United States v. Mayfield, 86-10004-01.

Citation628 F. Supp. 1515
Decision Date26 February 1986
Docket NumberNo. 86-10004-01.,86-10004-01.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. William W. MAYFIELD, Defendant.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas

Robin Fowler, Asst. U.S. Atty., Wichita, Kan., for plaintiff.

Jim Lawing, Wichita, Kan., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PATRICK F. KELLY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion in limine. The defendant, William W. Mayfield, has been charged with 10 counts of federal firearms violations. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1), and 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 1202(a)(1). Nine of the counts are premised on defendant's felony conviction in 1978 in the Cowley County District Court. The defendant contends the 1978 conviction was void from its inception because he was a juvenile when he committed the crime, and therefore, the state district court was without jurisdiction to hear his plea or to sentence him. K.S.A. 38-808(b). The defendant moves for an order preventing the government from utilizing evidence of the 1978 "conviction" for purposes of the federal firearms charges. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds the Cowley County District Court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment in the 1978 case, and therefore, that judgment is void as a matter of law. As such, it cannot serve as the predicate conviction for the federal firearms charges. Accordingly, the nine counts in the indictment which are premised on the earlier conviction are dismissed.

On July 18, 1978, Mayfield pleaded guilty in the District Court of Cowley County, Kansas, to theft by deception, a Class D Felony under the Kansas Criminal Code. The court inquired if Mayfield was 18 years of age. Mayfield replied that he was, and he was then convicted and sentenced. However, the court failed to inquire whether the defendant was 18 years of age at the time the offense occurred on February 8, 1978. Had the court so inquired, it would have learned that the defendant was only 17 years of age at the time of commission, thereby divesting the court of jurisdiction and requiring that the defendant be dealt with under the juvenile code. Both parties have stipulated to these facts.

K.S.A. 38-815(e) requires that whenever a person 18 years of age or older is taken into custody for an alleged act committed prior to the time the person reached 18, the law enforcement officer shall refer the matter for proceedings pursuant to the juvenile code. According to K.S.A. 38-806(a), proceedings concerning any "delinquent child" (defined in K.S.A. 38-802(b) as a child less than 18 years old who does an act which would be punishable as a felony under the criminal code) are to be governed by the provisions of the juvenile code. Under 38-808(b), a person between the ages of 16 and 18 must be prosecuted under the juvenile code unless a hearing is held on motion of the district attorney and the court finds the child is not a "fit and proper" person to be dealt with under the juvenile code. It is clear that unless the 38-808(b) procedure is followed, the district court has no jurisdiction to try the child under the criminal code.

In State v. Chatmon, 234 Kan. 197, 671 P.2d 531 (1983), the Kansas Supreme Court held that in any criminal action the trial court must have jurisdiction over the offense charged and that a judgment rendered with lack of jurisdiction is void. The Chatmon court relied on State v. Minor, 197 Kan. 296, 300, 416 P.2d 724 (1966), wherein it was stated, "This court has repeatedly held that a judgment which is void for want of jurisdiction may be attacked at any time and may be vacated because it is a nullity."

Based on the foregoing Kansas statutes and cases, this Court finds the Cowley County District Court lacked jurisdiction to convict Mayfield under the Kansas Criminal Code, and therefore, the 1978 conviction of theft by deception is void ab initio.

The issue which must now be determined is whether a judgment which was void at its inception may constitute the predicate for a subsequent federal firearms violation.

The nine counts with which the defendant is charged that depend on the earlier conviction involve: falsely certifying that he had never been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6); receiving firearms transported in interstate commerce, having been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1); and possessing a firearm affecting commerce, having been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 1202(a)(1).

The government contends that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980), and Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983), have clearly established that it is the fact of the previous conviction, and not its validity, which determines whether a person has been "previously convicted" for purposes of the gun control laws. According to the government's argument, the defendant in this case was "previously convicted" for purposes of the firearms violations regardless of whether that conviction was void at its inception for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendant, on the other hand, argues that neither the United States Supreme Court nor Congress—in promulgating the federal gun control laws—could have intended such a harsh result. The defendant maintains that the facts in both Lewis and Dickerson are distinguishable from those in the case at bar.

In Lewis, the defendant argued that he had not violated the gun control laws because his predicate conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. (Lewis did not challenge the earlier conviction on direct appeal; he raised the issue for the first time by way of collateral attack in the firearms proceeding.) The Supreme Court held that a constitutionally infirm conviction could be used by the government as the predicate for a federal firearm conviction, stating, "... § 1202(a)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm despite the fact that the predicate conviction may be subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds." 445 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 921. The Court reached this decision after examining the plain language of the gun control laws, and the intent of the legislature in enacting these laws as ascertained through legislative history. The court pointed out that "no exception ... is made for a person whose outstanding felony conviction might turn out to be invalid for any reason." 445 U.S. at 62, 100 S.Ct. at 919 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that the government should not be put in the position of proving the validity of the predicate conviction. After pointing out that the gun control laws provide a convicted felon with possibilities for relief, including a pardon expressly permitting him to possess a firearm, the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, or a successful challenge to the predicate conviction before obtaining a weapon, the Court concluded, "Congress clearly intended that the defendant clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress' purpose `broadly to keep firearms away from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.'" 445 U.S. at 64-65, 100 S.Ct. at 920-21 (quoting Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218, 96 S.Ct. 498, 502, 46 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)).

Lewis applies in situations where the defendant seeks to attack a firearm conviction on the ground that the predicate conviction is constitutionally infirm (or invalid for any other reason). A subsequent reversal or modification of the underlying conviction will have no effect. See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 630 F.2d 789 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Wilder, 621 F.2d 1077 (10th Cir.1980); and United States v. MacGregor, 617 F.2d 348, 349 (3d Cir.1980). In the case at bar, however, it is not the validity of the underlying conviction which is questioned (insofar as its constitutionality, etc.), it is the very existence of that conviction. A judgment which is void from its inception for lack of jurisdiction is clearly distinguishable from a judgment which may be, or is, invalid due to a constitutional infirmity. In Dickerson, 460 U.S. 103, 111...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • U.S. v. Padilla, 02-50636.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 2 Noviembre 2004
    ...possessing a firearm no matter what infirmity infects his conviction. Padilla relies primarily on the reasoning of United States v. Mayfield, 628 F.Supp. 1515 (D.Kan.1986), a case with similar facts that does support Padilla's position. The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed that decision and......
  • Zerman v. EF Hutton & Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 26 Febrero 1986
    ... ... HUTTON & COMPANY, INC., Defendant ... No. 82 Civ. 4527 (MP) ... United States District Court, S.D. New York ... February 26, 1986.628 F. Supp ... ...
  • State v. Mayfield, 59226
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 12 Junio 1987
    ...under the Kansas Criminal Code, and therefore, the 1978 conviction of theft by deception is void ab initio." United States v. Mayfield, 628 F.Supp. 1515 (D.Kan.1986). The learned trial judge then dismissed the federal charges which were dependent upon prior conviction of a felony. We agree ......
  • U.S. v. Mayfield, 86-1486
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 30 Enero 1987
    ...LOGAN and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. BARRETT, Circuit Judge. The United States appeals from a memorandum and order, United States v. Mayfield, 628 F.Supp. 1515 (D.Kan.1986), in which the district court dismissed nine of ten counts brought against the defendant, William W. Mayfield. The nine c......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT