United States v. Meadows, Cr. A. No. 5553

• Decision Date: 21 March 1955
• Docket Number: 5597,Cr. A. No. 5553,5598.
• Citation: 140 F. Supp. 184
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Gene Arnold MEADOWS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

140 F. Supp. 184

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Gene Arnold MEADOWS, Defendant.

Cr. A. Nos. 5553, 5597, 5598.

United States District Court W. D. Michigan, S. D.

March 21, 1955.

Wendell A. Miles, U. S. Atty., Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiff.

Gene Arnold Meadows, in pro. per.

STARR, Chief Judge.

In Criminal Action No. 5553 defendant Gene Arnold Meadows and one Lester Paul Hockman, who were named as codefendants, were indicted on May 18, 1951, by a Federal grand jury in this district for the transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce, knowing the vehicle to have been stolen. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. On May 21, 1951, upon the request of Meadows and Hockman, one Leon B. Buer of Grand Rapids, Michigan, a competent and experienced attorney, was appointed to represent them. On May 22, 1951, they were arraigned with their attorney present, and each defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of both of the defendants was adjourned from time to time upon their request, the request of their attorney, and the request of the United States attorney.

Defendant Meadows was arraigned on February 25, 1952, in Criminal Action No. 5597 under an information charging that while he was being transported to jail for confinement by a deputy United States marshal, he forcibly assaulted one Henry Kloet, a person employed to assist the deputy marshal. 18 U.S.C.A. § 111. Upon his arraignment with his attorney present, Meadows waived grand-jury indictment and voluntarily pleaded guilty of that offense. On the same date Meadows was arraigned in Criminal Action No. 5598 under an information charging him with attempting to escape from the custody of a Federal officer. 18 U.S.C.A. § 751. Upon his arraignment with his attorney present, Meadows waived grand-jury indictment and voluntarily pleaded guilty of that offense.

On the same date, February 25, 1952, defendant Meadows changed his plea of not guilty in Criminal Action No. 5553 to a plea of nolo contendere and, upon the recommendation of the United States attorney, the court accepted such plea. On March 7, 1952, Meadows was sentenced in Criminal Action No. 5553 to a prison term of two years and in Criminal Action No. 5598 to a prison term of three years, said terms to run consecutively. On the same date the court suspended imposition of sentence in Criminal Action No. 5597 and placed defendant Meadows on probation for a term of two years, said period of probation to begin upon his release from actual confinement under the combined sentences imposed in Criminal Actions Nos. 5553 and 5598. Meadows began service of the above-mentioned sentences in the United States penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana.

It appears that sometime later Meadows was removed from the Federal penitentiary at Terre Haute to the District of Columbia to stand trial on a robbery charge in a criminal action in that district entitled United States of America v. Gene Arnold Meadows. He now contends that in that action a hearing was held on October 17, 1952, on the question of his mental competency to stand trial; that the court made a finding that he was mentally incompetent; that he was ordered committed to St. Elizabeth's hospital in Washington, D. C., for treatment; that he remained in that hospital until September 3, 1953, when he was transferred to the United States medical center for Federal prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, for treatment; and that he is still undergoing treatment at the medical center.

It may be noted that defendant Meadows' codefendant, Lester Paul Hockman, who was first represented by attorney Leon B. Buer appointed by the court at Hockman's request, and who was later represented by an attorney of his own selection and employment, likewise changed his plea of not guilty in Criminal Action No. 5553 to a plea of nolo contendere and that, on the recommendation of the United States attorney, the court accepted such plea; also that Hockman pleaded guilty under an information in Criminal Action No. 5595 charging him with forcibly assaulting a deputy United States marshal, and pleaded guilty under an information in Criminal Action No. 5596 charging him with attempting to escape from the custody of the United States marshal; that on March 7, 1952, the same sentences and terms of imprisonment and probation in Criminal Actions 5553, 5595, and 5596 were imposed upon Hockman that were imposed upon defendant Meadows in actions 5553, 5597, and 5598. It appears that Hockman and Meadows were both removed from the penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, to the District of Columbia for trial on robbery charges against them and that both sought hearings in the robbery actions as to their mental competency.

Defendant Meadows has now filed a motion to vacate and set aside his pleas and convictions and the sentences imposed upon him in this court as hereinbefore set forth. He has also filed a motion with his supporting affidavit that he be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, and he has requested that counsel be appointed for him. His motion to set aside and vacate his pleas, convictions, and sentences is filed in pursuance of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.¹ In support of his motion Meadows contends that prior to and at the times he committed the offenses charged in the grand-jury indictment in Criminal Action No. 5553 and in the informations in Criminal Actions Nos. 5597 and 5598, and at the time he entered pleas and was sentenced in each of these actions, he was mentally incompetent, did not understand the charges made against him, and was unable to waive his constitutional rights; and that the sentence imposed upon him in each of said actions was void. However, he makes no showing whatever by documents or affidavits as to the determination of his mental competency by the court in the District of Columbia or as to his commitment and confinement in St. Elizabeth's hospital, or as to his present confinement and treatment in the medical center for Federal prisoners at Springfield, Missouri. It should also be noted that he makes no claim that he was ever adjudged mentally incompetent or insane prior to his commission of the offenses involved in the three criminal actions in this court or prior to his pleas, convictions, and sentences in said actions.²

The government filed its answer to Meadows' motion, in which it contends that he was represented by competent counsel at the time of his arraignments, pleas, convictions, and sentences; that he was not deprived of any of his constitutional rights; and that his present contentions as to his mental incompetency or insanity are matters to be referred to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons under administrative procedure provided by 18 U.S.C.A. § 4245, which provides:

"Whenever the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall certify that a person convicted of an offense against the United States has been examined by the board of examiners referred to in title 18, United States Code, section 4241, and that there is probable cause to believe that such person was mentally incompetent at the time of his trial, provided the issue of mental competency was not raised and determined before or during said trial, the Attorney General shall transmit the report of the board of examiners and the certificate of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to the clerk of the district court wherein the conviction was had. Whereupon the court shall hold a hearing to determine the mental competency of the accused in accordance with the provisions of section 4244 above, and with all the powers therein granted. In such hearing the certificate of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall be prima facie evidence of the facts and conclusions certified therein. If the court shall find that the accused was mentally incompetent at the time of his trial, the court shall vacate the judgment of conviction and grant a new trial."

It seems clear that defendant Meadows has misconceived the procedure which he should follow in raising the question of his mental competency or sanity at the times he pleaded and was convicted and sentenced in the three criminal actions in this court. Section 4245 quoted above expressly relates to a person who has been convicted of an offense against the United States and provides for an examination by a board of examiners. It also provides in effect that if the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall certify that there is probable cause to believe that the person was mentally incompetent at the time of his trial and conviction, and if the issue of mental competency was not raised and determined before or at the time of his trial and conviction, the Attorney General shall transmit the report of the examiners and the certificate of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to the clerk of the district court wherein the conviction was had, and the court shall then hold a hearing to determine the mental competency of the accused at the time of his conviction. Under said section 4245 Meadows may request an examination by the board of examiners and may request a certification by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that there is probable cause to believe that he was mentally incompetent at the time he was convicted and sentenced, and the court upon receipt of the report of the board of examiners and the certificate of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons will then hold the hearing required by said statute to determine his mental competency. It should be noted that section 4245, which expressly provides the procedure Meadows should follow, was enacted in September, 1949, subsequent to the decision in June, 1949, in Allen v. United States, 6 Cir., 162 F.2d 193.

As mentioned above, Meadows' motion to vacate and set aside his pleas, convictions, and sentences is filed in pursuance of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, quoted in footnote 1, and the government further contends that under that section he cannot collaterally attack the judgments of conviction and sentence...