United States v. Masini

• Decision Date: 24 March 1966
• Docket Number: No. 16460.,16460.
• Citation: United States v. Masini, 358 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1966)
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Dennis MASINI, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

358 F.2d 100 (1966)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Dennis MASINI, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16460.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

March 24, 1966.

Eugene W. Youngs, Cincinnati, Ohio (Court-appointed), for appellant.

C. Odell Horton, Jr., Memphis, Tenn. (Thomas L. Robinson, U. S. Atty., Memphis, Tenn., on the brief), for appellee.

Before PHILLIPS and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.

HARRY PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the conviction of defendant-appellant under a two count indictment, charging possession and passing of counterfeit federal reserve notes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. Appellant was represented in the district court by two attorneys employed by him. Trial by jury was waived. The district judge found him guilty and imposed a sentence of fifteen years.

There is evidence in the record to support the conclusion of the district court that appellant purchased two paperback books at a Memphis bookstore, using a counterfeit $20 federal reserve note and receiving the difference in change. The owner of the store was talking on the telephone at the time of the transaction. The Memphis police had been alerted that passers of counterfeit $20 bills were active in the area. The proprietor of the bookstore had information to this effect.

The proprietor immediately was suspicious that the $20 bill passed by appellant was counterfeit, testifying that "it did not look right" because of its color and paper. He further testified that he went to the sidewalk outside the store, saw appellant waiting for a traffic light, and called for him, but appellant ignored the call and proceeded across the street. The proprietor then telephoned his brother and asked him to come and keep the store. When the brother arrived approximately fifteen minutes later the proprietor and a traffic policeman made a search for the customer who passed the bill, and found him in the lobby of the Peabody Hotel.

Appellant denied that he had passed a bill or had been in the bookstore. Upon positive identification by the proprietor, the traffic officer placed appellant under arrest. The officer immediately telephoned for additional policemen who arrived promptly and handcuffed and searched appellant.

The search of appellant's person disclosed three more counterfeit bills and a Peabody Hotel room key.

Appellant then was taken to police headquarters and turned over to a Secret Service agent who, upon the basis of evidence already taken, obtained a search warrant for appellant's hotel room. This search revealed a paper bag with appellant's name on it which contained 384 counterfeit bills.

On appeal appellant contends: (1) that his arrest was unlawful and was made without probable cause; (2) that the search of his person, made without his consent and without a search warrant, was not a lawful search incident to arrest; and (3) that the search warrant which was issued for the search of his hotel room was unlawful because it was based upon evidence illegally obtained from the prior search of his person. We find all of these contentions to be without merit.

Under Tennessee law an officer is authorized to make an arrest without a warrant upon "a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the person arrested." T.C.A. § 40-803(4). We hold that there was probable cause for the arrest under the circumstances of this case. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399; Bates v. United States, 352 F.2d 399 (C.A.9), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 984, 86 S.Ct. 561, 15 L.Ed.2d 473; cf. United States v. Smith, 357 F.2d 318 (C.A.6, March 3, 1966).

We further hold that the search of appellant's person, which was substantially...