United States v. Maxwell Land Grant

• Decision Date: 27 May 1887
• Citation: 7 S.Ct. 1271,30 L.Ed. 1211,122 U.S. 365
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. MAXWELL LAND GRANT Co. and others
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

122 U.S. 365

7 S.Ct. 1271

30 L.Ed. 1211

UNITED STATES v. MAXWELL LAND GRANT Co. and others.

May 27, 1887.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for petition.

[Petition for Rehearing from pages 366-370 intentionally omitted]

MILLER, J.

A petition for a rehearing has been filed in this case, and on account of its importance, as well as the interest in it manifested by the department of the interior, we have considered the petition very fully, and, departing from our usual custom, make some response to its suggestions.

The first ground on which a rehearing is asked is that this court was in error in treating the grant to Beaubien and Mirands as an empresario grant, upon which alleged mistake it is asserted that the decision of the court turned. The error, however, is in the assumption in the petition that the decision of the court turned upon that point. It is true that the assistant attorney general, in his argument on behalf of the United States, rested the case almost exclusively, so far as he was concenred, on the proposition that the validity of the grant was governed by the limitation of the decree of the Mexican congress of 1824 to 11 square leagues for each grantee, in ordinary grants; and in response to that argument we endeavored to show that while the land in controversy was not strictly an empresario grant, there being no evidence of a contract with any person to bring emigrants from abroad for the purpose of settling them upon the land, yet that it partook very largely of that character; and that Beaubien and Miranda, Gov. Armijo, the departmental assembly, and the surveyor general had all looked upon it as partaking so much of that nature, in regard to the quantity of land granted, as well as the actual settlement of families upon it, that the congress of the Unites States was justified in treating it likewise. But we stated distinctly that we did not rest our judgment upon the fact of its being an empresario grant, but upon the proposition that the congress of the United States, having confirmed this grant as made to Beaubien and Miranda, and reported for confirmation by the surveyor general of New Mexico to that body, without qualification or limitation as to its extent, acted in that respect within its power, and that its action was conclusive upon the court.

In the opinion, after discussion the history of this grant and its conformity to the character of a colonization grant, it was said, (121 U. S. 363, ante, 1019:) 'The final confirmation of this grant by the congress of the United States in 1860 affords strong ground to believe that that body viewed it as one of this character, and not one governed by the limitation of eleven square leagues to each grantee.' Afterwards we added, (page 365, ante, 1020:) 'But whether, as a matter of fact, this was a grant not limited in quantity by the Mexican decree of 1824, or whether it was a grant which in strict law would have been held by the Mexican government, if it had continued in the ownership of the property, to have been subject to that limitation, it is not necessary to decide at this time. By the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, under which the United States acquired the right of property in all the public lands of that portion of New Mexico which was ceded to this country, it became it right, it had the authority, and it engaged itself by that treaty, to confirm valid Mexican grants. If, therefore, the great surplus which it is claimed was conveyed by its patent to Beaubien and Miranda was the property of the United States, and congress, acting in its sovereign capacity upon the question of the validity of the grant, chose to treat it as valid for the boundaries given to it by the Mexican governor, it is not for the judicial department of this government to controvert their power to do so.'

In support of this we cited Tameling v. United States Freehold, etc., Co., 93 U.S. 644, in which that proposition is emphatically laid down. And in the concluding paragraph of the opinion, referring to the constitutional provision that congress shall have power to dispose of the territory or other property belonging to the United States, (page 382, ante, 1029,) we further said: 'At the time that congress passed upon the grant to Beaubien and Miranda, whatever interest there was in the land claimed which was not legally or equitably their property was the property of the United States; and congress having the power to dispose of that property, and having, as we understand it, confirmed this grant, and thereby made such disposition of it, it is not easily to be perceived how the courts of the United States can set aside this action of congress.' It is therefore quite clear that, as regards this question, the court rested its opinion upon the action of the congress of the United States.

In reference to this action of congress the petition says that it was error on the part of the court 'further to assume that the surveyor general reported to congress upon the extent of the grant, or that congress knew or considered the question of quantity, since no survey had been made, and no statement of area, other than that made by Beaubien to the departmental assembly, appears in the papers in the case.' It is nowhere stated in the opinion of the court th...