United States v. Mangano
Citation | 299 F. 492 |
Decision Date | 06 May 1924 |
Docket Number | 6370. |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. MANGANO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
George A. Keyser, Asst. U.S. Atty., of Omaha, Neb. (James C Kinsler, U.S. atty., of Omaha, Neb., on the brief), for the United States.
E. D O'Sullivan, of Omaha, Neb. (W. N. Jamieson and C. J Southard, both of Omaha, Neb., on the brief), for defendant in error.
Before LEWIS, Circuit Judge, and BOOTH and SYMES, District Judges.
This is a writ of error seeking reversal of an order dismissing a libel, and restoring to the intervening owner an automobile libeled and seized in alleged pursuance of section 3450, R.S (Comp. St. Sec. 6352). The libel alleged that the automobile was--
'in the possession of and used by George Folker in removing from one point to another in the said city of Omaha certain quantities of narcotics, to wit, fifty-six (56) grains of morphine, a derivative of opium, the aforesaid narcotics being in unstamped packages, and which were removed as hereinbefore stated, with the intent to defraud the United States of the taxes upon the aforesaid drugs; * * * that is to say: That on the 22d day of September, 1922, the said George Folker did use the aforesaid Chalmers automobile in transporting and conveying over the streets in the city of Omaha the said narcotics, from a point in the city of Omaha aforesaid to another point in the said city of Omaha.'
The sole question in dispute is whether section 3450, R.S. is applicable to cases where an automobile is used to transport untax-paid narcotics, but which are taxable under the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of December 17, 1914 (38 Stat. 785), as amended by the Act of February 24, 1919 (40 Stat. 1130), and the Act of November 23, 1921, (42 Stat. 227, 298 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, Sec. 6287g et seq.)). Section 3450 was originally section 14, chapter 184, Act of July 13, 1866, an internal revenue act. It read as follows:
The words 'removed' and 'removal,' occurring in this section, had a definite and well-understood meaning at the time the original act was passed. Similar words occur in numerous other sections of the same act. A reading of these various sections leads to the conclusion that the words 'removed' and 'removal' had reference to a transfer from particular, specified places designated in the law-- places of production or manufacture or specified warehouses. It is clear that the word 'removed,' where it occurs in the taxing clause of section 1 of the Act of December 17, 1914, as amended, is used with the same meaning. It may well be doubted, therefore, whether the 'transportation' of narcotics, such as is specifically described in the libel in the instant case, would come within the 'removal' described in section 3450. See U.S. v. One Ford Automobile Truck (D.C.) 286 F. 204. The cases of Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. U.S., 254 U.S. 505, 41 Sup.Ct. 189, 65 L.Ed. 376, Logan v. U.S., 260 F. 746, 171 C.C.A. 484, United States v. Mincey, 254 F. 287, 165 C.C.A. 575, 5 A.L.R. 211, and United States v. Two Bay Mules (D.C.) 36 F. 84, do not hold to the contrary. The question of the meaning of the term 'removal' was not involved in these cases, for it was conceded on the record in each case that there had been a 'removal' of liquor with the intent to defraud the United States of the tax thereon.
But we prefer to rest our decision upon a broader ground. Legislation, considerable in amount and extending over many years, has been passed by the Congress of the United States relative to narcotics:
As to the manufacture, sale and possession: Act of December 17, 1914 (38 Stat. 785); Act of February 24, 1919 (40 Stat. 1132); Act of November 23, 1921 (42 Stat. 227, 298).
As to the importation of narcotics: Act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat. 621); Act of March 3, 1897 (29 Stat. 695); Act of February 9, 1909 (35 Stat. 614); Act of January 17, 1914 (38 Stat. 275); Act of May 26, 1922 (42 Stat. 596 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, Sec. 8800 et seq.)).
These two sets of statutory enactments, while independent of each other in most respects, nevertheless are brought into correlation by certain provisions of several of the enactments. These statutes, with such references to other statutes as are specifically made, constitute a fairly complete code of legislation, in regard to the manufacture, sale, possession, and importation of opium and its derivatives.
We are mainly concerned in the present case with the Act of December 17, 1914, and its amendments. This act provides a tax of one cent an ounce on opium and its derivatives. Section 1 of the act, as amended by section 1006 of the Act of February 24, 1919, as re-enacted by section 1005 of the Act of November 23, 1921. The same section provides, also, special taxes for dealers. It is unlawful to have in possession the drugs mentioned on which the taxes have not been paid. Section 8 (Comp. St. Sec. 6287n), and section 1 of the act as amended. Forfeiture of the drug is one of the penalties for such unlawful possession. Section 1 and section 1008 of the amendatory Act of February 24, 1919, as re-enacted in section 1007 of the Act of November 23, 1921 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, Sec. 6287r). Further punishment is provided in the way of fine and imprisonment for violation of any of the provisions of the act. Section 9 of the original act, as amended (Comp. St. Sec. 6287o).
The offense recited in the libel in the instant case as having been committed by Folker is plainly punishable by forfeiture of the drug, and by fine and imprisonment. It is claimed, however, that section 3450 should be considered as part of said Narcotic Act as amended by reason of the following clauses, contained in section 1 thereof:
It will be observed that these references, while not to specific sections by number, are to sections covering specific matters. The provisions as to forfeiture refer specifically to 'forfeitures of unstamped articles.' It is a rule of statutory construction that, where specific references are made in a statute to certain...
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