United States v. Meek, 16309.

Decision Date02 February 1968
Docket NumberNo. 16309.,16309.
Citation388 F.2d 936
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George Walter MEEK, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Harvey B. Stephens, Springfield, Ill., for appellant.

Carl W. Feickert, U. S. Atty., Arthur J. Ginsburg, Asst. U. S. Atty., E. St. Louis, Ill., for appellee.

Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and CASTLE and SWYGERT, Circuit Judges.

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.

George W. Meek was indicted on a two-count indictment. The first count charged him with transporting in interstate commerce a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312; the second count charged him with concealing the same stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313. After a jury found the defendant guilty on both counts, the district court sentenced him to concurrent five year terms of imprisonment. In seeking a reversal, the defendant makes four claims: the insufficiency of the evidence, the lack of a fair trial, the erroneous admission of evidence, and the giving of improper instructions.

A white Mustang automobile owned by Airways Rent-A-Car of Tampa, was rented in Tampa, Florida for two days on March 14, 1966. The rental agreement was signed "George W. Meek", as lessee. When the car was not returned to the rental agency, a theft report was filed with the local sheriff's office on March 21, 1966.

Howard Richard Hanson, the Government's chief witness and an acquaintance of the defendant, met him for the first time on March 24, 1966 in a restaurant in East St. Louis, Illinois. The next morning, the defendant solicited Hanson to drive with him to Arkansas "to get some titles changed." On the morning after their return, the defendant picked up Hanson at his home and drove to a house in St. Louis, Missouri. There the defendant removed Missouri license plates from a black Mustang automobile registered in the name of Margaret Ecker. They then drove to the Triple A Salvage lot in East St. Louis where a white Mustang was parked. The defendant took some keys out of his pocket, got in the white Mustang and started the motor, while Hanson put on the license plates which they had previously picked up in St. Louis.

The defendant told Hanson to drive the car to Hanson's house where he was "supposed to pick it up * * * later on in the evening." While driving the white Mustang, Hanson was arrested for speeding in Centreville, Illinois. After being told by Hanson that the car was stolen, the arresting officer examined the car for its identification number. This number corresponded to the identification number listed on the Florida registration certificate covering the car described in the Airways rental agreement.

While the defendant and Hanson were on their way to St. Louis to pick up the license plates, the defendant told him that he had rented the white Mustang "five or six months before in Florida." Later, at the Triple A Salvage lot, the defendant said to Hanson, "I am going to come over to your house and pick up the car after while and take it over to St. Louis and get rid of it." He also told Hanson, "Make sure you don't tell anybody about the car being at the Triple A place, so nobody will get in trouble."

The defendant contends that no evidence was adduced at the trial to prove that the motor vehicle in question was rented by him or was in his possession in Tampa, Florida. He also contends that there was no competent evidence from which the jury could infer that he had possession of the vehicle, knowing either that it was stolen or that it had been transported in interstate commerce. Finally, the defendant argues that there was no showing that the car rented in Florida was the same car that Hanson was driving at the time he was arrested.

For the Government to prevail on the count charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312, there must be proof that the automobile in question was stolen, that the defendant knew the automobile was stolen, and that the stolen automobile was transported in interstate commerce. We believe that there was sufficient evidence, both direct and circumstantial, to satisfy these elements of the offense. Settled precedent has established that a rented automobile which has not been returned to its owner, but has been converted to the lessee's own use, is a stolen vehicle within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 77 S.Ct. 397, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957). Moreover, from the evidence of possession of a recently stolen motor vehicle, unless such possession is satisfactorily explained, an inference may properly be drawn that the possessor knew the car was stolen. United States v. Bennett, 356 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975, 86 S.Ct. 1868, 16 L.Ed.2d 685 (1966).

Although there was no direct evidence adduced to show either that the defendant rented the automobile in question from the agency in Tampa, Florida, or that he drove it to East St. Louis, Illinois, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the jury to draw such inferences. The owner of the Triple A lot testified that the defendant brought a white Mustang to his place of business at the end of March, 1966. Hanson testified that the defendant took him to a Mustang parked on the Triple A lot. He further testified that the defendant had keys to the car, that he started the engine, and that he gave possession of the car to Hanson. The car that Hanson was driving when he was arrested was later identified as the car rented from Airways by "George W. Meek."

Evidence that the identification number found on the car driven by Hanson was the same as the number on the state registration certificate covering the car described in the rental agreement was ample to show that the car rented in Florida was the same car that the defendant turned over to Hanson in Illinois. This conclusion is supported by the defendant's admission to Hanson that he had rented the Mustang in Florida. From all this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant rented the Mustang in Florida, converted it, and then transported it to Illinois.

In addition, the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant concealed the Mustang, knowing that it was stolen and moving in interstate commerce, as charged in the second count of the indictment. The defendant's procurement of Missouri license plates, which Hanson placed on the car at the Triple A lot, was an act of concealment. Phillips v. United States, 206 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1953). Although the white Mustang came to rest temporarily in Illinois, that fact alone does not preclude the drawing of an inference that the car was still moving in interstate commerce. The jury could reasonably infer such movement from evidence of the defendant's trip to Arkansas to get "title papers changed" and his statement of intent to sell the...

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    ...91 (1971); United States v. Bruton, 414 F.2d 905 (8 Cir. 1969); United States v. Ryan, 415 F.2d 847 (5 Cir. 1969); United States v. Meek, 388 F.2d 936 (7 Cir. 1968), cert. denied 391 U.S. 951, 88 S.Ct. 1855, 20 L.Ed.2d 866 (1968); Mayzak v. United States, 402 F.2d 152 (5 Cir. 1968); McCarth......
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    ...presumption a heavy burden rests on the one asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, United States v. Kelton, supra. United States v. Meek, 7 Cir., 388 F.2d 936, 940, certiorari denied 391 U.S. 951, 88 S.Ct. 1855, 20 L.Ed.2d 866, holds that it must be assumed that defense counsel acted ......
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