United States v. Meinster

• Decision Date: 28 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 79-165-Cr-JLK.,79-165-Cr-JLK.
• Citation: 481 F. Supp. 1117
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Robert Jay MEINSTER et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

481 F. Supp. 1117

UNITED STATES of America v. Robert Jay MEINSTER et al.

No. 79-165-Cr-JLK.

United States District Court, S. D. Florida.

December 28, 1979.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Dana Biehl, Special Attorney, Washington, D. C.

Dennis J. Cogan, Philadelphia, Pa., for Robert Jay Meinster.

Arnold Stream, Monasch, Chazen & Stream, New York City, for Robert Elliot Platshorn.

Melvyn Kessler, Miami, Fla., for Lynne Platshorn.

Rebekah Poston, Miami, Fla., for Eugene Arter Myers.

Samuel Sheres, Hallandale, Fla., for Randall Gene Fisher.

Gerald Kogan, Miami, Fla., for Modesto Echezarreta-Cruz.

Michael Brodsky, Miami, Fla., for Richard Elliot Grant, Jr.

Arthur W. Tifford, Miami, Fla., for Mark Stephen Phillips.

Denis Dean, Miami, Fla., for Cari Jerry London.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR RELEASE ON BOND

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.

In the last few weeks this Court has been confronted with some of the most difficult issues which may arise in a criminal trial. Actually present for the Court's immediate consideration are motions by defendants Eugene Myers and Richard Grant for release on bond. However, these motions are enmeshed in the events of the last few weeks and cannot be considered in isolation.

This criminal trial involves an alleged criminal conspiracy to import and distribute vast quantities of marijuana over a three and a half year period. The indictment names twelve defendants, eight of whom remain in these proceedings. The Court briefly sketched the various charges of the one hundred page indictment hereinafter, Indictment # 1 in a prior order. See United States v. Meinster, 475 F.Supp. 1093 (S.D.Fla.1979) (Order Denying Motions to Dismiss on Double Jeopardy Grounds).

Trial began on September 17, 1979. After three months, the government has closed its case and the most recent estimates by counsel for all parties indicate that the trial will conclude some time in early February. Lengthy trials of complex criminal cases are becoming commonplace in this district. See United States v. Meinster, 481 F.Supp. 1112 (S.D.Fla.1979) (Order Denying Defendants' Requests to be Absent from Trial).

Shortly before the trial began in this case, the Court revoked the appearance bonds of two other defendants, Robert Meinster and Robert Platshorn. After lengthy further hearings on bond revocation, the Court entered a twenty-one page Order on October 10, 1979 which detailed the grounds for continuing to hold defendants Meinster and Platshorn without bond. Based on extensive tape recordings and testimony, the Court concluded that both defendants were planning massive new drug deals and had made detailed arrangements to flee the country.

I. The Precipitating Events

The motions now before the Court have their origin in events which first came to light on December 6, 1979. On that day, Mr. Atlee Wampler, the head of the Justice Department's Organized Crime Strike Force in Miami,¹ appeared before this Court to request (1) that the jury be sequestered, (2) that the Court open a sealed indictment which pertained to this trial and which had been handed down by a federal grand jury and (3) that the Court revoke the appearance bonds of various defendants, including Grant and Myers. The government's motions to sequester the jury and open the sealed indictment were granted² and an evidentiary hearing was begun on the issue of bond revocation.

The sealed indictment hereinafter, Indictment # 2 charged four defendants³ in this trial and three others with a conspiracy to "influence, obstruct, and impede trial proceedings" in this case in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Since December 6, yet another indictment hereinafter, Indictment # 3 was disclosed which alleges that two of the defendants⁴ and one of the jurors in this trial conspired to obstruct these proceedings, i. e. a separate conspiracy in which the juror was purportedly to be paid in an effort to influence the juror's vote in this case, again in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. On the morning of December 7, 1979, after the evidentiary hearing the prior day and before Indictment # 3 was handed down by the grand jury, the Court excused from further service the individual juror who was eventually named in Indictment # 3.

At the conclusion of the December 6 evidentiary hearing, the Court remanded to custody Lynne Platshorn and Randall Fisher, the two defendants who were named in Indictment # 2 and who had hitherto been free on bond. The Court also revoked the appearance bonds of Grant and Myers, remanding them to custody. On December 12, 1979 Grant and Myers filed emergency motions for their release on bond, for a further hearing thereon, and for a written order on their motions. These are the motions now before the Court.

On Saturday, December 15, the requested hearing was held. In addition, in deciding these motions the Court has found it necessary to review the many hours of tape recordings presented in evidence. The present order constitutes the written order requested by the defendants. The Court agrees that the defendants deserve as complete an explanation of its decision as is possible.

II. Standards for Revocation of Bond

A. The Right To Bail

The eighth amendment of the constitution provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." The simplicity of this declarative clause belies the tremendous importance of the right to a reasonable bail for criminal defendants. At least two independent constitutional rights, and possibly the entire structure of the constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants, rely upon the right of a defendant to be free on bond pending a jury determination of guilt or innocence. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951); United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 1979) (dictum).

The two most important rights fostered by the availability of reasonable bail are (1) the constitutional guarantee that the defendant will be afforded a fair trial, a trial in which he or she can assist in his or her own defense; and (2) the due process and jury trial right which guarantees that criminal punishment will be inflicted only after a jury verdict. As the Supreme Court succinctly stated:

This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction. citation omitted. Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 4, 72 S.Ct. at 3. These constitutional policies are implemented in the liberal provisions of Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Bail Reform Act of 1966, as codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3146.

Despite the weighty constitutional and statutory policies underlying the right to a reasonable bail, that right is not unconditional. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 4, 72 S.Ct. at 3; United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1978). Most pertinent for the case sub judice are two conditions on bail. First, bail prior to and during trial is conditioned on the reasonable assurance that the defendant will in fact "stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty" rather than fleeing the jurisdiction. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 4, 72 S.Ct. at 3. See also Rule 46(b). Second, especially during the trial, bail is conditioned on the defendant refraining from conduct which would interfere with "the orderly progress of the trial and the fair administration of justice." Fernandez v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 642, 5 L.Ed.2d 683 (1961) (Harlan, J., sitting as Circuit Justice). See also Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16, 88 S.Ct. 6, 7, 19 L.Ed.2d 15 (1967) (per curiam); Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662, 667-68, 7 L.Ed.2d 769 (1962) (Douglas, J., sitting as Circuit Justice); United States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672, 674-675 (6th Cir. 1975); Rule 46(b).⁵

In a sense, these two conditions on bail are the criminal justice system's minimum prerequisites to ensure that the criminal justice system can function. Of course, releasing any criminal defendant on bail entails some risk that he will flee. In Stack v. Boyle, Justice Jackson stated:

Admission to bail always involves a risk that the accused will take flight. That is a calculated risk which the law takes as the price of our system of justice.

342 U.S. at 8, 72 S.Ct. at 5 (separate opinion). In the Bail Reform Act of 1966, Congress struck the balance and determined that the risk of flight would be tolerated so long as there remained a reasonable assurance that the defendant would appear for trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3146. Similarly, there is always the risk that a criminal defendant free on bail may be endeavoring to obstruct or disrupt the trial proceedings. However, before a trial court undertakes to revoke a defendant's bond in order to protect the trial proceedings, there must be objective evidence of such a nefarious scheme. See generally United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1961); Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 282, 286-87 (9th Cir. 1961); Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 686, 689-90 (9th Cir. 1961) (affirming trial court decision on remand).

B. The Respective Burdens

To state that there must be a reasonable assurance that the defendant will appear for trial and, if convicted, for sentencing or that there must be objective evidence of efforts to impede the trial begs the question: On whom do these burdens lie and how high are they?

With respect to the question of flight, it is clear that after trial, the burden rests with the convicted defendant to demonstrate that he or she will not flee. Rule 46(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 9(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See also United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Miranda, 442 F.Supp. 786, 792 (S.D.Fla.1977). On the other hand, before trial the wording of 18 U.S.C. §...