United States v. Mazon
| Citation | 454 F.Supp.3d 1155 |
| Decision Date | 13 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:18-cr-02208-JCH-1,1:18-cr-02208-JCH-1 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Federico MAZON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
Timothy Dale Trembley, United States Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Federico Mazon's "Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived as a Result of an Invalid Search and Seizure and to Suppress Statements Obtained in Violation of Miranda v. Arizona , and Memorandum in Support Thereof," (ECF No. 28) and "Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived as a Result of a Warrantless and Unlawful Search of his Telephone and Memorandum in Support Thereof" (ECF No. 36). The Court held a hearing on the motions on March 10, 2020. Having considered the motions, briefs, evidence, arguments, and being otherwise fully advised, the Court rules as explained herein.
The Court makes the following findings of fact, as supported by the record, in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d). In making its factual findings, the Court heard the testimony of Tony DeTavis and Eric Wilmeth, law enforcement officers with the New Mexico State Police's Automobile Theft Suppression Unit, whom the Court finds credible and finds have specialized knowledge through their training and experience with automobile theft and drug trafficking practices and recognition of illegal narcotics. See Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript 7:22-24 – 9:1-21; 87:24-25 – 88:23 – 90:1-20 .
On the night of March 31, 2018, DeTavis and Wilmeth patrolled the streets of southeast Albuquerque in their unmarked police truck. Id. 10:21-22; 42:10. Near the intersection of Louisiana Boulevard and Central Avenue, they saw a silver Nissan with a temporary registration tag that was torn and difficult to see because the numbers were covered by tape. Id. 10:25 – 11:1-3; 12:23-25; Govt.’s Exs. 1, 2, 6. When officers queried the temporary tag through law enforcement databases, it was reported as "record not on file," meaning that "the [Motor Vehicle Department did not] have a record of the vehicle." Mot. Hr'g. Tr. 11:3-5; 33:10-12.
So the officers activated their police lights and sirens to stop the vehicle. Id. 11:18-19. The driver, Defendant, slowed down to a rate of speed of about 10 to 15 miles per hour, but nonetheless continued driving more than one-half of a mile and passed six or seven avenues on which he could have safely turned off before finally stopping. Id. 11:20-25 – 12:1-3; 13:10-24; 57:5. Officer DeTavis testified that based on his training, when a driver does not immediately stop in response to police commands, it is typically because the person is hiding contraband inside the car or planning to flee. Id. 14:5-10.
Once the vehicle stopped, Wilmeth approached the driver's door while DeTavis approached the vehicle's passenger door. Id. 15:1-5. At this point, other marked law enforcement officers were on the scene. Id. 14:17-24. Defendant was in the driver's seat and a female was in the passenger seat. Id. 15:6-8. Wilmeth requested Defendant's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Id. 15:12-13.
As Defendant opened the glovebox, he "began to reach for a pistol" within. Id. 15:13-16.1 Officers immediately told Defendant to stop reaching for the gun and then Officer Wilmeth opened the car door and ordered Defendant out of the vehicle. Id. 17:3-4, 7-9; 96:5-7. Officer DeTavis told the passenger not to move as he grabbed the gun from the glovebox and gave it to another officer. Id. 15:24-25 – 16:1-4; 17:8-14. That officer unloaded the gun, revealing ammunition in the chamber and magazine. Id. 17:15-24. After removing the passenger from the car, other officers on the scene determined that she had outstanding arrest warrants. Id. 18:9-17; 70:11-12.
At that point, Officer DeTavis searched the vehicle's identification number (VIN) on the driver's side door frame. Id. 19:6-7. From his position, DeTavis saw a plastic baggie shoved inside the seam of a panel in the driver's footwell area. Id. 19:8-9: 19:22-25 – 20:1-18. Based on his training, DeTavis knew that the baggie contained narcotics and that drivers commonly conceal illegal drugs in the exact location where the baggie was. Id. 20:19-25 – 21:1; 85:6-11.
Meanwhile, Officer Wilmeth escorted Defendant to the trunk of Defendant's car and continued asking Defendant his name, paperwork for the car, and a driver's license. Id. 96:7-9, 21-24. Defendant responded that paperwork for the car and his driver's license could be found in his car, but when Wilmeth looked for those items in the vehicle they were not there. Govt.’s Ex. 11, 5:4-7:9; Mot. Hr'g. Tr. 97:14-25. Wilmeth then ran the name and date of birth that Defendant provided him through a law enforcement database, but no information matched that data. Id. 98:11-24. Other law enforcement officers on the scene communicated with Defendant in English and Spanish in an attempt to identify him, and it was around this time that Defendant was placed in handcuffs. Id. 99:15-20; 100:8-10.
DeTavis alerted Wilmeth to the plastic baggie in the footwell. Id. 102:21-23. Wilmeth walked over to the driver's side and observed a white powdery substance on the floor. Id. 103:16-17. Wilmeth then called Defendant to him, id. 105:1, and as Wilmeth and Defendant stood on the street looking into the open driver's side door, the following exchange occurred:
Govt.’s Ex. 11 at 12:2-13:9. Although Defendant initially consented to Wilmeth "checking it," video footage shows Wilmeth entering the vehicle as Defendant repeatedly said "no." Def.’s Ex. C, 5:34-37. Wilmeth then extracted the baggie from its concealed location and again asked Defendant if the baggie was his, along with the firearm. Mot. Hr'g. Tr. 105:18-20; Govt.’s Ex. 11 at 13:17-14:13.
Officer Wilmeth then searched Defendant's person and found in his pockets packaging material and pieces of THC "wax." Mot. Hr'g. Tr. 106:10-16. Wilmeth did not recall whether he Mirandized Defendant before or after finding these items. Id. 106:20-23. Officers then searched the vehicle on the scene and found a large package in the back-seat center console that Wilmeth identified as illegal narcotics. Id. 109:12-15, 20-22. At that point they stopped the searched, took custody of the vehicle, and planned to apply for a warrant to search it later. Id. 109:17-19.
Two days later, a K-9 detective used a drug sniff dog to search the vehicle's exterior. Id. 117:19-23. The dog alerted to the odor of drugs at the driver's side door seam and window opening, and at the rear driver's side door seam. See Govt.’s Ex. 15, 5. Based on the dog's alerts, Wilmeth obtained and executed a warrant that same day to search the vehicle. Id. at 7. During the search, officers seized the baggie in the footwell and the large package in the back seat, both of which contained methamphetamine. Mot. Hr'g. Tr. 119:7-9; 120:12-16.
Officers’ search of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) eventually showed that the firearm was not stolen. Id. 101:14-22. As for the vehicle, it was registered as "title only" to an insurance company in Arizona. Id. 101:10-13.
Defendant was charged in a three-count superseding indictment for violating federal drug and gun laws. See ECF No. 25. On November 12, 2019, Defendant moved to suppress the drug, gun, and ammunition evidence that police officers retrieved after his encounter with them, claiming that the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant also moves to suppress both pre- and post- Miranda statements that Defendant contends were elicited in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
On December 11, 2019, Defendant filed a second motion to suppress warrantlessly extracted contents from his cellular phone. However, Defendant's second motion is denied as moot because at the suppression hearing Defendant informed the Court that the Government will not utilize the extractions and acknowledged that his motion is not actionable. See Mot. Hr'g. Tr. 187:7-15.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement officers. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. To prove that a search violated the Fourth Amendment, the defendant must show that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a searched place or item. See Rawlings v. Kentucky , 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). United States v. Eckhart , 569 F.3d 1263, 1274 (10th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
However, even if a defendant "lacks the requisite possessory or ownership interest in a vehicle to directly challenge a search of that vehicle," he "may nonetheless contest the lawfulness of his own detention and seek to suppress evidence found in the vehicle as the fruit of [his] detention." United States v. Mosley , 743 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To suppress...
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