United States v. McGirt

Citation458 F.Supp.3d 564
Decision Date05 May 2020
Docket NumberCRIMINAL CASE NO. 4:16-CR-86
Parties UNITED STATES of America v. Weseley MCGIRT (4)
CourtUnited States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District Texas

Tracey M. Batson, U.S. Attorney's Office U.S. Dept. of Justice, Plano, TX, for United States of America.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

SEAN D. JORDAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Weseley McGirt's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. #298). McGirt requests that the Court reduce his sentence to time served due to COVID-19 and release him to home confinement. McGirt also filed a supplemental motion in support. (Dkt. #299). The Government replied in opposition. (Dkt. #301). The Court, having considered the motions, the record, and the applicable law, DISMISSES the motion and the supplemental motion for want of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

Weseley McGirt pleaded guilty to one count of felon in possession of a firearm while an unlawful user of a controlled substance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The charge arose from McGirt's drug trafficking as a member of the "Crips" street gang. On November 20, 2017, McGirt was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. (Dkt. #246). McGirt has been detained in FCI Oakdale I in Oakdale, Louisiana, where he has served nearly 30 months of his sentence.

McGirt moves for a reduction of his sentence to time served pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. #298). McGirt contends that he is eligible for such a reduction because of the general danger presented by the COVID-19 pandemic to prison populations, especially in the FCI Oakdale I facility, his medical history of thyroid removal, and his low risk of recidivism. McGirt did not exhaust administrative remedies available through the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") prior to filing this motion. In a supplemental motion, McGirt reasserts his contentions and adds that he is not required to exhaust administrative remedies to obtain relief. (Dkt. #299).

The Government opposes McGirt's request. (Dkt. #301). The Government argues that McGirt's failure to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s threshold exhaustion requirement precludes relief, as exhaustion is a jurisdictional bar or, alternatively, a mandatory claims-processing rule. Exhaustion aside, the Government further argues that McGirt has not shown a right to relief on the merits because his reasons for release are not "extraordinary and compelling."

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A judgment of conviction imposing a sentence of imprisonment "constitutes a final judgment and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances." Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 824, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(b), (c). One such exception arises from section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which authorizes a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment if, after considering the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it determines that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" support a sentence reduction and that reduction is "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).1 A sentence modification under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) may be obtained only through a motion made either by the Director of the BOP or by a defendant "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf" or "the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier[.]" Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

III. DISCUSSION

McGirt's failure to meet section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement deprives this Court of jurisdiction to consider modifying his sentence. Even if the Court could exercise adjudicatory authority over McGirt's motion, the relief he requests would nonetheless remain precluded by section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement, as it is not susceptible to any judicially created exception. McGirt's motion must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

A. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s Exhaustion Requirement Is Jurisdictional.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), district courts have authority to modify a prisoner's sentence under narrow circumstances. One such circumstance, invoked by McGirt, is provided by section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). This provision allows a court to modify a defendant's sentence if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a reduction of the sentence and the reduction is "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]" Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). But section 3582(c)(1)(A) makes clear that a court cannot consider any modification to a defendant's sentence under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) unless a motion for such modification is properly made by the Director of the BOP or by a defendant who has fully exhausted administrative remedies.

Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s mandate is unequivocal. The Director of the BOP may request a sentence reduction in court at any time. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A defendant may also make such a request, but only after fully exhausting remedies within the BOP or allowing 30 days to pass since seeking administrative remedies. Id. Here, it is undisputed that the BOP has not requested a reduction on McGirt's behalf, nor has McGirt pursued administrative remedies within the BOP. Under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent, section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, and McGirt's failure to meet that requirement deprives the Court of jurisdiction to consider a modification to his sentence.

It is well-settled in the Fifth Circuit that 18 U.S.C. § 3582 sets out the limited instances in which a district court has jurisdiction to modify a term of imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia , 606 F.3d 209, 212 n.5 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ("The district court's jurisdiction to correct or modify a defendant's sentence is limited to those specific circumstances enumerated by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3582.") (citing United States v. Bridges , 116 F.3d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 1997) ). In an unbroken line of cases over two decades, circuit precedent has reaffirmed that section 3582 provides a limited grant of jurisdiction for a district court to modify a term of imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. Rene , 785 F. App'x 240, 240–41 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); Bridges , 116 F.3d at 1112. Because these cases speak in terms of section 3582 as a whole, it follows that section 3582(c)(1)(A), and the limitations within, circumscribe the Court's jurisdiction.

The Court recognizes that, in a series of recent opinions, the Supreme Court has cautioned against imprecise use of the "jurisdictional" label, which can elide "the ‘critical difference[s] between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional limitations on causes of action." Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick , 559 U.S. 154, 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). To reinforce these critical differences, the Supreme Court has encouraged courts to use the label "jurisdictional" "not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority." Kontrick v. Ryan , 540 U.S. 443, 454–55, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) ; see also id. at 455, 124 S.Ct. 906 ("Jurisdiction" refers to "a court's adjudicatory authority"). Claims-processing rules, in contrast, "seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Henderson v. Shinseki , 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011). Based upon this line of Supreme Court authority, some courts have determined that section 3582 is a nonjurisdictional, mandatory claims-processing rule. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor , 778 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2015) ; see also United States v. Calton , 900 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that the Taylor court concluded that section 3582 "is not part of a jurisdictional portion of the criminal code," and that section 3582(c) is not "phrased in jurisdictional terms").

The Court is skeptical that the Supreme Court's recent authority distinguishing jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional statutory limitations will cause the Fifth Circuit to overrule its prior jurisprudence and hold that section 3582 is merely a claims-processing rule. Neither the text of section 3582 nor Supreme Court precedent supports such a reversal of the Fifth Circuit's established understanding of the statute. The Supreme Court has made clear that, to determine whether a statutory prescription is a jurisdictional limitation on a court's adjudicatory authority, courts must "look to see if there is any ‘clear’ indication that Congress wanted the rule to be ‘jurisdictional.’ " Henderson , 562 U.S. at 436, 131 S.Ct. 1197. That indication, however, does not turn on Congress's use of "magic words." Id. Instead, as the Supreme Court has explained, Congress's intent must be determined through traditional tools of statutory construction by examining the "text, context, and relevant historical treatment" of the limitation at issue, Reed Elsevier , 559 U.S. at 166, 130 S.Ct. 1237 (citation omitted), and "what they reveal about the purposes [the limitation] is designed to serve," Dolan v. United States , 560 U.S. 605, 610, 130 S.Ct. 2533, 177 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010).

Both the text and context of section 3582 demonstrate that its requirements are not simply rules that "seek to promote the orderly process of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Henderson , 562 U.S. at 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197. Instead, ...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT