United States v. Mandel

• Decision Date: 13 January 1927
• Docket Number: No. 7234.,7234.
• Citation: 17 F.2d 270
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. MANDEL et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

17 F.2d 270 (1927)

UNITED STATES v. MANDEL et al.

No. 7234.

District Court, D. Massachusetts.

January 13, 1927.

Frederick H. Tarr, U. S. Atty., of Gloucester, Mass., and John V. Spalding and Clifford H. Byrnes, Asst. U. S. Attys., both of Boston, Mass., for the United States.

Daniel A. Shea, of Boston, Mass., for defendants.

BREWSTER, District Judge.

The defendants in the above-entitled case have been indicted for the illegal possession and manufacture of intoxicating liquors and for maintaining a common nuisance. Before trial they filed a motion to suppress evidence which the government proposes to offer at the trial. This evidence will consist, in part, at least, of information gained by the federal agents as a result of search and seizure upon a search warrant, which, upon the authority of United States v. Roma, 17 F.(2d) 270 (decided in this court November 22, 1926), must be declared an invalid one, for the reason that the affidavit upon which it was issued did not show the existence of probable cause.

For the purposes of the motion only, the following facts may be taken as true: Federal agents secured a warrant to search certain premises situated in Chelsea, and with it they proceeded to a barn on said premises, and there discovered the defendants operating two 500-gallon stills. The officer seized a quantity of liquor, the stills, and other property designed for use in reclaiming denatured alcohol. The government offers to show that the defendants had no interest as lessees, or owners, in the premises searched or in the property seized, that they were employed to operate the stills by the lessee of the premises, and that the owner of the premises and the lessee were persons not named as defendants. It is not suggested that the officers made any unlawful search of the persons of the defendants.

The exhibits and the information which the government proposes to offer to prove the guilt of these defendants, and which defendants now move to suppress, is the evidence obtained by federal agents acting without authority, and must therefore be declared to be evidence unlawfully obtained. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746; Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 385-40 S. Ct. 182, 65 L. Ed. 319.

The government contends notwithstanding that the evidence should be admitted, because the agents in obtaining it did not invade any constitutional rights secured to these defendants.

It is an old and familiar rule that evidence otherwise competent will not be excluded, because it may have been obtained by unlawful means. Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 495; Com. v. Dana, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 329; Com. v. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519, 32 N. E. 910; People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636, 63 L. R. A. 406, 98 Am. St. Rep. 675. And there are many cases to be found in the books where the federal courts have recognized this rule. Stockwell v. U. S., Fed. Cas. No. 13,466, 3 Cliff, 284; Adams v. N. Y., 192 U. S. 585, 24 S. Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575; Hartman v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 168 F. 30; Ripper v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 178 F. 24; Lyman v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 241 F. 945; Weeks v. U. S., supra.

But it can no longer be doubted that, when the evidence results from the activities of those representing the government, the federal courts will not adhere to this ancient rule, but will inquire into the legality of those activities (Boyd v. U. S., supra; Weeks v. U. S., supra; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S., supra; Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647; Amos v. U. S., 255 U. S. 313, 41 S. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654; Byars v. U. S., 47 S. Ct. 248, 71 L. Ed. ___; Snyder v. U. S. C. C. A. 285 F. 1; Giles v. U. S. C. C. A. 284 F. 208), especially if the defendant seasonably moves to have the evidence excluded or suppressed (Weeks v. U. S., supra; Lyman v. U. S., supra; Lum Yan v. U. S. C. C. A. 193 F. 970; Youngblood v. U. S. C. C. A. 266 F. 795).

The same may be said of certain states whose constitutional provisions are similar to those of the United States. State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261, 24 A. L. R. 1398; Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845, 24 A. L. R. 1377; Youman v. Com., 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860, 13 A. L. R. 1303.

Coming, then, to the defendants' motion, we have to consider whether the evidence which the government proposes to offer, obtained upon a technically invalid search warrant, comes within the exceptions to the general rule that the admissibility of evidence will not be affected by the manner in which it was secured.

At the outset I think it should be noted that the scope of the federal rule excluding evidence unlawfully obtained by federal agents does not go so far as to preclude the government in every case and under all circumstances from availing itself of benefits derived from the wrongdoing of its officers. It is possible to find in the opinions language which would indicate that knowledge gained by the government's own wrongdoing could not be used under any circumstances. But I am satisfied that the exceptions to the general rule admitting such evidence which have grown up in the federal courts are to be limited to such evidence as was obtained by federal agents in violation of rights secured to the defendant, and to the defendant only, by the Constitution of the United States.

It is the Fourth Amendment which protects the individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, whenever evidence is obtained by encroaching upon these rights, to offer it in evidence at the trial of the persons whose rights have been thus invaded is to compel the defendant to give evidence against himself, which comes within the inhibitions of the Fifth Amendment.

On the same principle that the constitutional guaranty against self-incriminations is violated by an extorted confession of guilt, so is it violated by the involuntary and forced yielding of private documents, papers, and information which has been gained by officers of the government acting without authority.

"His home is as sacred from illegal force as his person. When his home speaks, he speaks; they speak the same voice. The invaders of his home are barred from testifying, not only as to his forced confessions of guilt made by word of mouth, but also to such confessions made through the contents of his home and premises. The securities afforded by our Constitution against unreasonable search and seizure, and self-incrimination, are not to be given a narrow construction. * * * They are among the chief fundamentals of our system of government." Tucker v. State, supra.

In McGuire v. U. S., 47 S. Ct. 259, 71 L. Ed. ___, federal agents under valid search warrant seized a quantity of liquor which unlawfully and without right they proceeded to destroy, saving only samples for evidence. One of the questions certified to the Supreme Court by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was this: "Was the admission in evidence of the samples of liquor unlawful?" The court held the samples admissible, and in the course of the opinion Mr. Justice Stone makes this observation:

"Even if the officers were liable as trespassers ab initio, which we do not decide, we are concerned here not with their liability but with the interest of the government in securing the benefit of the evidence seized, so far as may be possible without sacrifice of the immunities guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. A criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the government may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its officers have not played according to rule. The use by prosecuting officers of evidence illegally acquired by others does not necessarily violate the Constitution nor affect its admissibility."

I think it can be taken as settled that the rule as applied in the federal court does not extend to evidence obtained by unlawful means, unless its introduction will operate to compel the defendant to involuntarily furnish evidence against himself, and that he is so compelled if the evidence is secured in violation of his rights to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizure.

We are not now concerned with the rights of the owner of the premises searched, or those of the owner of the property seized. It is only when the acts of the federal agents derogate from the rights of these defendants on...