United States v. Medina, (Criminal No. 97-190-1) (E.D. Pa. 7/30/2001)
| Decision Date | 30 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 00-623.,(Criminal No. 97-190-1). |
| Parties | United States Of America v. Gustavo Medina |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Petitioner Gustavo Medina, pro se, moves to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255.1
On July 21, 1997, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 18 U.S.C. § 846. On November 9, 1998, he was sentenced to 135 months custody and five years supervised release. On appeal the sentence was affirmed.2 United States v. Medina, 203 F.3d 818, No. 98-2094, slip op. (3d Cir. Nov. 23, 1999). He now challenges the sentence on three grounds: 1) the procedure under which the plea was taken contravened Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11; 2) the plea he entered was "not guilty"; and 3) ineffective assistance of counsel.
The plea and the sentencing were before the Honorable Marjorie O. Rendell, then of this court.
Petitioner maintains that the district court deviated from the requirements of Rule 11 by: (1) impermissibly delegating its responsibilities to the prosecutor and courtroom deputy, who did not advise him of the essential elements of a conspiracy, the identity of his co-conspirators, or the correct maximum term or effect of supervised release; and (2) injecting a waiver of rights that were not part of the Rule 11 requirements or the plea agreement. He also asserts that at the end of the colloquy, he pleaded "not guilty" and that, therefore, he was not sentenced on a guilty plea.4
"To be entitled to habeas corpus relief under section 2255, [petitioner] must show that the Rule 11 error amounted to `a fundamental defect which inherently result[ed] in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.'" United States v. Cleary, 46 F.3d 307, 310-11 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Deluca, 889 F.2d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 1989)). Therefore, "[n]ot only must [petitioner] demonstrate an error of constitutional magnitude, but he also must show that he was prejudiced by that error, i.e., that he did not understand the consequences of his plea or that, if he had been properly advised about the effect of [his sentence], he would not have pled guilty." Cleary, 46 F.3d at 311.
Petitioner argues that the court erred because under Rule 11(c)(1) "the indictment, the plea agreement, and plea colloquy did not apprise the Petitioner [of] the identity of a co-conspirator, the meaning of conspiracy, [or] the correct maximum supervised release. . . ." Pet. at 15. Under Rule 11(c), "[b]efore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands. . . the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered. . . ." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). "[M]ost courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant was informed of the nature of the charges against him, considering factors such as the complexity of the charge, the age, intelligence, and education of the defendant, and whether the defendant was represented by counsel." United States v. Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 502, 508 (3d Cir. 2000). A challenge to Rule 11(c) may be rejected "`where the record plainly shows that the defendant understood the nature of the charges despite a flawed inquiry by the court.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1521 (2d Cir. 1997)).
The record shows that the nature of the charge was adequately delineated.5 The prosecutor said that petitioner, having learned of a conspiracy to distribute between 300 and 550 kilograms of cocaine, agreed to distribute portions of it in New York City. 7/21/97 tr. at 6-7. In response to the court's inquiry, petitioner stated that he heard the prosecutor, and that he fully understood and discussed with his counsel the indictment.6 Id. at 7-8. The indictment contained the essential elements of a conspiracy;7 that a co-conspirator was unidentified is inconsequential.8 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 679 F.2d 845, 851 (11th Cir. 1982) ().
As to petitioner's assertion that "the agreement element of conspiracy" was not adequately explained to him, pet. at 15, our Court of Appeals recently considered, and rejected, a similar argument in United States v. Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 502 (3d Cir. 2000). There a district court's failure to specifically state elements of the offense in a plea colloquy was held to be a harmless variance under Rule 11(c)(1) because the indictment contained the essential elements of the offense, and the reasonably sophisticated defendant admitted to having reviewed it with his counsel. Id. at 508-09. Similarly, in this case, given petitioner's reasonable sophistication,9 his review of the indictment with his attorney, and the extensive inquiry at the plea hearing, if a deviation from Rule 11 occurred, it was harmless. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h) ().10
Petitioner also asserts that the court participated in the plea agreement in violation of Rule 11(e)(1).11 Specifically, he maintains, the court modified the agreement by requiring him to waive rights in the plea colloquy that were not part of the plea agreement or required by Rule 11.12 His argument is without merit.
"The Rule 11(e)(1) prohibition `simply commands that the judge not participate in, and remove him or herself from, any discussion of a plea agreement that has not yet been agreed to by the parties in open court.'" United States v. Bierd, 217 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1992)). "The primary philosophy behind it is that `[j]udicial involvement in plea negotiations inevitably carries with it the high and unacceptable risk of coercing a defendant to accept the proposed agreement and plead guilty.'" Id. Here, the statements made by the court, to inform petitioner of those rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, simply did not create the type of pressure or coercion contemplated by Rule 11(e).
As regards the plea colloquy, petitioner further argues that the government did not establish a sufficient factual basis for the acceptance of the plea, thereby violating Rule 11(f). Rule 11(f): "Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment . . . without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(f). "The court may make that inquiry by looking to the defendant's own admissions, the government's proffer of evidence, the presentence report, or `whatever means is appropriate in a specific case — so long as the factual basis is put on the record.'" Cefaratti, 221 F.3d at 509 (quoting United States v. Smith, 160 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1998)).
According to unchallenged facts stated by the prosecutor, petitioner introduced a confidential informant to his co-conspirator, Alfred Fuentes, relative to the sale of an airplane. Subsequently, upon finding out that they also made a drug deal, petitioner demanded payment from the informant for having introduced him to Fuentes. Petitioner traveled from New York to Philadelphia on a few occasions to meet with the informant and an undercover agent. During the meetings, he agreed to arrange for the sale of 50 kilograms of the 300 to 500 kilograms of cocaine that the informant was to receive from Fuentes. 7/21/97 tr. at 18-19.
During the plea colloquy, petitioner acknowledged that the facts were correct with two exceptions. First, he disagreed that a total of 62 kilograms were attributable to him.13 Secondly, as stated by his attorney, "when [petitioner] introduced Mr. Fuentes in Venezuela, with the confidential informant, to buy the airplane, or airplanes, he was not aware at that time that it was a drug transaction." 7/21/97 tr. at 19-20. Petitioner now asserts that there was not a sufficient factual basis to establish conspiracy.
"To prove a conspiracy, the government must establish a unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators, an intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work together toward that goal." United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). "The government need not prove that each defendant knew all of the conspiracy's details, goals, or other participants." Id. Here, as the plea colloquy makes clear, petitioner acted as intermediary between the purchasers and importers of the 50 kilograms of cocaine, thereby taking "`a step in achieving the conspiracy's common goal of distributing cocaine for profit.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 593 (3d Cir. 1989)). Moreover, in response to the court's inquiry, petitioner admitted his knowing involvement in the conspiracy. The plea, therefore, was supported by a sufficient factual basis.
Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective by: 1) not moving to dismiss the indictment; and 2) advising him to plead guilty prior to investigating and adequately assessing the merits of his case.
To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, petitioner must show "(1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Nino, 878 F.2d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-69, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Prejudice in the context of a guilty plea means "a...
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