United States v. Mayfield
| Citation | 177 F. 765 |
| Decision Date | 11 March 1910 |
| Docket Number | 1,679. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. MAYFIELD et al. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Alabama |
O. D Street, U.S. Atty.
Tillman Bradley & Morrow and John L. Stone, for defendants.
The defendants in this case are charged with having violated certain provisions of what is known as the 'Food and Drugs Act'-- an act passed by Congress in 1906 (Act June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909 p. 1187))-- the purpose of which was to protect consumers against impure and adulterated foods and drugs, and also against the use of foods or drugs which do not show what they contain by the brands on the package. Congress did not have any power to make this law concerning matters relating to commerce entirely within one state, but only as to commerce between one state and another state. The states themselves have the exclusive power to regulate their own internal commerce. So the prohibition of this act is directed only against the introduction into interstate commerce of any article of food or drink, or of any drug, either adulterated or misbranded. These two acts--adulteration and misbranding-- are made offenses when they occur in an article which is introduced into interstate commerce. Now, you will see that the first proposition in this case will be whether or not this shipment was one of an interstate character. This proposition is simplified for your consideration, however, by the admission that this particular jug, which is made the subject of this prosecution, was shipped from Birmingham Ala., to New Orleans, La. Therefore it is conceded that it was introduced into interstate commerce by some one. Now, as I say, the prohibition is against the introduction into interstate commerce of any article of food which is either misbranded or adulterated. I charge you that the shipment in this case was a food product within the meaning of the act of Congress.
In order to make out a case under the first count of the information, which charges misbranding, three things would be necessary for you to believe from the evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt. The first is that there was in the shipment some constituent which should have been, and was not, shown by the brand. The act itself defines what constitutes misbranding in some respects. If the article shipped contains cocaine, and that fact is not indicated by the brand, then the failure to so indicate its presence by the brand is defined to be misbranding. In order to convict on this count, you would have to find that there was cocaine in the jug which went to New Orleans, and that there was nothing on the jug which indicated that it contained cocaine, and that the defendants or some one or more of them were responsible for the introduction of that jug into interstate commerce. These three things you would have to be convinced of beyond a reasonable doubt to convict under the first count of this information. Now as to the presence of cocaine in this liquid there seems to be little dispute. The government experts testified that it was there, and there is no contradiction of this fact by the defendants. Therefore, if the testimony of the government experts convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the presence of cocaine in this liquid-- and you have no right to reject their testimony capriciously and without good cause-- this fact is sufficiently established.
It is conceded that this jug had no brand upon it indicating the presence of cocaine in the liquid in the jug.
Then, the next proposition for you to consider is whether or not these defendants were responsible for the introduction of this shipment into interstate commerce. It is admitted that this jug was introduced into interstate commerce by some one. The evidence shows that the order on which the jug was shipped was received by the Birmingham Celery Cola Company, and by it filled by shipping the jug from Birmingham to New Orleans. Clearly, the Birmingham Celery Cola Company primarily introduced this shipment into interstate commerce. The corporation, however, is not informed against in this prosecution. A corporation acts only by agents. The law is that, if any agent does an illegal act on behalf of his principal, he makes not only the principal liable for his act, but himself as well. An agent cannot shift the responsibility for wrongdoing altogether from his own shoulders onto those of his principal. If the act was illegal, the manager who filled the order and shipped the stuff would be responsible, even though his responsibility was shared by his principal. The manager is not informed against in this prosecution, however. The men who are informed against are stockholders and officers of the company. So far as the mere fact of their being officers and stockholders in the corporation is concerned, I charge you that it does not make them responsible in this prosecution; but their responsibility depends altogether upon whether or not they conferred on the manager the authority to ship Celery Cola from one state into another; and whether the shipment upon which this prosecution is based was made by the manager pursuant to the authority so conferred.
The question for you to inquire into is whether or not the defendants are shown by the evidence, to your satisfaction to have given the manager the authority to do what he did in shipping this Celery Cola out of Birmingham to New Orleans. If, from the evidence, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this authority was conferred upon him by the defendants, then they would be just as responsible as the manager of the Birmingham Celery Cola Company. The evidence tends to show that Celery Cola had been shipped during the time from January 1, 1908, until the date of the shipment on which was based this prosecution, which was some time in October of that year. It also tends to show that when this company began to get into financial difficulty, the defendants secured the manager to take charge of the plant, operate it, and sell its product. That much is conceded by both sides. There is also evidence tending to show that they told the manager expressly to sell the Celery Cola on hand. And I take it that the operation of the plant and the conduct of the business would imply the authority in the manager to sell...
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United States v. Dotterweich, 5
...into interstate commerce could not be held culpable for conduct which was indubitably outlawed by the 1906 Act. See, e.g., United States v. Mayfield, D.C., 177 F. 765. This argument proves too much. It is not credible that Congress should by implication have exonerated what is probably a pr......
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44 489 United States v. Park 8212 215 18 8212 19, 1975
...provisions, and that responsible corporate agents could be subjected to the liability thereby imposed. See, e.g., United States v. Mayfield, 177 F. 765 (ND Ala.1910). Moreover, the principle had been recognized that a corporate agent, through whose act, default, or omission the corporation ......
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...and also against the use of foods or drugs which do not show what they contain by the brands on the package." United States v. Mayfield, 177 F. 765, 766 (N.D.Ala.1910). And in United States v. Dotterweich, supra, 320 U.S. 277, at 282, 64 S.Ct. 134, at 137, the Supreme Court noted the contin......
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