theft from a Baltimore warehouse of 24 one hundred-pound bags of sugar, worth more than $100. His appeal raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to connect him with the theft, and (2) whether, at the time of the theft, the stolen goods constituted a part of an interstate or foreign shipment.1
Landborn Company, a sugar broker and sole agent for the sale of Hi-Glo sugar in the United States, with principal offices in New York City, regularly purchased large quantities of sugar through an agent in Puerto Rico. The size of each order depended on the anticipated needs of its various customers who would enter into purchase agreements months before the actual delivery. The price was determined at the time of the contract, and was unaffected by any subsequent market fluctuations. Pursuant to their contracts, the customers were then obligated to arrange for the delivery of their orders within an agreed period from the date of arrival at the port of Baltimore.
Customarily, sugar was shipped to Landborn as consignee, the waybills carrying the notation "Order of Shipper notify — Landborn and Company, 99 Wall Street, New York 5, N. Y." After the ships docked in Baltimore, and the sugar for the region was unloaded, 40% to 60% of each shipment was picked up by regular customers directly from the pier, under release orders from Landborn. Of the remainder, which would be removed from the pier and temporarily stored in the Phillips Brothers Warehouse in Baltimore, approximately 70% was held to meet pre-existing contracts with buyers serviced by the port of Baltimore. While the precise number is unknown, appellant admits that "many" of the predetermined buyers were located in the surrounding states of Virginia, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia.
An investigation by the manager of the Phillips Brothers Warehouse disclosed a shortage in the sugar inventory, and shortly thereafter a fellow employee at the warehouse confessed his complicity and implicated appellant in the theft. The accomplice, Franklin Williams, testified that he was approached by defendant and asked if he did any "hustling." He further stated that he assisted defendant in loading bags of sugar on defendant's truck and estimated that over a three month period Maddox removed approximately 220 bags, which corresponds very closely to the number found to be missing.2
As to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant contends that since Williams was an accomplice, his testimony, while admissible, must be closely scrutinized. In this connection, he points to the fact that Williams gave several contradictory statements.
In federal prosecutions, the testimony of an accomplice may be sufficient to sustain a conviction even though not corroborated, if it generates a belief beyond a reasonable doubt. Gormley v. United States, 167 F.2d 454 (4 Cir. 1948); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company v. United States, 260 F.2d 397 (4 Cir. 1958). In the instant case, however, the District Judge who tried the case without a jury had more than Williams' testimony on which to base a finding of guilt. His story was corroborated in some measure by three warehouse employees who testified that they had been approached by the defendant with offers to pay them money if they would help load bags of sugar on his own truck. Also, the conversation between Maddox and one of these employees was overheard by a third person who testified at the trial.
That Williams gave various inconsistent statements during the period of investigation did not compel the trial judge to disregard his entirely consistent in-court testimony. It is not...
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McElroy v. United States
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