United States v. Mejias

Decision Date21 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. 76 Cr. 164.,76 Cr. 164.
Citation417 F. Supp. 585
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Rev. Alberto MEJIAS et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

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Robert B. Fiske, Jr., U. S. Atty., S. D. N. Y., by Michael Q. Carey, Nathaniel H. Akerman, Asst. U. S. Attys., New York City, for the U. S.

John A. Ciampa, New York City, for defendant Rev. Alberto Mejias.

Stokamer & Epstein, by Michael Stokamer, New York City, for defendant Mario Navas.

Howard Jacobs, Donald Nawi, New York City, for defendant Estella Navas.

Stuart R. Shaw, New York City, for defendant Henry Cifuentes-Rojas.

Abraham Solomon, New York City, for defendant Jose Ramirez-Rivera.

Federal Defender Services Unit by Jack Lipson, New York City, for defendant Manuel Francisco Padilla Martinez.

Herbert Olan Brown, Brooklyn, N. Y., for defendant Francisco Cadena.

Jerome Allan Landau, New York City, for defendant Alba Luz Valenzuela.

OPINION

ROBERT L. CARTER, District Judge.

Defendants Manuel Francisco Padilla Martinez ("Padilla Martinez")1 and Estella Navas ("Navas") have moved to dismiss the indictment against them on the grounds that they have been denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Rule 48(b), F.R. Crim.P., and the District Court's Interim Plan Pursuant to the Provisions of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.

In the alternative, the moving defendants seek a dismissal of the indictments against them on the grounds of pre-indictment delay, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 The motions are denied.

Facts

On September 3, 1974, defendants Padilla Martinez, Mejias, Cadena and Valenzuela were arrested by New York City Police in apartment 1B at 455 West 48th Street in New York City and were charged with various violations of New York State drug laws. Special Agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice ("DEA") were present at the time of the arrest.

On the same day, defendant Rojas was arrested at the corner of 8th Avenue and 30th Street in New York City by a New York City Police Officer, for violations of New York State drug laws. A special agent of the DEA was present at the time of the arrest.

On October 4, 1974, defendant Navas was arrested for violations of state drug laws by the New York City Police in apartment B-204 at 61-20 Grand Central Parkway, Queens, New York. Special Agents of the DEA were present at the time of the arrest.

The decision to make all these arrests was made by a Lieutenant O'Shea of the New York City Police Department and the arrests were authorized by Assistant District Attorney Lawrence Herrmann. All federal agents participating in the arrests were under the command of Lieutenant O'Shea; no federal agent made any arrests, seized any evidence or detained any defendant. Indeed, no defendant was served with a federal summons and no federal charges were lodged until the filing of the instant indictment. Each of the above named defendants was subsequently indicted by the State of New York for various violations of state drug laws.

On October 4, 1974, Indictment 74 Cr. 939 was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The indictment named twenty-nine individuals as defendants. It also identified as co-conspirators, among others, the Rev. Alberto Mejias, Mario (Evangelista) Navas, Estella Navas and Juan Mesa.

On April 30, 1975, Indictment 74 Cr. 939, among others, was superseded by the filing of Indictment S 75 Cr. 429. This superseding indictment named thirty-eight persons as defendants and identified as co-conspirators either in the indictment itself or in the government's bill of particulars, approximately 400 persons, including the defendants in this case.

The trial of Indictment S 75 Cr. 429, United States v. Alberto Bravo, D.C., 403 F.Supp. 297, commenced before the Honorable John M. Cannella, United States District Judge and a jury on October 20, 1975. It ended approximately fourteen weeks later, on January 23, 1976, with a jury verdict of guilty as to the twelve defendants on trial.

On February 19, 1976, the indictment in this case, 76 Cr. 164, was filed in the Southern District of New York. Defendants Padilla Martinez and Navas are charged in the indictment with one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 963. In addition, defendant Navas is charged in Count Three of the indictment with distributing and possessing with the intent to distribute approximately one pound of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

The investigation by the government and the grand jury preceding the filing of the indictment did not commence until after the conclusion of the Alberto Bravo trial on January 23, 1976. The investigation was begun because the government had been informed by the New York State authorities that the various state prosecutions against the defendants in this action were severely jeopardized by the loss of a suppression motion in state court.3

The federal investigation covered a period beginning in January, 1972 — one and one half years earlier than the earliest date in any state charge against the defendants named in the instant indictment. Furthermore, the federal indictment identifies far more individuals than were named in the various state indictments, and was based on evidence which had come into the government's possession from the State in preparation for the Alberto Bravo trial, as well as on evidence developed solely by federal agents.4

Discussion

Right to a Speedy Trial

I

The moving defendants first argue that they have been denied a speedy trial as guaranteed by the District Court's Interim Plan Pursuant to the Provisions of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 ("Interim Plan"). The rule on which the defendants rely, Rule 5 of the Interim Plan, provides as follows:

"In all cases the government must be ready for trial within six months from the date of the arrest, service of summons, detention, or the filing of a complaint or of a formal charge upon which the defendant is to be tried (other than a sealed indictment), whichever is earliest. If the government is not ready for trial within such time, and if the defendant is charged only with non-capital offenses, the defendant may move in writing, on at least ten days' notice to the government, for dismissal of the indictment. Any such motion shall be decided with utmost promptness. If it should appear that sufficient grounds existed for tolling any portion of the six-months period under one or more of the exceptions in Rule 6, the motion shall be denied, whether or not the government has previously requested a continuance. Otherwise the court shall enter an order dismissing the indictment with prejudice unless the court finds that the government's neglect is excusable, in which event the dismissal shall not be effective if the government is ready to proceed to trial within ten days."

Defendants argue that their speedy trial rights crystallized at the time of their initial arrests on state charges, (i. e., on September 3, and October 4, 1974) since such arrests were the product of a joint state-federal investigation, and that since the government was not ready to try the defendants within six months of such arrests, the indictments must be dismissed.

In so arguing, defendants place primary reliance on United States v. Cabral, 475 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1973). The facts of Cabral are quite simple. On October 4, 1970, two state police officers drove to a cabin located in a remote section of Maine to investigate a report that parts from a stolen car were being sold there. When they arrived, dressed in plain clothes, they inquired of the appellant and his companion whether certain automobile parts were for sale. The appellant showed the officers some parts and stated that he had additional ones stored in the woods. Before leaving the cabin, however, Cabral pulled out a sawed-off shotgun and took it along "to keep things honest." The foursome then proceeded down a road until a car came into view, but before they reached it one of the police officers ordered Mr. Cabral to "freeze" and arrested him. When he asked why he had been arrested, the police told the appellant it was for possession of the shotgun. After checking the engine number on the car, the appellant and his companion were also arrested for possession of stolen property. The appellant was taken to a local jail and eventually arraigned in state court on a grand larceny charge. Approximately a month later Cabral was transferred to a Connecticut state prison where he was held for past parole violations. Sometime after this transfer the grand larceny charge was dismissed.

On October 7, 1970, three days after Cabral's arrest, the shotgun was turned over to federal authorities. On January 18, 1972, over fifteen months later, appellant was federally indicted for possession of a firearm. In February, 1972, a federal detainer was lodged at the Connecticut prison, and on April 15, 1972, appellant was arraigned on his federal indictment. Cabral's motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Rule 48(b), F.R.Crim.P., was denied; Cabral was subsequently convicted and appealed.

In passing on appellant's speedy trial claim, the court found that the government's prosecution of the illegal firearm charge was initiated when state authorities turned over the shotgun to a federal officer three days after Cabral's arrest. On this basis, the court held that appellant's right to a speedy trial "crystallized at the time of his initial arrest." 475 F.2d at 718.

Cabral, however, is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. First, Cabral was not decided pursuant to a Circuit or District Court rule providing for trial within a fixed period of time. Rather, the Cabral...

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    ...when he was prosecuted under the former. See United States v. Stoker, 522 F.2d 576, 580 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 & n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.1976); United States v. Clark, 398 F.Supp. 341, 349 & n. 3 (E.D.Pa.1975), aff'd mem., 532 F.2d 745, 746 (3d Cir. 1976). I t......
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    • March 10, 1977
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