United States v. Maude

Decision Date24 May 1973
Docket NumberNo. 23741.,23741.
Citation481 F.2d 1062
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. Charles T. MAUDE, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Barry Smoler, Washington, D. C., with whom George F. Trowbridge, Washington, D. C. (both appointed by this Court), was on the brief, for appellant.

Philip L. Cohan, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Robert S. Bennett, Asst. U. S. Atty., at the time the brief was filed, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before McGOWAN and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,* Senior United States District Judge, District of Utah.

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge:

This appeal has brought before us appellant's conviction, by a jury, of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 5031 asserted in a two-count indictment. One of the counts charged the forging and counterfeiting of a postmarking stamp;2 the other charged the knowing possession of the stamp with intent to use it.3 Appellant attacks the conviction on a number of grounds, which have been ably advanced by his counsel.4 We have examined each contention with care and, finding no error warranting reversal, we have affirmed.5

I

The events underlying the conviction were established by the Government's uncontradicted evidence at appellant's trial.6 Appellant entered the office of the Hay Rubber Stamp Company7 and, in the name "Robert M. Dix," placed an order for a stamp and a set of dates. By appellant's specifications, the stamp was to make an impression consisting in two concentric circles, the inscription "Greenville, N. C." between the circles, and a date inside the smaller circle. In design and dimensions, the stamp invoiced was identical to an all-purpose dating stamp commonly used in post offices.8

The Hay Company had previously been requested by postal authorities to maintain an outlook, for orders of stamps of that kind, with which money orders were being counterfeited.9 Since appellant displayed no evidence of authority to procure the stamp on behalf of the Post Office Department, Hay promptly notified Inspector Alexander McRae, and was instructed to make the stamp as directed. Four days later, Rufus F. Bryant called at Hay for "the order for Mr. Dix," displayed a copy of the invoice, and Hay delivered the stamp and dates to him. Bryant then walked to a parked car in which appellant was seated, and both Bryant and appellant were immediately arrested.10

An on-scene search of appellant uncovered a piece of paper on which appeared Hay's name, address and telephone number, and a rough sketch seemingly depicting the face of a circular stamp. Later that day, Inspector McRae obtained a warrant to search appellant's apartment for money orders recently stolen from a post office.11 The search yielded no money orders, but did turn up identification cards bearing the name "Roger M. Dix."12 Inspector McRae, noting the similarity of that name to the name given when the stamp was ordered,13 seized the cards and, over appellant's objection, the Government introduced them into evidence at trial. The real Roger M. Dix testified that he did not know appellant or how he got the cards. He added that they had been missing about six months, and that he had not given them to appellant or anyone else.

The stamp ordered by appellant— GX-3, as it was marked as an exhibit at trial—was fabricated as appellant directed. It bears repeating that, used with standardized dates, it made an impression consisting in two concentric circles with "Greenville, N.C." between the circles and a date inside the inner circle; and that, as so made, it was an exact duplicate of an all-purpose stamp which sees general service in post offices. Testimony at the trial dealt extensively with the nature and frequency of the functions which its genuine counterpart performed, and differences in the functioning of other stamps.14

The Post Office Department has adopted a variety of stamps for postmarking and other purposes. Most post offices postmark first-class mail with a stamped impression containing a single circle, the initials "U.S.P.O.," and straight or wavy lines which cancel the postage stamps attached. The impression made by the all-purpose stamp, on the other hand, sometimes lacks the designation "U.S.P.O."15 and always omits the lines. That stamp is used principally to validate money orders and mail receipts, but it is also used in postmarking. The all-purpose stamp is regularly employed in postmarking registered and certified mail,16 and in smaller post offices also to postmark first-class mail.17 A third to a fourth of the post offices in the United States use stamps which do not have the legend "U.S.P.O.,"18 and some post offices have only one type of stamp—the all-purpose model.

At appellant's trial, the Government presented five witnesses and twelve exhibits. The defense tendered four exhibits, two of which were admitted,19 but presented no witnesses. The jury found appellant guilty on both counts, and the judge imposed a general sentence of imprisonment for twenty months to five years.

II

Each of the two counts on which appellant was convicted charged activities involving a forged or counterfeited "postmarking stamp." Appellant first contends that these words, as used in Section 503,20 the underlying statute, refer to objects devoted by the Post Office Department solely to the cancellation of postage stamps on mail matter. Since most post offices cancel first-class mail with a different type of stamp,21 and since the all-purpose stamp which GX-3 simulates is more generally employed in operations other than postmarking,22 appellant argues that GX-3, the stamp fabricated on his order, falls outside the ambit of the statute.

Section 503 does not define "postmarking stamp," nor is a definition contained elsewhere in postal legislation. We think, however, that the meaning of the term is clear enough. It is commonly known that a postmark is the official mark which the Post Office Department places on mail,23 and a stamp regularly used to impress that mark is obviously a postmarking stamp. That understanding is thoroughly consistent with the language of Section 503, and it finds solid support in its legislative history.24 Whatever else the term "postmarking stamp" may embrace,25 we are satisfied that it intercepts at least that much.26

This does not mean, however, that only those stamps which are used exclusively for marking mail, and which are put to that use in all post offices, are postmarking stamps within the meaning of Section 503. Nothing in the statutory language or legislative history suggests that narrow construction; on the contrary, the evident legislative purpose negates such limitations. The congressional concern was the ease with which false postmarkings could be and were being made,27 and the "increasing necessity" of curbing them.28 That objective hardly leaves room for differentiating postmarking devices according to the number of post offices in which they are to be found, or to the singleness or multiplicity of their uses. Rather, the clear purpose of Section 503 is to outlaw the falsification of any official mail-marking stamp, and thereby to eliminate the capability for impressing mailmarks which give the appearance of genuineness.29 In our view, it suffices that the imitated stamp does substantial, though not the entire, postmarking service in the Nation's post offices, and notwithstanding its engagement in other postal functions as well.

GX-3 survives that test. The uncontradicted evidence at appellant's trial established that the Post Office Department's all-purpose stamp, of which GX-3 was a copy, is regularly utilized to postmarking registered and certified mail.30 It disclosed, too, that a number of smaller post offices across the country also use the all-purpose stamp for postmarking first-class mail.31 It is immaterial, then, that most post offices do not employ the all-purpose stamp for postmarking first-class mail, or that many employ it for a variety of purposes. We sustain the jury's finding, implicit in its verdict, that GX-3 was a postmarking stamp within the contemplation of Section 503.

III

As an alternative to his first contention, appellant argues that unless the expression "postmarking stamp" is limited strictly to devices used to cancel postage stamps, Section 503 becomes unconstitutionally vague. More specifically, appellant's position, in his words, is that "if the term `postmarking stamp' . . . is to be given a construction sufficiently broad to encompass GX-3—i. e., broad enough to encompass an all-purpose rubber dating stamp primarily used to stamp receipts and validate postal money orders, and bearing no wavy lines or `U.S.P.O.' designation, but which some small post offices also use as a postmark—then the phrase lacks the `technical or other special meaning' required by the Constitution."32 Appellant's approach thus proceeds on the premise that persons of ordinary intelligence would not know that a stamp such as GX-3 is used not only to validate money orders but also to postmark mail matter;33 and that resultantly the statute unconstitutionally compels them to speculate as to its meaning, and thus to act, if at all, at their peril.34 This rationale, however, ignores the realities which are as much observed in applying the void-for-vagueness precept as well as other legal principles.

To be sure, penal statutes must "convey sufficiently definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct"35 to enable affected citizens to ascertain in advance the activities they are legally free to pursue.36 As we have declared, "the imposition of criminal liability for behavior which a person could not reasonably understand to be prohibited offends the most rudimentary consideration of fairness."37 And as the Supreme Court, summing up the central teaching of the...

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