United States v. McCready

• Decision Date: 18 March 1882
• Citation: 11 F. 225
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. McCREADY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

11 F. 225

UNITED STATES v. McCREADY.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Tennessee.

March 18, 1882

The indictment in this case contains two counts. The first charges that defendant, at a certain time and place unlawfully 'did take a certain letter then addressed to one Lettie Amis, * * * and which had been in the United States post-office at said Memphis before the said letter had been delivered to the said Lettie Amis, to whom it was then and there addressed and directed, then and there with the design of her, the said Harriet McCready, to obstruct the correspondence of the said Lettie Amis, the said letter not then and there containing any article of value or evidence thereof.'

The second count is like the first, except that it charges that the letter taken 'had then and there been in the custody of one David Washington, * * * a letter carrier of the United States at said Memphis,' and was unlawfully taken 'then and there, with the design of her, the said Harriet McCready, to pry into the business and secrets of the said Lettie Amis.'

This indictment is based on section 3892 of the United States Revised Statutes, which is as follows:

'Any person who shall take any letter, postal card, or packet although it does not contain any article of value or evidence thereof, out of a post-office or branch post-office, or from a letter or mail carrier, or which has been in any post-office or branch post-office, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, with a design to obstruct the correspondence or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy the same, shall, for every such offence, be punishable by a fine of not more than $500, or by imprisonment at hard labor for not more than one year, or both.'

On the trial the jury returned the following special verdict:

'On or about May 14, 1881, David W. Washington, a United States letter carrier, threw into the hall of a building on Union street, (Memphis,) in which Lettie Amis and the defendant occupied rooms near each other, and both opening into the hall, a letter addressed to Lettie Amis, and sent by mail from Collierville. The defendant took this letter, carried it into an adjoining house and opened it, then, after having it read to her, sealed it up and afterwards gave it to Lettie Amis. Lettie Amis had previously instructed the letter carrier to leave her letters in that hall. The defendant took and opened the said letter with the intent to obstruct the correspondence and pry into the business and secrets of Lettie Amis. The letter did not contain any article of value or evidence thereof.'

John T. Moss, for defendant.

W. W. Murray, Dist. Atty., and John B. Clough, Asst. Atty., for the United States.

HAMMOND D.J.

The question for the consideration of the court in this case is whether, under the facts found by the jury in their special verdict, the defendant is guilty, as charged in this indictment, or has violated the provisions of the statute under which it is drawn. The indictment charges the offence literally in the words of the statute, and the special verdict finds all the material allegations of both counts to be true.

But it is insisted for the defendant that these facts do not constitute a violation of the statute, because, as the letter was taken by the defendant after its delivery by the letter carrier at a place designated by Lettie Amis for the delivery of her mail, it had in law been 'delivered' within the intent and meaning of the act; and that, if a proper construction of its language embraces an offence committed after the letter has passed from the actual control of the post-office officials and agents, and before mutual delivery to the person to whom it was directed, the enactment is to that extent beyond the legislative power of congress.

The clause of the statute material to be considered is the taking of 'any letter * * * which has been in any post-office or branch post-office, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it had been delivered to the person to whom it was directed,' with the unlawful design. From the language used there can be no doubt that congress intended to protect letters sent by mail from embezzlement, and from interference, with the improper designs here enumerated, until they reached their destination by a proper delivery. The offence created is concerning a letter which 'has been' in the mail, as well as the unlawful taking of a letter 'out of a post-office,' or 'from a letter or mail carrier,' evidencing an intention on the part of congress to protect postal correspondence from depredation as well after it has left the actual custody of the agents and officers of the post-office department as during the transit, or while in the post-office or in the hands of the letter carrier for delivery. The offences denounced by the last clause of the statute are the secretion, embezzlement, or destruction of letters before they have reached the persons to whom directed; and, under the language used, none of these offences could be committed until after the letters had left the custody of the postal authorities and agents; and, according to the defendant's argument, they would not, therefore, be punishable. Persons employed in the postal service of the government are punished for these offences by the preceding section, and this section seems intended to apply to other than postal employes.

This act has been several times considered by the circuit courts, and a few of the cases will be examined. In the case of U.S. v. Parsons, 2 Blatchf. 104, decided in 1849, a special verdict was found, under the literal facts of which the defendant was guilty of opening (then an offence under the act before revision) a letter with the design here charged. Without discussing the authority of congress to pass the act, the court held it did not embrace the case made by the facts found, which were as follows: A letter carrier having a letter for delivery directed to Charles H. Parsons, gave it to A., in the defendant's house, in the absence of the defendant, who afterwards, at a different place, gave it to the defendant, who opened and embezzled the contents. The defendant's name was the same as that on the direction of the letter. The court says: 'We think that the object of this section does not look beyond a possession of letters obtained wrongfully from the post-office or from a letter carrier. Its design is to guard the post-office and its legitimate agents in the execution of their duties in the safe-keeping and delivery of letters. After the voluntary termination of the custody of a letter by the post-office or its agents, the property in and right of possession to it belong wholly to its real proprietor, and his rights are under the guardianship of the local law and not of that of the United States. All action and authority of the post-office department in respect to the letter terminated on its delivery to that third person, and in our opinion it was not intended that the act of congress should apply any longer than while the letter should be within the power and control of that department.'

It seems to be conceded, however, by the learned judge that if the letter in this case had been wrongfully obtained from the letter carrier, the case would have been within the statute; yet the argument used in support of the doctrine that a letter is not protected after the termination of its custody by the post-office agents, would as well apply to a wrongful as to a rightful possession of it.

In the case of U.S. v. Sander, 6 McL. 598, (A.D. 1855,) the indictment contained two counts,-- one charging the defendant with opening a letter with the prohibited designs; the other, with secreting and embezzling it. The defence was that defendant was the authorized agent of Phoebe Sturdivant, to whom the letter was directed, and that a delivery to him was in law such a delivery to her that the functions of the government over the letter thereupon terminated. The court so held, saying:

'A letter having been committed to the post-office department for carriage and delivery, if once parted with by the postmaster to a person authorized to receive it, from that moment ceases alike to be under the control of the department, and the power and authority of the general government. * * * When the functions of the department are exhausted by the proper delivery of mail matter, (once placed in its charge,) such mail matter is then beyond the reach and authority of any legislation of congress.'

Yet while the learned judge in charging the jury in that case instructed them to return a verdict of not guilty if they found the defendant was the authorized agent, as alleged, and received the letter from the post-office without any criminal purpose entertained at the time, he also charged that if, when he obtained it from the post-office, he had the criminal intent of opening with the design specified in the statute, the offence was complete, having had its inception in his taking the letter from the office with the wrongful intent. It is difficult to see how, under the above-quoted construction of the act, the question of 'design' or 'intent' could enter into the consideration of the question if the defendant was the authorized agent to receive the letter, or how the opening or embezzlement of the letter after it is taken by rightful authority from the post-office, but with an intent to violate the seal for the forbidden or wrongful purpose, would be within the statute or within the scope of the legislative power of congress, while one so taken with a proper intention would not be longer within that protection. In either case the criminal...