United States v. Manafort

Decision Date15 May 2018
Docket NumberCrim. Action No. 17–0201–01 (ABJ)
Citation312 F.Supp.3d 60
Parties UNITED STATES of America, v. Paul J. MANAFORT, Jr., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Andrew Weissmann, Greg Donald Andres, Kyle Renee Freeny, Adam C. Jed, Elizabeth Barchas Prelogar, Michael Richard Dreeben, United States Department of Justice Special Counsel's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

Kevin M. Downing, Law Office of Kevin M. Downing, Washington, DC, Richard William Westling, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., Washington, DC, Thomas Edward Zehnle, Law Office of Thomas E. Zehnle, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge

On May 17, 2017, the Acting Attorney General of the United States appointed Robert S. Mueller III to serve as Special Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice.1 Paragraph (b) of the Appointment Order authorized him "to conduct the investigation confirmed by then–FBI Director James B. Comey in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on March 20, 2017," including:

(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and
(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and
(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).2

As part of the Special Counsel's investigation, defendant Paul J. Manafort, Jr. was indicted on a number of charges relating to his lobbying and political consulting activities on behalf of Ukraine, the pro–Russia political party in Ukraine, and the former President of Ukraine who fled to Russia in 2014. See Indictment (Redacted) [Dkt. # 13]; Superseding Indictment [Dkt. # 201].

Defendant Manafort has moved to dismiss the Superseding Indictment.3 He contends that when the Acting Attorney General issued the Appointment Order, he exceeded limits imposed on his appointment authority by the Department of Justice Special Counsel Regulations, and that therefore, the Appointment Order, and the acts undertaken by the Special Counsel under its auspices, are invalid. Manafort also argues that even if the appointment was valid, the Special Counsel overstepped the authority he was granted when he investigated and prosecuted the particular charges in this case.

It is important to note that Manafort does not challenge the entire Appointment Order; he objects only to paragraph (b)(ii), the grant of authority to pursue "any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation," which he claims is too broad. Thus, as Manafort acknowledges, his motion does not support the dismissal of any charges if they were properly brought under paragraphs (b)(i) or (iii) of the Appointment Order. See Tr. of Apr. 19, 2018 Mot. Hr'g [Dkt. # 281] ("Tr.") at 8–9.

The motion to dismiss will be denied for a number of reasons.

First, the indictment falls squarely within that portion of the authority granted to the Special Counsel that Manafort finds unobjectionable: the order to investigate "any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign." Appt. Order (b)(i). Manafort was, at one time, not merely "associated with," but the chairman of, the Presidential campaign, and his work on behalf of the Russia-backed Ukrainian political party and connections to other Russian figures are matters of public record. It was logical and appropriate for investigators tasked with the investigation of "any links" between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign to direct their attention to him. Thus, the Departmental regulations that Manafort claims were violated by paragraph (b)(ii) of the Appointment Order are not implicated here, and the motion, which supplies no other basis to dismiss the indictment, should be denied for that reason.4

But even if one posits that the scrutiny of Manafort's alleged activities on behalf of Ukraine did not flow from the investigation of "links" to Russia that was assigned to the Special Counsel, and that instead, it was a "matter that arose" from that investigation, the indictment should not be dismissed. The second reason Manafort's motion fails is that the Department of Justice promulgated the Special Counsel Regulations for its own internal management, and they do not create any substantive rights for the benefit of individuals under investigation. This means that Manafort cannot predicate a motion to dismiss on the regulations.

Also, even if a judge were to conclude that the regulations could give rise to rights that can be enforced in a courtroom, the Acting Attorney General did not violate those regulations when he exercised his statutory authority to authorize the Special Counsel to investigate not only "links and/or coordination," but also, "any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation." The Acting Attorney General had the authority under the applicable statutes and regulations to define the Special Counsel's charter broadly. Therefore, paragraph (b)(ii) of the Appointment Order—which does not appear to bear on this indictment in any event—is not invalid on its face.

Finally, the case did not arise in a vacuum, and the Special Counsel did not create his own job description. He was appointed to take over an existing investigation, and it appears from the chronology and the written record that the matters contained in the Superseding Indictment were already a part of the ongoing inquiry that was lawfully transferred to the Special Counsel by the Department of Justice in May of 2017. More important, the Acting Attorney General has confirmed in writing that he assigned the Special Counsel the specific responsibility to investigate the very allegations that comprise the Superseding Indictment. This is exactly what the Department of Justice regulations contemplate: a specific factual statement of the matters to be investigated. So to the extent the regulations bear on this case at all, they were not violated; the management of the investigation into the allegations against Manafort has been consistent with the objectives and requirements of the set of regulations as a whole, as well as the terms of the individual regulation upon which the defendant relies.

As the Department explained when it issued the Special Counsel Regulations, the regulations were designed to "strike a balance between independence and accountability in certain sensitive investigations." Final Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,038 (July 9, 1999). The regulations recognize that there will be occasions when the Attorney General or Acting Attorney General may determine that it would be in the public interest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume responsibility for a matter. In recognition of the conflict of interest or other extraordinary circumstances that prompted the appointment, the regulations preserve the Special Counsel's day-to-day independence to structure the investigation. They expect and require that he or she will exercise prosecutorial discretion when determining what charges to bring, informed by both the experience and integrity that led to the appointment, as well as the established rules, policies, and procedures of the Department.

At the same time, the Department's Special Counsel Regulations call for ongoing communication and consultation, because the ultimate responsibility for the matter continues to rest with the Department hierarchy. When it promulgated the regulations, the Department anticipated that a Special Counsel, like any other prosecutor, could become aware of, and could have legitimate reasons to explore, paths that branch out naturally from the original investigation, as well as entirely new and disconnected allegations. The regulations establish a procedure to ensure that it is the Department of Justice, and not the Special Counsel himself or herself, who decides whether it should be the Special Counsel or attorneys within the Department of Justice who will pursue those lines of inquiry. The regulations place no boundaries on who can be investigated or what charges can be brought—what they address is who decides who the prosecutor will be. With respect to the investigation of the defendant that led to this indictment, the Acting Attorney General made that decision and confirmed it in writing, so the defendant has no grounds for complaint.

It bears emphasizing at this stage that Manafort is presumed to be innocent of these charges, and it will be the prosecution's burden to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But the indictment will not be dismissed, and the matter will proceed to trial.

BACKGROUND

On March 2, 2017, the United States Attorney General recused himself "from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United States." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-statement-recusal.

There was such an investigation underway, and on March 20, 2017, the Director of the FBI officially confirmed its existence in public testimony before an open session of Congress. He stated:

I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's efforts. As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.

Statement of FBI Director James B. Comey, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on Russian Active Measures Investigation (Mar....

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • United States v. Stone
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 1 Agosto 2019
    ...because the ultimate responsibility for the matter continues to rest with the Department hierarchy." United States v. Manafort, 312 F. Supp. 3d 60, 66 (D.D.C. 2018). But the fact that the regulation calls for a certain level of oversight and compliance with the policies and procedures of th......
  • United States v. Flynn
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 16 Diciembre 2019
    ...Counsel was tasked with taking over the existing investigation, ‘including’ ‘any links and/or coordination.’ " United States v. Manafort , 312 F. Supp. 3d 60, 72 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation omitted); cf. Mueller Report, ECF No. 79-1 at 10 ("[C]ollusion is not a specific offense or theory of lia......
  • United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 13 Agosto 2018
    ...exceeded his authority by prosecuting the particular charges against Manafort. See United States v. Manafort , No. 17-cr-0201, 312 F.Supp.3d 60, 64, 2018 WL 2223656, at *1 (D.D.C. May 15, 2018) ; United States v. Manafort , No. 18-cr-0083, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2018 WL 3126380, at *1 (E......
  • In re Grand Jury Investigation
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 31 Julio 2018
    ...600 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 509 and 510 as authority for the regulations' promulgation); United States v. Manafort , No. 1:18-cr-83, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2018 WL 3126380, at *11 (E.D. Va. June 26, 2018) ("The Special Counsel's legal authority is not grounded in the procedural regulations ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT