United States v. Martin

• Decision Date: 10 June 2014
• Docket Number: CR-14-678-PHX-GMS (DKD)
• Parties: United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Joseph S. Martin; Christopher J. Heikkila, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

United States of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Joseph S. Martin; Christopher J. Heikkila, Defendants.

CR-14-678-PHX-GMS (DKD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dated: June 10, 2014

ORDER

The Government seeks the detention of Defendants Joseph S. Martin ("Martin") and Christopher J. Heikkila ("Heikkila") on the grounds that each of them is a serious flight risk, a danger to the community, and no release condition or combination of conditions exist that would reasonably assure their appearances at future court proceedings if they were released. See the Government's Motion for Detention and Removal to the United States, initially filed under seal on May 19, 2014, and, as a public document, on May 22, 2014.¹ (Docs. 10, 16) The matter has been under advisement since May 29, 2014, pending the Court's review of post-hearing memoranda and analysis of the detention factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

After considering the Government's and each Defendant's separate detention briefings; all the evidence and proffers at the detention hearing held over two days; the

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arguments of counsel; the controlling and persuasive authorities on the issues sub judice and all the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the Court finds that the Government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that each of the Defendants is a serious flight risk and no combination of conditions exist that would reasonably assure their appearance at future court proceedings if they were released from custody. Defendants shall remain detained pending resolution of this case.

I. Background

Defendants Martin and Heikkila, each 19 years of age, were indicted by a Phoenix federal grand jury on May 14, 2014, and charged with Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Sexual Abuse, Sexual Abuse, and Abusive Sexual Contact (Count 1), a Class A felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2241(b)(1), 2242(2)(B), 2244(a)(2), and 3261(a)(1); Sexual Abuse (Count 2), a Class A felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2242(2)(B), 2246(3), 3261(a)(1), and 2; Abusive Sexual Contact, (Count 3), a Class E felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)(2), 2246(3), 3261(a)(1), and 2. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a), (1)-(5).² (Doc. 3) Upon the grand jury's finding of probable cause, the sexual abuse charge raises a statutory rebuttable presumption "that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of the community[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E) (citing, among others, section 2242); see also United States v. McCarty, 2009 WL 5061577 (D. Haw. Dec. 24, 2009); United States v. O'Field, 2009 WL 920734 (N.D. Okla. March 27, 2009).

The crime of Sexual Abuse, under 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B), has the fo1lowing elements: 1) the defendant knowingly engaged in a sexual act with the victim; 2) the victim

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was physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act; and, 3) the offense was committed within the special meritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See United States v. Fasthorse, 639 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. James, 2013 WL 5423979, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2013) ("Section 2242 was enacted in 1986 . . . , which was intended to modernize and reform the federal rape statutes.").

Federal courts have held that sexual abuse may occur when the victims are incapacitated by alcohol or asleep. See United States v. Stamper, 507 Fed. Appx. 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2013) ("In sexual assault cases, 'a reasonable jury may conclude that a person who is asleep when a sexual act begins is physically unable to decline participation in that act.") (citing Fasthorse, 639 F.3d at 1184) (alteration omitted), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2840 (2013); United States v. Barrett, 937 F.2d 1346, 1348 (8th Cir. 1991) (sustaining conviction for sexual abuse where the victim was physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act until after the act was complete when the testimony showed the victim was intoxicated and extremely tired, vaguely remembered someone pulling down her jeans and underwear, once fully awake, she realized defendant was on top of her and his penis was inside her vagina, and she immediately pushed defendant off her and ran out of the room).

A defendant commits the offense of abusive sexual contact, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(2), when the defendant "knowingly engages in or causes sexual contact with or by another person, if to do so would violate . . . section 2242 of [Title 18] had the sexual contact been a sexual act."³ As previously mentioned, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2) occurs

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where a person "knowingly . . . (2) engages in a sexual act with another person if that other person is . . . incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct; or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2).

The terms "sexual act" and "sexual contact" referred to in sections 2242 and 2244 are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246. A "sexual act" involves penile-genital contact, oral-genital contact, or genital penetration. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). "Sexual contact" means "the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3).

The subject indictment alleges the crimes occurred in Landstuhl, Germany, which is near Ramstein Air Force Base, on or about October 19, 2013. The Government represents this criminal case involves the sexual assault and rape of a 17-year-old girl ("Jane Doe") while she was incapacitated due to voluntary intoxication. At the time the crimes were allegedly committed, Jane Doe and Defendants lived in Germany where the alcohol drinking age is 16 years for beer and wine and 18 years, the age of adulthood, for all other alcohol.⁴ (Doc. 16 at 3) The Government's investigation involved the interview of numerous individuals, including Defendants, Jane Doe, certain confidential witnesses, and a search and review of Defendants' messages sent to each other on Facebook⁵ and Twitter.⁶ According to

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the Government, in their Facebook messages, Defendants "[a]ppeared to plan the sexual assault of Jane Doe. Specifically, the defendants sent messages that included a discussion of who would engage in sexual activity with Jane Doe, how to get Jane Doe drunk at an upcoming party, and where the assault would occur." (Id.)

On May 14, 2014, arrest warrants were issued by the Clerk of the District Court of Arizona. (Docs. 7-8) Defendants were arrested in Germany shortly thereafter, returned to the United States, and, on May 19, 2014, appeared before Phoenix Magistrate Judge John A. Buttrick, when counsel were appointed, pleas of not guilty entered, and each Defendant temporarily detained pending a detention hearing, which began on May 27, 2014.⁷ (Docs. 13-14, 21-23)

A. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Government asserts jurisdiction over the indicted offenses pursuant to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act ("MEJA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267, which subjects certain individuals to prosecution in federal district courts for felonies committed outside the United States, if the offense would have been subject to federal prosecution within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. See United States v. Arnt, 474 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007). The categories of individuals who can be subject to federal prosecution pursuant to MEJA include, inter alia, individuals who are "employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 3261. As alleged in the indictment, Martin and Heikkila were employed by and accompanied the Armed Forces in Germany at the time of the offenses were allegedly committed. (Doc. 3, ¶ 4 at 2)

B. Venue

Venue presumptively exists in the District of Arizona pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3238, because the conduct in the indictment allegedly occurred outside the jurisdiction of any

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particular State or District and the last known residence of Martin was Peoria, Arizona. (Id., ¶ 7 at 2)

The Government has asserted in an unsealed search warrant affidavit that Martin was employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States, as defined by Title 18, United States Code, § 3267(1), as a clerk at the Army & Air Force Exchange, on the Ramstein Air Force Base, a non-appropriated fund instrumentality of the Department of Defense. See May 6, 2014 search warrant application and affidavit, ¶ 18 at C-7. According to the Government, Heikkila was residing in Weilerbach, Germany, and was also employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States, as defined by Title 18, United States Code, Section 3267(1), as a clerk at the Army & Air Force Exchange in Ramstein, Germany. Id., ¶ 19. Both Defendants are U.S. citizens.

II. The Bail Reform Act of 1984

"The Bail Reform Act [the "Act"], 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150, authorizes and sets forth the procedures for a judicial officer to order the release or detention of an arrested...