United States v. Martinez
Decision Date | 15 December 2020 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:19-CV-345 |
Citation | 507 F.Supp.3d 793 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Luis Alberto MARTINEZ ; aka Martinez-Sanchez; aka Sanchez Martinez |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Daniel P. Chung, Pro Hac Vice, James Jiann Wen, U.S. Department of Justice, CIvil Division, Washington, DC, David Louis Guerra, Office of the US Attorney, McAllen, TX, for United States of America.
Amber Qureshi, National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Washington, D.C., Carlos Moctezuma Garcia, Garcia & Garcia Attorneys at Law, P.L.L.C., McAllen, TX, for Luis Alberto Martinez.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Now before the Court is Defendant Luis Alberto Martinez's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 11). Through its Complaint, the United States of America ("the government" or "Plaintiff") seeks to revoke and set aside the 2011 grant of U.S. citizenship to Defendant Luis Alberto Martinez ("Martinez" or "Defendant"). Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 1. Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asserting that the government is time-barred from bringing this proceeding, did not comply with statutory requirements, and that the government has not alleged sufficient facts. Dkt. No. 11 at 1. After considering the Motion, the applicable law, and the parties' responsive briefings (Dkt Nos. 20, 23), the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion (Dkt. No. 11) should be denied.
Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 17, Ex. B at 1.
As a result of Martinez's guilty plea, the government initiated a civil denaturalization action. See Dkt. No. 1. The government lists several reasons why denaturalization is warranted, all of which revolve around allegations that Martinez illegally procured his naturalization because he provided false testimony about his past criminal activity during the naturalization application process. Id. at ¶¶ 56–96. Martinez now moves to dismiss the government's claims against him. See Dkt. No. 11.
When a district court has pending before it both a 12(b)(1) motion and a 12(b)(6) motion, the generally preferable approach, if the 12(b)(1) motion essentially challenges the existence of a federal cause of action, is for the court to find jurisdiction and then decide the 12(b)(6) motion. Jones v. State of Ga. , 725 F.2d 622, 623 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Williamson v. Tucker , 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied , 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) ).
A court properly dismisses a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) "when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison , 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund , 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996) ); see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). "The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction," who "constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." Ramming v. United States , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) ; see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) () (internal citations omitted). Subject matter jurisdiction is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint. Whatley v. Resolution Tr. Corp. , 32 F.3d 905, 907 (5th Cir. 1994).
Should the Court find it has subject-matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1), it must then address the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenge for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with the pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a), which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) ; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 677-68, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). This standard does not require detailed factual allegations. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). However, a party's "obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]’ to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citations omitted). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint and any other matters properly considered2 must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court, drawing upon its "judicial experience and common sense," to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ), 679. "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) ).
Martinez argues the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the government filed its Complaint several years too late, in violation of the statute of limitation or the doctrine of laches. Dkt. No. 11 at 8–10. Martinez also argues the government did not comply with the statutory prerequisites to bringing suit, as the Complaint is allegedly not accompanied by an affidavit of good cause. Id. at 7–8. The Court takes these arguments in turn.
It is well-settled that there is no statute of limitations for civil denaturalization actions. Costello v. United States , 365 U.S. 265, 283, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (). The Supreme Court and various circuits have allowed the government to maintain denaturalization proceedings well beyond the 8 years at issue in this case. See e.g., Kungys v. United States , 485 U.S. 759, 765, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988) ( ); United States v. Szehinskyj , 277 F.3d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 2002) (41 years); Costello , 365 U.S. at 282–84, 81 S.Ct. 534 (27 years) ; United States v. Arango , No. 09-cv-178, 2014 WL 7179578, at *7 (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 2017), aff'd , 686 Fed.Appx. 489 (9th Cir. 2017) (19 years); United States v. Schmidt , No. 88 C 9475, 1990 WL 6667, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 1990), aff'd , 923 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1991) (two decades).
Martinez argues that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 provides the appropriate statute of limitations in this case: five years. Dkt. No. 11 at 8–11. The government filed this lawsuit almost eight years after Martinez's naturalization and over six years after Martinez signed the plea agreement in the Medicaid fraud case. See Dkt. No. 1 (filed October 2, 2019). Therefore, according to Martinez, the government did not file its claim within the five-year statute of limitation and the Court must dismiss the case. Dkt. No. 11 at 8–11. Section 2462 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Martinez claims denaturalization is a penalty (and therefore falls within § 2462 ) under the Supreme Court decision Kokesh v. Securities and Exchange Commission. In Kokesh , the Court held a civil action may be a penalty when it seeks to redress wrongs to the public and is "for the purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like manner—as opposed to compensating a victim for loss." ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642, 198 L.Ed.2d 86 (2017) ; Dkt. No. 11. Kokesh dealt with a SEC disgorgement action, not a denaturalization proceeding. Kokesh , 137 S. Ct. at 1642. All the...
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