United States v. Marandola, Cr. No. 15-120-JJM-PAS

Decision Date29 March 2019
Docket NumberCr. No. 15-120-JJM-PAS
Citation372 F.Supp.3d 7
Parties UNITED STATES of America v. Louis MARANDOLA, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

Sandra R. Hebert, William J. Ferland, United States Attorney Office, Providence, RI, for United States of America.

William C. Dimitri, William C. Dimitri & Associates, Providence, RI, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. McCONNELL, JR., United States District JudgeLouis Marandola has petitioned this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his judgment of conviction, entered after he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft. He now claims that the Court should vacate his conviction because his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The Court has determined that no hearing is necessary. The Court finds that Mr. Marandola's Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 172) is procedurally barred and thus DISMISSES his petition.

FACTS

A federal grand jury sitting in the District of Rhode Island indicted Mr. Marandola on charges of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, (Count 1), bank fraud (Counts 2-6), wire fraud (Counts 7-9), and aggravated identity theft (Counts 10, 12-13, 15-16, and 19).1

Mr. Marandola pleaded guilty to Counts 1 and 16, in exchange for the Government's agreement to dismiss the remaining counts. The Court sentenced him to two consecutive twenty-four-month terms of imprisonment and three years' supervised release on each count, to run concurrently. Mr. Marandola did not appeal. Mr. Marandola timely filed this Motion to Vacate.

LAW
A. Section 2255

Section 2255 provides for post-conviction relief only if the court sentenced a petitioner in violation of the Constitution or lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence, if the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, or if the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. United States v. Addonizio , 442 U.S. 178, 185, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979) ; David v. United States , 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998). In trying collaterally to attack his sentence, the petitioner bears the burden of proving "exceptional circumstances" that call for redress under § 2255. See Hill v. United States , 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962) ; Mack v. United States , 635 F.2d 20, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1980). For example, an error of law must be a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Hill , 368 U.S. at 428, 82 S.Ct. 468 ; accord David , 134 F.3d at 474.

B. Procedural Default

"Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent’ of the crimes for which he was convicted." Bousley v. United States , 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (internal citations omitted); see also Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) ; Murray v. Carrier , 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). "Cause" consists of "some objective factor external to the defenses[.]" Carrier , 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639 ; see also Coleman , 501 U.S. at 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (noting that, in Carrier , "[w]e explained clearly that ‘cause’ under the cause and prejudice test must be something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him"). To show prejudice, the "habeas petitioner must show ‘not merely that the errors at ... trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’ " Carrier , 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (quoting United States v. Frady , 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) )(alteration in original); see also Derman v. United States , 298 F.3d 34, 45 (1st Cir. 2002) ("The showing of prejudice needed to cure a procedural default generally requires a habeas petitioner to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different absent the error. The question is not whether the petitioner, qua defendant, would more likely have received a different verdict had the error not occurred, but whether he received a fair trial, understood as a trial worthy of confidence, notwithstanding the bevue.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The defendant must show both cause and prejudice. Carrier , 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639 ; Derman , 298 F.3d at 45 (noting that petitioner bears burden of showing both cause and prejudice).

The "actual innocence" standard established by the Supreme Court in Carrier "requires the habeas petitioner to show that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo , 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). To show the requisite probability, "a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. A credible claim of actual innocence "requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial"). Id. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. The standard is "demanding and permits review only in the ‘extraordinary’ case." House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (quoting Schlup , 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851 ). " [A]ctual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Bousley , 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley , 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992) ). "In cases where the Government has forgone more serious charges in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner's showing of actual innocence must also extend to those charges." Id. at 624, 118 S.Ct. 1604.

ANALYSIS

As noted above, Mr. Maranclola filed the Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 172), the Government then responded (ECF No. 184), and Mr. Marandola filed a reply ECF No. 189.

Mr. Maranclola alleges that he incorrectly understood the elements of the aggravated identity theft charge to which he pleaded guilty. ECF No. 172 at 3.2 He also argues that he did not understand the statute's interpretation. Id. As a result, he contends, his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. Mr. Marandola bases his argument on the fact that when he entered his plea "he relied ... on a statute that the First Circuit, subsequently, construed as ambiguous ...." Id. at 4. The Government responds first that Mr. Marandola has procedurally defaulted his claim by not raising it on direct appeal, and, second, that the claim fails on the merits. ECF No. 184 at 1-2, 5-6. Before the Court may consider the merits of Mr. Marandola's claim, however, it must determine whether it is properly before the Court.

Mr. Marandola argues that "a Petitioner in federal custody, may attack his conviction and sentence on the grounds that it is in violation of the United States Constitution, was imposed without jurisdiction, or exceeded the maximum penalty under U.S.C. § 2255." ECF No. 189 at 1-2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). That said, the Supreme Court

ha[s] strictly limited the circumstances under which a guilty plea may be attacked on collateral review. It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked. And even the voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on collateral review only if first challenged on direct review. Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy and will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.

Bousley , 523 U.S. at 621, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Oakes v. United States , 400 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2005) ("It is a bedrock principle that, under ordinary circumstances, the voluntariness of a guilty plea can be questioned on collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 only if, and to the extent that, the plea has been challenged on direct appeal.")(citing Bousley , 523 U.S. at 621, 118 S.Ct. 1604 ). As noted above, Marandola filed no direct appeal. Thus, he has procedurally defaulted his claim. Bousley , 523 U.S. at 621, 118 S.Ct. 1604 ; Oakes , 400 F.3d at 95 ("If a federal habeas petitioner challenges his conviction or sentence on a ground that ho did not advance on direct appeal, his claim is deemed procedurally defaulted.").

Mr. Marandola's Motion may go forward if he can show either "(i) that there is cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from it, or (ii) that he is actually innocent of the offense of conviction." Oakes , 400 F.3d at 95 ; see also Bousley , 523 U.S. at 622, 118 S.Ct. 1604. Mr. Marandola argues that "the misinformation as to the term ‘use’ and its ambiguity in § 1028(A) (cause), has resulted in Petitioner being imprisoned for a mandatory minimum of 24 months (prejudice). ECF No. 189 at 12. He also asserts that he was "precluded" from filing a direct appeal by the Plea Agreement (ECF No. 101). ECF No. 172 at 2; ECF No. 189 at 1. Mr. Marandola further contends that he is "actually innocent" because "from the facts, ... his actions are not criminal ...." ECF No. 172 at 4.

Mr. Marandola argues that "at the time of Petitioner's plea of guilty, Petitioner relied on decisions of the First Circuit regarding the elements of § 1028(A);" that he "was misinformed as to the narrowed scope and element term ‘use’ within § 1028(A) as subsequently announced in Berroa ;"3 and that "[t]he ambiguity of the term ‘use’ directly impacted Petitioner's plea as unknowing and involuntary." ECF No. 189 at 15. As noted...

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