United States v. Maxwell
| Decision Date | 12 April 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 16338,16339.,16338 |
| Citation | 278 F.2d 206 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Thomas J. MAXWELL, Appellee (two cases). |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Anthony L. Mondello, Atty., Civil Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Kenneth T. Wilson, Sioux City, Iowa, for appellee.
Before GARDNER, VOGEL and VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judges.
VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge.
United States of America appeals from adverse judgments entered in these two consolidated cases brought under the provisions of the Soil Bank Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq.1
Plaintiff Maxwell owned and operated a 175 acre farm in Plymouth County, Iowa. In the spring of 1957 he entered into contracts to place 54 acres of his land under the conservation reserve program (hereinafter called C. R.) for a period of five years, pursuant to sections 1831-1837, and 39.1 acres in the acreage reserve program (hereinafter called A. R.) for a period of one year, under the provisions of sections 1821-1824. As compensation for compliance Maxwell is to receive $866.88 annually on the C. R. contract and $1407.60 on the A. R. contract.
Maxwell was charged with violations of statutory and contractual prohibition of grazing upon the A. R. and C. R. reserves during the year 1957. Hearings upon the alleged violations in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the statutes and regulations were had before the County Committee and later the State Committee. Maxwell appeared at and participated in such hearings.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the State Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Committee determined that the A. R. and C. R. land had been knowingly and wilfully grazed and that by reason thereof compensation payable in the amount of $866.88 under the C. R. contract is forfeited and a civil penalty of 50%, or $433.44, is imposed; and that compensation of $1407.60 under the A. R. contract is forfeited and a civil penalty of 50%, amounting to $703.80, is imposed.
Section 1831(d) by its terms applicable to C. R. contracts and by 1821(a) (i) made applicable to A. R. contracts, provides in part:
"A contract shall not be terminated under paragraph (6) of subsection (a) of this section unless the nature of the violation is such as to defeat or substantially impair the purposes of the contract."
The statute then makes provision for administrative hearings before county and state committees upon the issue of whether there has been a violation which would warrant termination of a contract. If the State Committee finds a violation which warrants the termination, the producer is given a right to a judicial review of such termination. The statute then provides:
"The action in the United States district court shall be a trial de novo to determine whether there has been a violation which would warrant termination of the contract."
All required administrative procedures were followed. Plaintiff instituted these two actions for judicial review of the State Committee's determination, in accord with the provisions of section 1831.
One action pertains to the C. R. contract; the other to the A. R. contract. The trial court acquired jurisdiction to review the forfeiture determination made by the State Committee.
The situation relative to the recovery of civil penalties is somewhat different. Neither the Secretary nor his representative is given power to adjudicate liability for civil penalties. Section 1811, relating to the enforcement of civil penalties, reads:
The statute just quoted clearly vests jurisdiction to enforce the penalty in the district court. The State Committee exceeded its jurisdiction in attempting to assess penalties. The Committee's determination as to penalties is without any legal significance.
United States has filed counterclaims to enforce the penalties. Issue has been joined upon the counterclaims. The district court, by virtue of the counterclaims, acquired jurisdiction to consider the penalty issue. These cases were consolidated and tried to the court. Separate judgments were entered, determining that there had been no substantial violation of either the A. R. or C. R. contracts, such as would warrant the termination of the contracts, and hence that there was no legal basis for the forfeiture and penalties imposed by the Committee. The court set aside the forfeiture determinations of the Committee, ordered payment of the benefits provided by the contracts to the plaintiff, and dismissed the counterclaims for civil penalties. These appeals are from the final judgments entered.
The rights of the parties under the C. R. and A. R, contracts are substantially the same. No material difference as to applicable law so far as it pertains to the legal problems here presented has been pointed out or discovered by us. There is no material difference in the controlling facts. The trial court filed a memorandum opinion, reported at Maxwell v. Benson, D.C., 173 F.Supp. 75, wherein he sets out the material provisions of the contracts, the applicable statutes, the pertinent facts and the controlling legal principles.
United States urges that the cases should be reversed for the following reasons:
The asserted errors will be considered in the order stated.
These cases were tried to the court.
Questions relating to the credibility of witnesses are presented. Findings of fact made by a trial judge shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. We have frequently stated and applied the well established rule to the effect that:
"In a nonjury case, this Court may not set aside a finding of fact of a trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or unless it was induced by an erroneous view of the law." Neely v. Boland Manufacturing Co., 8 Cir., 274 F.2d 195, 201.
Section 1831(d) provides for a trial de novo in the district court. Such provision negatives any thought that the trial court is bound to give any presumptive force to the findings of the State Committee. The responsibility for determining disputed fact issues is placed squarely upon the trial court. The record shows that the evidence before the court is more extensive and differs in a number of material respects from the record made before the Committee. We observe that the County Committee, some of whose members were personally familiar with the facts bearing upon the alleged grazing violation, made no determination that the violation was knowing and wilful but instead determined that the violation was due "mainly to gross negligence." The County Committee recommended that the A. R. contract be paid in full, but that the C. R. payment should be forfeited, the Committee stating that they had determined "this amount as equal to the value of grazing on both A. R. and C. R., and compensation for expense of checking and reviewing this violation."
The State Committee found the grazing violation to have been knowingly and wilfully committed. The State Committee made no express finding or determination that the violations found were such as to defeat or substantially impair the purpose of the contract, nor did it find that the alleged violations warranted the termination of the contracts. The trial court did not expressly make a finding on whether plaintiff's action with reference to the grazing of the reserve acres was knowing and wilful. A fair reading of the opinion as a whole satisfies us that the court did not regard the violations as wilful. Moreover, it is very doubtful whether there is any substantial evidence to support a finding of wilful violation. It appears incredible to us that the plaintiff, who had 45 acres of pasture in the early summer for the exclusive use of six colts, would wilfully permit them to graze upon the reserve acres.
The trial court held that neither the A. R. nor C. R. contract could be terminated unless the violation of the contract 173 F. Supp. at page 80.
Pursuant to section 1821(i) (ii), the following provisions were made a part of the A. R. contract:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mitchell v. White Motor Credit Corp.
...void, finding it "in direct variance with an unambiguous statutory provision." Lair, 428 F.Supp. at 781 (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 278 F.2d 206, 210 (8th Cir. 1960)). This Court, however, rejects the reasoning of the Lair court, finding instead that 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(a)(1) exempts c......
-
TELEGRAPH S & L ASS'N v. FEDERAL S & L INS. CORP.
...F.2d 212, 217-218 (7th Cir.1939). The presumption accorded ex parte action is one of "prima facie correctness"); but see U.S. v. Maxwell, 278 F.2d 206 (8th Cir.1960). This view is confirmed by the more recent case of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra. In that case, the gover......
-
Buda v. Fulton
...presumption of regularity does not extend to factual determinations by an officer, board, agency or commission. See United States v. Maxwell, 278 F.2d 206, 209, (8 Cir.), and Hiner v. Wenger, supra, loc. cit., 91 S.E.2d 639. See generally, 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, section 753, page ......
-
Caulfield v. US Department of Agriculture
...II. For the reasons spelled out in Dickson v. Edwards, supra, that was the sole matter accorded judicial review. Cf. United States v. Maxwell, 8 Cir., 1960, 278 F.2d 206. Section 1831 (7 U.S.C.A. § 1831) has both an affirmative and negative significance. Affirmatively, in a judicial system ......