United States v. Mallides, PC 71-2571.
| Decision Date | 01 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. PC 71-2571.,PC 71-2571. |
| Citation | 339 F. Supp. 1 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alexander Manuel MALLIDES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Harry D. Steward, U. S. Atty., Lyn I. Goldberg, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
J. David Franklin, San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States Magistrate's Court for the Southern District of California adjudging appellant to be guilty as charged in a complaint alleging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Prior to trial appellant signed a consent to be tried by the United States Magistrate.
The jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court was based upon Rules 1 and 3 of the Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Minor Offenses before United States Magistrates. Jurisdiction of this Court rests upon Rules 8 and 11 of those Rules.
The appellant was charged with aiding and assisting the entry of three named and two unnamed aliens in that he did pick up and transport said aliens from San Diego to Oceanside, en route to Los Angeles, when he was apprehended by officers of the Oceanside Police Department, and that he had reason to believe that said aliens were in the United States contrary to law.
The Court found the appellant guilty as charged following a trial without a jury. The appellant was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for a period of 15 days pursuant to 18 U.S. C. § 4082.
The appellant specifies three errors on appeal: 1) that he was unlawfully detained by state law enforcement officers; (2) that evidence seized as a result of that unlawful detention should have been suppressed; 3) assuming that the defendant had knowledge that the persons he had transported were unlawfully in the country, the undisputed facts of the case do not show that appellant aided or assisted the illegal entry.
The lawfulness of the detention must be determined with reference to state law. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948); Wartson v. United States, 400 F.2d 25 (9th Cir.1968). The state standards must comport with federal constitutional standards as articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968): "Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure ... `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?"
Relying upon that standard, the California courts have developed a three-fold test for judging the reasonableness of detentions. To justify a temporary detention there must be (1) a rational suspicion by the peace officer that some activity out of the ordinary is or has taken place; (2) some indication to connect the person under suspicion with the unusual activity, and (3) some suggestion that the activity is related to crime. Irwin v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 423, 82 Cal.Rptr. 484, 462 P.2d 12 (1969); People v. Henze, 253 Cal.App. 2d 986, 61 Cal.Rptr. 545 (1967).
That test does not differ materially from that currently in use in the Ninth Circuit.
We take it as settled that there is nothing ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens under circumstances not justifying an arrest, for purposes of limited inquiry in the course of routine police investigations. Citations omitted. A line between reasonable detention for routine investigation and detention which could be characterized as capricious and arbitrary cannot neatly be drawn. But due regard for the practical necessities of effective law enforcement requires that the validity of brief, informal detention be recognized whenever it appears from the totality of the circumstances that the detaining officers could have had reasonable grounds for their action. A founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing.
Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir.1966).
The factors presented to the trial court upon which the detention was based were the following: The appellant's car was spotted in an isolated area. The arresting officers had never seen cars in that location at that time before. There had been numerous thefts in the area. The occupants of the vehicle appeared to be "six Mexican-appearing males." The occupants of the car were sitting in what the officers described as a rigid position, one that they had never seen before. Their eyes were straight ahead, they did not turn to look at the police car as it passed them, and the occupants were all completely motionless. The arresting officer had two years of experience, including from 20-to-30 arrests on alien charges in the Oceanside area.
Based upon these factors, it does not appear that this detention constituted a constitutional violation under the standards in Terry, Wilson, or the California cases. In the words of the Terry decision, the officers in this case could point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences reasonably warranted a detention. The facts known to the officer were such as to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action in detaining the vehicle was appropriate. As stated in Wilson, it appears that the facts within the knowledge of the detaining officers did create a "founded suspicion," and it does not appear that the detention was arbitrary or harassing.
Accordingly, it is the conclusion of this Court that the trial court correctly determined that the detention was valid. Since the detention was valid, it is not necessary to discuss the second issue advanced by appellant in this appeal.
We move next to the third issue raised by appellant. He argues that the act of providing transportation for an alien illegally in the country, knowing that the alien is illegally in the country, from downtown San Diego to Oceanside, California, does not constitute the crime of aiding and abetting the entry of said aliens into the United States as charged in the complaint.
There are two different theories by which it can be said that the appellant aided and assisted the illegal entry. First, if the entry of the aliens into the United States had not been completed at the time that the appellant transported them from San Diego to Oceanside, with knowledge that they were illegally in the country, then the...
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United States v. Mallides
...plaintiff-appellee. Before KOELSCH, HUFSTEDLER and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges. HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge: Mallides appeals from a judgment, 339 F.Supp. 1, convicting him for aiding and abetting illegal entry of aliens (18 U.S.C. § 2; 8 U.S.C. § 1325). He argues that the evidence upon which the......