United States v. McGrane

• Decision Date: 08 February 1921
• Docket Number: 2622.
• Citation: 270 F. 761
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. McGRANE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

270 F. 761

UNITED STATES v. McGRANE.

No. 2622.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

February 8, 1921

Isaiah Matlack, of Trenton, N.J., for the United States.

James B. McGrane, of Philadelphia, Pa., and James Mercer Davis and John A. Riggins, both of Camden, N.J., for defendant in error.

Before BUFFINGTON and WOOLLEY, Circuit Judges, and LYNCH, District judge.

BUFFINGTON Circuit Judge.

In this case, James B. McGrane, a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, against the United States. McGrane, as appears from the record, owned land in New Jersey. The government under power which both government and McGrane conceded was vested in it by section 10 of the Act of Congress of August 10, 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, Sec 3115 1/8ii) seized and took title to said land for storage purposes. The compensation fixed by the President, under the terms of the act, not being satisfactory to McGrane, he brought this suit in the District Court, where the cause was tried by jury, verdict rendered, and judgment entered thereon in his favor. Thereupon the government sued out a writ of error to this court.

We state the question involved in the case, by using the language of the counsel of the United States, as found in their brief, viz.:

'The question presented is whether the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, in a suit for the recovery of just compensation for land requisitioned under section 10 of the Act of August 10, 1917, (40 Stat. Sec 10, c. 53, p. 279), has jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause, and whether the defendant in error was entitled to trial by jury, either by virtue of the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or by reason of the provisions of the act. The District Court held in the affirmative on each issue. This, the defendant submits, was error.

'I. Section 10 of the Act of August 10, 1917 (40 Stat.p. 279), giving jurisdiction to the United States District Court was superseded by the Act of March 2, 1919 (40 Stat.p. 1272 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, Secs. 3115 14/15a-3115 14/15e)), and the United States District Courts have no jurisdiction to hear suits under section 10 of the Act of August 10, 1917.

'II. The amount sued for is in excess of $10,000 and therefore without the jurisdiction of the United States District Court.'

Turning to the first question, we inquire whether section 10 of the Act of August 10, 1917, was repealed by the Act of March 2, 1919, 40 Stat.p. 1272. After due consideration, we are of opinion it was not, and our reasons for so holding we now state:

In the first place, the act of 1919 nowhere states or evidences a purpose to repeal the act of 1917. The statute of 1917 was one of war necessity, and, under its provisions, acts of inclusive scope had been done, and property of large value had been taken by the government, and unadjusted liabilities of great amounts were in process of adjustment when the act of 1919 was passed. By the act of 1917, jurisdiction had been 'conferred on the United States District Courts to hear and determine all such controversies,' namely, those arising under the act. No suggestion is now made, and in the absence thereof we are justified in concluding that none were or could have been made to Congress, that the jurisdiction thus conferred by Congress on the District Courts was unsuitable in process or had proved unsatisfactory in performance. In the absence, therefore, of any call for changing that jurisdiction, and in the absence of any expression or implication in the statute to repeal, supersede, or affect the act of 1917, and in view of the fact that such widespread change in the statute of the then accrued war claims under it would naturally and reasonably have been evidenced in express enactments, and not be left to implication, we cannot attribute to Congress, and to the act of 1919, an intent to repeal the statute of 1917. This conclusion is supported by the further consideration that the particular department of the government to which was intrusted the enforcement of the act of 1917, continued after the act of 1919 was passed on March 2, 1919, to act under the law of 1917, for on May 31, 1919, the award was made to McGrane, an award authorized by the act of 1917, and one that had no basis of support save section 10 thereof, and a practice by a department is, where long enough continued, an interpretation of a law. United States Fidelity Co. v. Commonwealth, 186 F. 290, 108 C.C.A. 331, citing Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 308, 2 L.Ed. 115.

Moreover it is clear to us, both...