United States v. Marcrum

• Decision Date: 17 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 13–020224–JPM–1.,13–020224–JPM–1.
• Citation: 953 F.Supp.2d 877
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Cameron MARCRUM, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

953 F.Supp.2d 877

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Cameron MARCRUM, Defendant.

No. 13–020224–JPM–1.

United States District Court,

W.D. Tennessee,

Western Division.

July 17, 2013.

Chris Scruggs, U.S. Attorney's Office, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

Patricia A. Woods, Law Office of Patricia A. Woods, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff and Defendant.

ORDER DENYING BOND

JON P. McCALLA, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is the Government's Motion for Stay of Bond Order and Appeal of Magistrate Judge's Order Granting Bond in this Matter, filed June 28, 2013. (ECF No. 20.) For the following reasons, after careful consideration of the record, the relevant law, and the briefs of the parties, the Court REVOKES the Order Granting Bond and ORDERS that Defendant Cameron Marcrum be detained without bond pending trial.

I. BACKGROUND

The instant case was commenced by a three-count indictment (the “Indictment”) against Defendants Cameron Marcrum (“Marcrum”), Jonathan Martin, and Crystal McCracken on June 24, 2013. (ECF No. 3.) Marcrum was charged with the following three counts related to the distribution of a controlled-substance analogue ¹: (1) conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846; and (3) conspiracy to engage in money laundering with the intent to engage in drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) and § 1956(h). ( Id. at 1–3.)

On June 28, 2013, Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham held a detention hearing as to Marcrum. ( See ECF No. 21; ECF No. 42.) The Government asked that Marcrum “be denied bond and kept in custody until the completion of his federal case.” (Detention Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 42, at 3:23–25.) The Government called three witnesses involved with the investigation of Marcrum: Parris Quon, an agent with IRS Criminal Investigations, who testified about the investigation into Marcrum's finances ( id. at 5:1–11:20); Albert Cranor, an agent with the Postal Inspection Service, who testified about the “controlled delivery” of the controlled-substance analogue to Marcrum and the February 2012 search of Marcrum's residence and storage facility which contained controlled-substance analogues ( id. at 12:14–21:17); and Michael Ciesliga (“Ciesliga”), an agent with the West Tennessee Violent Crime and Drug Task Force, who testified about Marcrum's arrest on June 25, 2013, Marcrum's business in selling controlled-substance analogues, and bank accounts owned by Marcrum under the name “Empire Fights” ( id. at 21:22–32:22). Marcrum did not put on any proof at the hearing. ( Id. at 32:25–33:2.) After the parties presented their arguments ( id. at 33:3–41:23), the Magistrate Judge, relying on the hearing testimony and pretrial report (the “PTR”),² determined that Marcrum was entitled to release pending trial based on the appropriate § 3142(g) factors ( id. at 48:2–7). The Magistrate Judge set the bond at $50,000 to be secured by a corporate surety. ( Id. 48:22–49:6.)

On June 28, 2013, the Government filed a Motion requesting that this Court “stay the order entered on June 28, 2013, by United States Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham, which denied the Government's request for pretrial detention without bond in the instant case” and “to hold a detention hearing on this matter.” (ECF No. 20 at 1.) Following a hearing regarding the Government's Motion on July 2, 2013, this Court ordered further briefing on the bond issue. ( See ECF No. 36.) On July 8, 2013, Marcrum filed his Memorandum of Law in Support of Bail (ECF No. 40) and the Government filed its Memorandum Regarding Presumed Detention (ECF No. 41).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145, a district court may review a magistrate judge's release order on motion by the government. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a). A magistrate judge's release order is reviewed de novo. See United States v. Villegas, No. 3:11–CR–28, 2011 WL 1135018, at *4 (E.D.Tenn. Mar. 25, 2011); see also United States v. Romans, No. 00–5456, 2000 WL 658042, at *1 (6th Cir. May 9, 2000) (affirming district court that had reviewed the magistrate judge's detention order de novo). Accordingly, the Court must “engage in the same analysis, with the same options ... as the magistrate judge.” Villegas, 2011 WL 1135018, at *4 (quoting United States v. Yamini, 91 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1129 (S.D.Ohio 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A defendant should be detained without bond pending trial if a “judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). “A judicial officer's finding of dangerousness must be ‘supported by clear and convincing evidence.’ ” United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 945 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(b)).

This default standard, however, is modified where the defendant is “particularly dangerous.” Id. If a “judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the [defendant] committed” one of the crimes listed in § 3142(e)(3)(A)-(E), a presumption in favor of detention arises. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)). “A grand jury indictment, by itself, establishes probable cause to believe that a defendant committed the crime with which he is charged.” Stone, 608 F.3d at 945;accord United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir.1985). Accordingly, “when the government submits an indictment including charges listed in section 3142(e)(3), it has fulfilled its burden to establish the presumption in favor of detention.” Stone, 608 F.3d at 945.

This presumption, however, may be rebutted by the defendant. See18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). In rebutting the presumption, the defendant must come “forward with evidence that he does not pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” Stone, 608 F.3d at 945 (quoting United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the defendant has the “burden of production,” the “burden of persuasion” stays with the government. Id. The defendant's “burden of production ‘is not heavy.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir.1991)).

Even if a defendant has satisfied his burden of production, “the presumption favoring detention does not disappear entirely, but remains a factor to be consideredamong those weighed by the district court.” Id. (quoting Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether or not the presumption applies, “the government's ultimate burden is to prove that no conditions of release can assure that the defendant will appear and to assure the safety of the community.” Id. at 946. In making this determination, a court must consider the following factors: (1) the natures and circumstances of the offense; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1)-(4). “Pretrial detention can be ordered based on a judicial finding of either substantial danger to the community or risk of flight; only one is required.” United States v. Hernandez, No. 1:02–CR–006, 2002 WL 1377911, at *3 (E.D.Tenn. Feb. 27, 2002) (citing United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 765 (7th Cir.1985)).

III. ANALYSIS

The Government asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying the Government's request for pretrial detention without bond. (ECF No. 20 at 1.) The Court considers the following in turn: (1) whether the Government has raised the presumption in favor of detention without bond; (2) whether Marcrum has produced some evidence to rebut this presumption; and (3) whether the Government has met its burden of persuasion in showing that Marcrum should be detained without bond pending trial.

A. The Government Has Raised the Presumption

As previously stated, if a “judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the [defendant] committed” one of the offenses listed in § 3142(e)(3), a presumption in favor of detention without bond arises. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A)-(E). One of the listed offenses in § 3142(e)(3) is “an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. § 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). In the instant case, Marcrum is charged in the Indictment with conspiring to distribute two varieties of controlled-substance analogues in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846. (ECF No. 1 at 1–3.) If convicted of these offenses, Marcrum faces a sentence of not more than twenty years of imprisonment. (ECF No. 41 at 1; accord Detention Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 42, at 42:7–12.) Accordingly, there is probable cause, based on the Indictment, to believe that Marcrum committed one of the offenses listed in § 3142(e)(3). See18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). Therefore, the statutory presumption in favor of detention is triggered. ( See Detention Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 42, 42:13–18.)

B. Marcrum Has Rebutted the Presumption

The Government argues that Marcrum has not submitted sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of detention and, as a result, Marcrum should be detained without bond pending trial. (ECF No. 41 at 2.) In support, the Government asserts that at the previous hearings, Marcrum did not submit any evidence to the Court to show that he is neither “particularly dangerous” nor poses a “risk of flight.” ( Id.)

Marcrum asserts that he has produced some evidence that he will appear and that he will not pose a threat to the community. (ECF No. 40 at 6.) Accordingly, Marcrum argues that the Magistrate Judge's finding that the presumption in favor of...