United States v. Marin–Castano

• Decision Date: 18 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–3810.,11–3810.
• Citation: 688 F.3d 899
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Luis Eduardo MARIN–CASTANO, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

688 F.3d 899

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Luis Eduardo MARIN–CASTANO, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 11–3810.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 31, 2012.

Decided Aug. 10, 2012.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 18, 2012.

Michelle Marie Petersen (argued), Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Alison Marlowe Siegler, Attorney, Amanda Penabad (argued), Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellant.

Before BAUER, SYKES and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

The defendant-appellant, Luis Eduardo Marin–Castano, was indicted and pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 6 U.S.C. § 202(4). On November 30, 2011, upon consideration of Marin–Castano's criminal history and other factors, the district court issued a low-end, within-Guidelines sentence of 46 months in prison. This appeal followed. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Marin–Castano, a native and citizen of Colombia, illegally entered the United States in 1982. In 1985, he was convicted of drug offenses in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), was sentenced to five years in prison, and in 1987 he was deported to Colombia. Approximately five years after his deportation, Marin–Castano reentered the United States and was arrested twice, yet managed to avoid deportation. On October 27, 2010, he was arrested in Illinois for driving under the influence and Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents were informed of his illegal status. Marin–Castano was indicted on one count of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 6 U.S.C. § 202(4) and pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, upon consideration of the government's Presentence Investigation Report, and in accordance with the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court determined Marin–Castano's criminal history category to be 3 and, after applying a 16–level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), determined his offense level to be 21. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2010). This resulted in a calculated Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months' imprisonment. U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table (2010). Neither the government nor Marin–Castano objected to this calculation. Marin–Castano was sentenced at the low-end of the Guidelines range to 46 months in prison and he appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Marin–Castano claims that the district court committed procedural error at sentencing by failing to address two of his principal arguments. At the heart of each of these arguments (which were at best complementary, if not duplicative) was his claim that his 1985 conviction was stale and it overstated the seriousness of his current reentry offense. He further argued that although the district court's Guidelines calculation was technically correct, consideration of the § 3553(a) factors necessitated a below-Guidelines sentence.

The first argument cited § 3553(a)(2)(C) and claimed that a Guidelines range accounting for his 1985 conviction overstated the seriousness of his criminal history by elevating it to a Category 3, and thus would be greater than necessary to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.

The second argument cited § 3553(a)(2)(A) and claimed that a Guidelines range accounting for his 1985 conviction overstated the seriousness of his reentry offense by imposing a 16–level offense enhancement, pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).

We pause for a point of clarity and underscore that Marin–Castano essentially split one argument into “two principal arguments” by dividing it between the horizontal (criminal history) and vertical (offense level) axes of the Guidelines Sentencing Table. After sentencing, Marin–Castano appealed, claiming the district court committed procedural error by failing to properly address both of these arguments.

In addition to procedural error, Marin–Castano also claims the sentence imposed was substantively unreasonable because it failed to give proper weight to the age of Marin–Castano's 1985 conviction, in accordance with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

We disagree. We find neither procedural error, nor substantive unreasonableness with regard to the district court's imposed sentence of 46 months' imprisonment.

Because Marin–Castano argues that the court committed both procedural and substantive error, we employ more than one standard of review. First, we conduct a de novo review for any procedural error. United States v. Curby, 595 F.3d 794, 796 (7th Cir.2010). If we determine that the district court committed no procedural error, we review the sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). In this circuit, we do apply a presumption of reasonableness to all within-Guidelines sentences. It is not a binding presumption, but it applies in every case and it is the defendant's burden to overcome it. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (an appellate court may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)); United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir.2012) (holding that a properly calculated Guidelines sentence is presumed to be reasonable).

When addressing a party's non-frivolous argument, the sentencing court commits procedural error if it “fail[s] to calculate (or improperly calculat [es] ) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

The district court must say enough to “satisfy the appellate court that it has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456. Furthermore, “the court must address the defendant's principal arguments that are not so weak as to not merit discussion” United States v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir.2010) (citing United States v. Villegas–Miranda, 579 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir.2009)), though, “[a] short explanation will suffice where the context and record make clear the reasoning underlying the district court's conclusion.” United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir.2008). Finally, as we noted in Curby, “the amount of explanation needed in any particular case depends on the circumstances and less explanation is typically needed when a district court sentences within an advisory guidelines range.” Curby, 595 F.3d at 797 (citing United States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 853–54 (7th Cir.2009), and United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 838 (7th Cir.2009)).

At the sentencing hearing, the district court began by summarizing the arguments advanced in Marin–Castano's sentencing memorandum, including the staleness of his 1985 conviction, that the Guidelines significantly overstated the seriousness of the offense, Marin–Castano's good behavior and lack of criminal activity since 1985, that he was now 56 years old having spent the previous 27 years workinghard to send money back to his family and sick mother in Colombia, and that in light of these facts, a within-Guidelines sentence would be inappropriate. When the district court asked if anything had been missed or overlooked, defense counsel replied, “No your Honor. That is a summary of all the points I was making.” Sentencing Transcript, p. 5. The district court continued by summarizing the government's arguments and heard a statement in allocution from Marin–Castano.

As noted above, context and record are crucial to rendering an accurate analysis of the district court's consideration of the arguments. Because it is easy to overlook context by simply extracting quotations and considering them in isolation, as Marin–Castano did on appeal, below we provide relevant portions of the 18–page sentencing transcript all together, in an effort to detail the district court's analysis and provide the context through which it was delivered. The district court stated:

I am directed to consider a sentence that is necessary but not greater than necessary to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, protection to the public and any needed training or treatment. In doing that, I am directed to consider the nature and history of the offense. In this case, the nature and history of the offense is a serious one. This country has a right to protect its borders, ensure the safety of its citizens and its economy, and immigration laws are enacted to achieve those ends, among others. Violation of those laws do pose a threat to our country, sometimes direct and sometimes more indirectly. Considering the need to promote respect for the law and general deterrence, [defendant]'s points, I suppose, are somewhat well taken, that a sentence imposed here on Mr. Marin–Castano might not do much to deter others from entering this country.... But deterrence has two components. As to specific deterrence, that is, the need to deter Mr. Marin–Castano from further conduct in this regard, it's clear that a sentence of incarceration would at least deter him for the period of time while he's confined. Considering specifically the nature and history of this offense, the defendant, after committing a serious felony in this country, received a very severe federal prison sentence for a first-time offender. He was sentenced to five years of custody and another three years of special probation. He was then deported from the United States, and a very short time after deportation he returned to the United States in direct violation of the law and the conditions of his release. That's a...