United States v. Mansfield

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Brennan, Circuit Judge.
• Citation: United States v. Mansfield, 21 F.4th 946 (7th Cir. 2021)
• Decision Date: 28 December 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-2981,20-2981
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathan MANSFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

21 F.4th 946

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Nathan MANSFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-2981

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued November 3, 2021

Decided December 28, 2021

M. Kendra Klump, Julian C. Wierenga, Attorneys, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Daniel J. Hillis, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Springfield, IL, Thomas W. Patton, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Peoria, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Kanne, Brennan, and Kirsch, Circuit Judges.

Brennan, Circuit Judge.

Nathan Mansfield was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to 188 months in prison. He now argues the district court erred by considering his arrest history during sentencing. But Mansfield waived this challenge when his counsel did not object to the district court's consideration of the presentence investigation report or its contents. Even if this point was not waived, a substantial history of arrests, especially if they are similar to the offense of conviction, can be a reliable factor to consider at sentencing. We therefore conclude the district court did not err when it reviewed Mansfield's arrest history.

I

In January 2019, law enforcement officers intercepted a package containing 6.6 kilograms of methamphetamine. The officers then conducted a controlled delivery to Nathan Mansfield's home, the package's original destination. Once the package was opened, the officers executed an anticipatory search warrant and arrested Mansfield as he exited the rear of the house.¹ A grand jury indicted Mansfield for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Mansfield received a copy of his presentence investigation report ("PSR") in June 2020. That report calculated a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of VI and recommended an imprisonment range under the Sentencing Guidelines of 188 to 235 months.

The PSR listed 26 "[o]ther [a]rrests" of Mansfield between 1992 to 2013. These arrests involved at least 49 charges, including, among other things, domestic battery and battery resulting in bodily injury, resisting law enforcement, felony intimidation, and neglect of a dependent. The arrests also included a series of drug possession charges in 2005, 2006, and 2007, culminating in two 2013 felony charges for "Dealing in Cocaine or Narcotic," and three 2013 felony charges for "Possession of Cocaine or Narcotic." The disposition for 48 of these charges was listed as "Dismissed," "No Action Taken," or "Unknown disposition." For the other charge—a 1999 criminal trespass charge—the disposition was listed as "Not guilty."

Mansfield entered an open guilty plea.² Less than a month before sentencing, Mansfield filed a Notice of Request for Departure Due to Role Reduction at Sentencing. This notice stated that Mansfield would request "the court depart downward and adjust his base level commensurate to his minimal role in the criminal activity that led to his arrest." The notice did not challenge the accuracy of the PSR or the inclusion of Mansfield's arrest history. Several weeks later, in advance of his sentencing hearing, Mansfield filed a sentencing memorandum. Once again, he did not challenge the accuracy of the report or the inclusion or accuracy of his arrest history. Rather, the sentencing memorandum focused on Mansfield's health, role in the crime, lack of dangerousness, and character.

At the sentencing hearing, Mansfield's counsel confirmed that she and Mansfield had "read and discussed [the] presentence report." The district court asked Mansfield's counsel if she had any objections "other than" the notice Mansfield filed, which "could be deemed as a request for departure." She confirmed there were none. The district court then explained its conclusions and asked if there was "any objection or response" to the offense level and criminal history category. She responded, "No, Your Honor, subject to my argument for departure, which I have preserved for the Court's consideration."

The district court next considered Mansfield's argument for departure and discussed the range of factors it would use to determine his sentence. Among other things, the court referenced the parties' statements, the sentencing memorandum, the probation officer's input, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. It highlighted considerations related to the § 3553(a) factors, such as the presence of two young girls at the drug bust, the current drug epidemic, past leniency during sentencing, evidence of Mansfield's desire to improve, and the potential effects of COVID-19 on Mansfield's health. In this discussion, the court made only a brief, two-sentence reference to Mansfield's arrest history:

I look at the history and characteristics of the defendant; and you do have a very long history, Mr. Mansfield. And in all of these convictions and arrests, arrests that included—that were not reduced to judgments but included domestic battery, intimidation felony, battery, neglect of a dependent, many resisting law enforcement.

Circumstances warranted a sentence at the upper end of the guideline range, the district court noted, yet it pronounced a sentence of 188 months' imprisonment, a term at the very bottom of Mansfield's guideline range. The court explained that this sentence was "sufficient but not greater than necessary to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, to reflect the seriousness of the offense, and to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct." The court then asked Mansfield's counsel whether she had a "legal objection to the [proposed] sentence" or a request for "any further elaboration ... under [§] 3553(a) as to the length of imprisonment or as to the length and/or conditions of supervised release." Once again, Mansfield's counsel stated she had none.

In imposing the sentence, the district court asked whether Mansfield had "[a]nything further." For the final time, Mansfield's counsel responded she did not. Mansfield appealed later that day and before us challenges only his sentence.

II

First, we address Mansfield's argument that United States v. Esposito , 1 F.4th 484 (7th Cir. 2021), supports de novo review of his sentence. We disagree.

Jeffrey Esposito was convicted of multiple counts of sexually exploiting a child and possessing child pornography. Id. at 485. At his sentencing hearing, the district court "pronounced Esposito's sentences, count by count, imposing six 30-year sentences to be served consecutive to each other, followed by fifteen 20-year sentences to be served concurrent with each other but consecutive to the 30-year sentences." Id. at 486. In total, Esposito was sentenced to 200 years in prison. Id. Following this pronouncement, the district court asked Esposito if he had an objection to the proposed sentence or a "request [for] any further elaboration of [the court's] reasons under Section 3553(a) as to the length of imprisonment or as to the length and/or conditions of supervised release." Id. at 486–87. Esposito "did not object" to the court's sentencing method but sought and received "clarification of the consecutive-versus-concurrent aspect of the sentences and how the 200 years was calculated." Id. at 486.

On appeal, Esposito argued the district court's decision should be reviewed de novo because his challenge was procedural. Id. (citing United States v. Ballard , 950 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Pennington , 908 F.3d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 2018) ). Our court agreed with his characterization and held that de novo review was proper under the circumstances. Id. at 487. Specifically, we reasoned that Esposito's disputes were "properly characterized as a procedural error" because they challenged the court's pronouncement and explanation of his sentence. Id. (citing Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) ; Pennington , 908 F.3d at 238 ).

As this court has concluded, "courts only elicit waiver when they ask specific questions—like whether the defendant is satisfied with the court's treatment of their main arguments in mitigation—not generalized inquiries about whether the defendant was confused or had anything else to say." Esposito , 1 F.4th at 486 (citing United States v. Speed , 811 F.3d 854, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2016) ; see also United States v. Mzembe , 979 F.3d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 2020) ("A general invitation for objections or asking, ‘anything else?’ at the end of the hearing is not sufficient, however, to show a waiver of challenges to the sufficiency of an explanation.")). The district court's inquiry at the end of Esposito's sentencing hearing was best characterized as a "broad," although "not completely general," question. Id. at 486.

The circumstances here differ substantially from those in Esposito. Mansfield had many opportunities throughout his case and at the sentencing hearing to object or to seek clarification. He was asked specifically whether he had any objection or response to the presentence investigation report, the offense level and criminal history category, or the proposed sentence. Each time his counsel stated she had none. In contrast, Esposito asked for clarification about a complicated combination of concurrent and consecutive sentences after those sentences were pronounced. Neither Esposito nor his counsel could have sought this clarification before the district court made its pronouncement.

The circumstances here did not involve the type of procedural error challenged in Esposito , so we decline Mansfield's request for de novo review.

III

We next consider whether Mansfield waived his right to challenge the use of his arrest history during sentencing. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. United States v. Flores , 929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 504, 205 L.Ed.2d 327 (2019).³ When a defendant waives an...