United States v. Marin

• Decision Date: 24 October 2018
• Docket Number: 15-CR-252 (PKC)
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JOSE MARIA MARIN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JOSE MARIA MARIN, Defendant.

15-CR-252 (PKC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

October 24, 2018

MEMORANDUM & ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO RELEASE BAIL FUNDS

PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Defendant Jose Maria Marin moves for the release of $1 million in cash that was deposited with the Court as part of his pre-trial bond. For the reasons discussed below, that motion is denied. Defendant Marin, however, may renew his motion following the Court's determination of restitution in this matter.

I. Factual Background

The facts relevant to Defendant Marin's motion are as follows. On November 3, 2015, Marin posted $1 million in cash as part of the bond to secure his release pending trial. (Dkt. 73, at ECF¹ 3.) On December 22, 2017, Marin was convicted, at trial, of multiple counts of wire fraud conspiracy and money laundering conspiracy. (Dkt. 873.) The parties appeared for sentencing on August 22, 2018. At that time, the Court sentenced Marin to a total term of incarceration of forty-eight months, to be followed by two years' supervised release. (See Minute Entry, dated 8/22/18.) The Court also ordered fines totaling $1.2 million, forfeiture in the amount of $3,335,593, and special assessments totaling $600. (Id.) The Court deferred its determination of restitution, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), to allow the parties, alleged victims, and interested third parties to brief and submit evidence regarding the imposition of restitution; the Court set a briefing andhearing schedule that contemplates a determination of restitution by November 20, 2018. (Id.; see also Scheduling Order, dated 8/21/18.) At the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, the Court granted the government's motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2044, and ordered that Marin's "bail money be held pending a resolution about whether and how it should be applied to any fines, forfeiture, or other monetary penalties that are imposed". (Minute Entry, dated 8/22/18.) Judgment reflecting the August 22, 2018 sentencing was entered on September 11, 2018. (See Judgment, dated 9/11/18, Dkt. 1015.)

On September 17, 2018, Defendant Marin filed the instant motion requesting that the Court "exonerate Mr. Marin's bond and release the cash portion to allow him to fund his defense, including fees and costs already incurred, as well as those necessary for his counsel of choice for a direct appeal." (Dkt. 1018, at 1.)² The government submitted its opposition on September 26, 2018. (Dkt. 1029.) At the Court's request, Marin filed a reply ex parte, accompanied by a publicly filed, redacted version. (Dkt. 1053.)³

II. Legal Standard

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2044 ("Section 2044"), provides, in full, that:

On motion of the United States attorney, the court shall order any money belonging to and deposited by or on behalf of the defendant with the court for the purposes ofa criminal appearance bail bond (trial or appeal) to be held and paid over to the United States attorney to be applied to the payment of any assessment, fine, restitution, or penalty imposed upon the defendant. The court shall not release any money deposited for bond purposes after a plea or a verdict of the defendant's guilt has been entered and before sentencing except upon a showing that an assessment, fine, restitution or penalty cannot be imposed for the offense the defendant committed or that the defendant would suffer an undue hardship. This section will not apply to any third party surety.⁴

III. Defendant Marin Fails to Satisfy the Requirements of Section 2044 to Permit the Release of Bail Funds

Section 2044 plainly governs Defendant Marin's motion to release his cash bond funds. Marin has been convicted, and his sentencing is still pending because the restitution portion of the sentence has yet to be determined and imposed.⁵ Under these circumstances, Section 2044 precludes the Court from releasing "any money deposited for bond purposes," unless Marin can show that no "assessment, fine, restitution or penalty" can be imposed for the offenses of conviction, or that Marin "would suffer an undue hardship." Marin has not demonstrated either.

First, Marin clearly cannot, and has not attempted to, demonstrate the impossibility of financial penalties or restitution being imposed in this matter. The Court has already ordered forfeiture of $3,335,593 and fines totaling $1.2 million against Marin individually, and restitution may be imposed against Marin and his co-defendants jointly and severally, based on losses claimed by FIFA, CONMEBOL, and CONCACAF. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.

Second, while not acknowledging the applicability of Section 2044, Marin argues, in effect, that he will suffer undue hardship by virtue of being deprived of the counsel of his choicefor his appeal. Marin casts this argument as one implicating Marin's rights under the Sixth Amendment. However characterized, this argument lacks merit.

Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Luis, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016), Marin argues that not releasing his bail money will prevent him from retaining counsel of his choice, i.e., his current counsel, for his appeal,⁶ thereby violating Marin's rights under the Sixth Amendment. Luis involved the pre-trial freezing of the criminal defendant's assets, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1345, to prevent their dissipation pending trial and to preserve them for payment of restitution and other criminal penalties. The defendant in Luis sought the release of those assets as necessary to fund her defense. The Supreme Court held that because the assets were "untainted," i.e., not traceable to the defendant's alleged criminal conduct (or a substitute asset), they belonged to her and should have been released so that she could use them to retain counsel of her choice to represent her. Id. at 1090 ("The relevant difference [from prior cases decided by the Court] consists of the fact that the property here is untainted; i.e., it belongs to the defendant, pure and simple. In this respect it differs from a robber's loot, a drug seller's cocaine, a burglar's tools, or other property associated with the planning, implementing, or concealing of a crime."). In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that "the Sixth Amendmentguarantees a defendant the right to be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire." Id. at 1089 (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).

Based on Luis, Marin argues that because his bail money is "untainted," that is, there is no claim that the bail money is connected to the crimes for which Marin was convicted, these funds belong to him, and that preventing him from using them to retain counsel of his choice for his appeal violates the Sixth Amendment.⁷ (Dkt. 1018, at 3.) This argument, however, ignores the fact that Luis involved a pre-trial asset freeze, whereas this case involves a post-conviction holding of assets. Marin dismisses this distinction, arguing that after Luis, the only relevant fact is "the nature of the funds at issue," and not the "innocence or guilt of the defendant" (id. at 2 (emphasis in original)), but this distinction is critical.

First, because this motion is being made post-conviction, Section 2044 clearly applies and mandates that the Court not release Marin's bail money pending sentencing, unless he can show that one of the two exceptions under Section 2044 applies. While Marin suggests that the Supreme Court's holding in Luis allows the Court to disregard the plain language of Section 2044 and release bail funds post-conviction, so long as they are "untainted" (id.), he fails to cite a single case supporting this untenable proposition.⁸ Marin also fails to cite any cases in which the court foundthat a defendant not being able to hire counsel of his choice because of withheld bail funds constituted "undue hardship" for purposes of Section 2044.⁹ See United States v. Catoggio, 698 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting defendant's "argument that the district court's refusal [post-conviction] to release any of his money denied him the right to counsel of his choice in violation of the Sixth Amendment").¹⁰

Second, the property-based reasoning behind Luis with respect to pre-trial asset freezes should not be applied to the post-conviction holding of bail funds, since in the latter situation, there is a reasonable likelihood, if not certainty, that the criminal defendant will be subject to forfeiture, restitution, or some other financial penalty. Thus, it makes sense that after conviction, and absent a showing by the defendant, Section 2044 does not permit the Court to find that no monetarypenalty will be imposed and that the bail funds are, therefore, the defendant's property, which he should be able to use to retain counsel of his choice. See Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1089 ("This 'fair opportunity' for the defendant to secure counsel of choice has limits. . . . [A]n indigent defendant, while entitled to adequate representation, has no right to have the Government pay for his preferred representational choice.") (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) and citing Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624). Rather, where, as here, the defendant has been convicted of a crime that could result in the imposition of forfeiture, fines, and restitution, Section 2044 treats a defendant's bail money like "robber's loot", which must be returned to the victim. Id. at 1090; see United States v. Sortini, 497 F. App'x 738, 739 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that Section 2044's prohibition on the release of bond monies "after entry of a plea or guilty verdict and before sentencing 'except upon a showing that . . . restitution cannot be imposed for the offense,'. . . evidences Congress's intent to keep monies belonging to and deposited by or on behalf of a defendant...