United States v. Massachusetts General Hospital

• Citation: 100 F. 932
• Decision Date: 10 April 1900
• Docket Number: 313.
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

100 F. 932

UNITED STATES v. MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL.

No. 313.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

April 10, 1900

Boyd B Jones, U.S. Atty. (Albert H. Washburn, Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellants.

Thomas Hunt (Gaston, Snow & Saltonstall, on the brief), for appellee.

Before PUTNAM, Circuit Judge, and WEBB and ALDRICH, District Judges.

PUTNAM Circuit Judge.

This appeal relates to the construction of so much of paragraph 585 of chapter 349 of the statutes of 1894 (28 Stat. 543) as permits the free importation of 'philosophical and scientific apparatus, utensils, instruments, and preparations' for certain uses therein pointed out including for the use of institutions 'incorporated or established' for educational or scientific purposes. This importation consisted of instruments especially designed and adapted for use in surgery, and such as are ordinarily used by surgeons in the practice of their profession; but it was made exclusively for use at the hospital, as well for scientific investigation as for surgical operations. Of course, the instruments were usable, and intended to be used for surgical instruction to medical students. There is no suggestion that they are usable for any other purpose than those which we have stated. The main question is whether such instruments, conforming in other respects to the conditions of paragraph 585, may be classed under the word 'scientific,' found therein. Paragraph 585 was in issue in U.S. v. Presbyterian Hospital, 18 C.C.A 338, 71 F. 866, 38 U.S.App. 201, before the circuit court of appeals for the Second circuit.

Exemptions of the character shown in this paragraph have always been within the policy of our customs laws. The act of August 10, 1790, c. 39, § 1 (1 Stat. 180), exempted 'philosophical apparatus, specially imported for any seminary of learning,' and that exemption was renewed in practically the same terms until 1816. From that time until the act of March 3, 1857 (11 Stat. 192), the exemption was continued, with a gradual enlarging phraseology, always retaining the word 'philosophical,' but never inserting the word 'scientific.' Since 1857 exemptions for the same substantial purposes have been renewed in every statute, except for a time a moderate duty of 15 per cent. ad valorem was imposed. The exemption first came into practically the form in which we now find it-- that is to say, 'philosophical and scientific apparatus, instruments, and preparations'-- in the act of 1870, c. 255, § 22 (16 Stat. 268). The act of 1894 differs from that only in adding the word 'utensils.'

Paralleling this legislation, there have been other lines; though, for this case, it is not necessary to go back of the Revised Statutes. There a duty of 40 per cent. ad valorem was imposed on 'philosophical apparatus and instruments.' Rev. St. (2d Ed.) Sec. 2505, p. 487. This is not found in the act of 1894; but it appears in the act of 1883, c. 121 (22 Stat. 513). It was this provision of the act of 1883 which was under consideration in Robertson v. Oelschlaeger, 137 U.S. 436, 11 Sup.Ct. 148, 34 L.Ed. 744. Another line of parallel legislation is that relating to 'professional books, implements, instruments, and tools of trade, occupation, or employment,' found in paragraph 596 of the act of 1894, now under consideration. No provision of this broad character was in the act of 1883, that being limited to professional books. 22 Stat. 518.

As customs legislation has a peculiarly practical purpose, and appeals directly to the commercial community, the rule of construction which apply to its schedules of rates have never been of a refined character, and have come down, mainly, to the following propositions:

First. The language of commerce, when used in such statutes, must presumably be construed according to the commercial understanding of the terms employed. When a term is confined in its meaning to a particular trade, the presumption is that the term is used in its trade signification. Hedden v. Richard, 149 U.S. 346, 13 Sup.Ct. 891, 37 L.Ed. 763; Dejonge v. Magone, 159 U.S. 562, 569, 16 Sup.Ct. 119, 40 L.Ed. 260; Chew Hing Lung v. Wise, 176 U.S. 156, 161, 20 Sup.Ct. 320, Adv. S. U.S. 320, 44 L.Ed.-- . It follows, of course, with reference to provisions relating to philosophical and scientific matters, that the term used ought ordinarily to have such construction as to commend itself to men particularly trained in those directions. The word 'scientific,' however, covers so many fields, and has so many different phases, that it is impracticable to apply this rule with satisfaction to the case at bar.

Second. Wherever, in the customs laws, generic terms are found, and also specific terms, the latter, within their range, control the former. Fink v. U.S. 170 U.S. 584, 587, 18 Sup.Ct. 770, 42 L.Ed. 1153; Chew Hing Lung v. Wise, supra. Applying this rule to the case at bar, it must be apparent that the mere expression 'philosophical and scientific,' in one paragraph of the act, is generic, and the mere word 'professional,' in another, is specific. But the difficulty here is that each paragraph is limited to a particular class of importers, so that, after all, neither is wholly generic, and we are left with the necessity of determining whether congress intended the case as within Magone v. Heller, 150 U.S. 70, 14 Sup.Ct. 18, 37 L.Ed. 1001, or within Chew Hing Lung v. Wise, supra. Therefore this rule only leads us back to the fundamental question involved, without solving it.

Third. The third and the safest rule for the interpretation of customs statutes doubtful in their application is that reiterated last in Chew Hing Lung v. Wise, 176 U.S.,AT Ages 166, 167, 20 Sup.Ct.,at page 324, Adv. S. U.S., at page 324, 44 L.Ed.,at page--, as follows:

'If there had been an intention to include it (meaning the article under consideration) in the dutiable list, especially after these repeated decisions of the treasury that it was entitled to free admission as tapioca, we cannot but believe that congress would have expressed that intention with reasonable clearness.'

This supplements the well-known fact that, when the practice of the department, whose duty it is to enforce the law relating to the conduct of the public business, has been uniform with reference to the consideration of a statute found to be doubtful or obscure, great weight should be given to that construction. U.S. v. Healey, 160 U.S. 136, 141, 16 Sup.Ct. 247, 40 L.Ed. 369. The principle applies with special force to the re-enacting of a particular expression of a statute after a decision by the supreme court. This rule, however, fails us here. The only case which touches this topic, and which antedates the act of 1894, is Robertson v. Oelschlaeger, supra. This, as we have said, turned on the construction of a paragraph of the act of 1883, where the word 'philosophical' appeared without the word 'scientific,' so that the court cannot be said to have construed the precise phraseology at bar.

All the departmental decisions prior to the act of 1894 relate to the paragraph in issue in Robertson v. Oelschlaeger, or were a part of the controversy now before us, except the first,-- that of August 1, 1879, Synopsis of Decisions (4128), -- where the importation was entered as 'philosophical instruments.' The turning point of that decision was that the importation was not expressly made for the uses covered by the paragraph in issue. The others are as follows: January 13, 1885, Synopsis of Decisions (6719); March 21, 1885. Synopsis of Decisions (6811); September 5, 1889, Synopsis of Decisions (9610); October 3, 1890, Synopsis of Decisions (10,334); January 16, 1891, Synopsis of Decisions (10,603); December 30, 1893, Synopsis of Decisions (14,637).

So far, therefore, as questions of classification are concerned, this rule leaves the case in the same unsatisfactory condition as the other special rules to which we have referred, and the result of the whole is well expressed in U.S. v. Presbyterian Hospital, at page 339, 18 C.C.A., page 867, 71 Fed., and page 208, 38 U.S.App., as follows: 'The term (that is, 'scientific instruments') is a very vague one, and there is nothing in the context or in the previous legislation of congress which assists in ascertaining its precise significance.' We think, however, that the decisions to which we have referred afford sufficient acquiescence on one proposition now made by the United States to enable us to dispose of it favorably to the importer. The United States claim that, even if the Massachusetts General Hospital has any educational phase, this is not sufficient unless there is some law of the corporation's existence specifically recognizing it. This is too technical, because a statutory enactment of the character of the paragraph in issue here has a generous purpose which cannot recognize such refined distinctions.

The educational phases of the Presbyterian Hospital seem to have had their origin in all respects in the same way as those of the Massachusetts General Hospital. In each case they were a growth arising from scientific development, and from the modern necessities of securing trained nurses, and of giving medical students clinical instruction. In neither instance, so far as we can discover, was there any express provision as called for by the United States in the case at bar. The Presbyterian Hospital first appears in the treasury decisions in September 5, 1889, Synopsis of Decisions (9610), already referred to. There the character of the institution was shown by a statement of a trustee as follows:

'It is maintained for the two distinct purposes of education and the care of the sick poor, and, while it has no school in the strict sense of that term, its amphitheater is

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