United States v. Masters, 71-1812.

• Decision Date: 07 March 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-1812.,71-1812.
• Citation: 456 F.2d 1060
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Philip Robert MASTERS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

456 F.2d 1060 (1972)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Philip Robert MASTERS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 71-1812.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

March 7, 1972.

Richard Caballero, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

Robert L. Meyer, U. S. Atty., David R. Nissen, Thomas E. Kotoske, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before MERRILL, BROWNING and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal, arising under the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314, presents a narrow issue: Was the evidence sufficient to establish that appellant caused the items in question to move in interstate commerce as the statute requires? Finding that it was, we affirm.

In October 1969 appellant gave a creditor a sheaf of eleven counterfeit stock certificates as collateral. Appellant testified that he knew the certificates were counterfeit and was merely using them to "buy time," intending to reclaim the certificates as soon as he could obtain the money to pay off the debt. He became concerned, however, and sent an agent to pick up the certificates. The creditor retained one certificate having a face value sufficient to cover the debt, and returned the balance. Appellant testified that the certificates were returned in a sealed envelope, and that he burned the envelope of certificates without noticing that one certificate was missing. Appellant did not pay his debt despite repeated promises to do so. Finally, in January 1970, the creditor mailed the certificate from California to Delaware for redemption, and its falsity was disclosed. Appellant was convicted of transporting the counterfeit security in interstate commerce.

Appellant asserts there was no evidence that he intended the certificate to be transported in interstate commerce; indeed, that the only evidence of his intention was precisely to the contrary.

However, neither an intention to use interstate facilities nor knowledge that they will be used is an element of the offense under section 2314. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 889-891 (9th Cir. 1970); Baty v. United States, 275 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1960). The question, therefore, is one of causation alone.

Appellant's acts were the "cause in fact"—the "but for" cause—of the interstate transportation. Had appellant not submitted the counterfeit securities to the creditor, they would never have been sent through the mails. We do not decide, however, whether such a causal relationship may be the basis for the imposition of legal responsibility under section 2314.

The actor is at least responsible under the statute for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his acts. As the court said in United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1968) vacated on other grounds, Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969): "There can be no doubt that a defendant may be a `cause' if the result which the law forbids was reasonably foreseeable." And in United States v. Weisman, 83 F.2d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 1936): "It has long been settled that a defendant may cause a letter to be sent or delivered by mail though such mode of transmission was neither known nor intended, provided mailing or delivery by post might reasonably have been foreseen." Similarly, in Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954), the Supreme Court found the requisite causation where def...