United States v. Melot
| Decision Date | 20 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-cv-0865 MCA/SMV,No. 09-cr-2258 MCA,14-cv-0865 MCA/SMV,09-cr-2258 MCA |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. BILL MELOT, Defendant/Petitioner. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER is before me on Defendant/Petitioner (hereinafter "Petitioner") Bill Melot's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [CV Docs. 1, 2; CR Docs. 316, 317]1 ("Motion"), filed on September 23, 2014. Plaintiff/Respondent (hereinafter "the Government") filed a Response [CV Doc. 14; CR Doc. 326] on November 19, 2014. Petitioner filed a Reply [CV Doc. 15; CR Doc. 327] on December 9, 2015. Petitioner then filed various amendments to his Motion, which I have construed as supplements. [CV Docs. 19, 20, 22, and 23; CR Docs. 330, 333, 335, and 3362]. The Government has not responded to Petitioner's supplements. The Honorable M. Christina Armijo, Chief United States District Judge, referred this matter to me for proposed findings and a recommended disposition on September 26, 2014. [CV Doc. 4]. Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the relevant law,the records in this case and Petitioner's underlying criminal case, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, I recommend that this Motion [CV Docs. 1, 2; CR Docs. 316, 317], together with the supplements [CV Docs. 19, 20, 22, and 23; CR Docs. 330, 333, 335, and 336], be DENIED and that Case No. 14-cv-0865 MCA/SMV be DISMISSED with prejudice.3
Petitioner is a convicted tax evader. United States v. Melot, 732 F.3d 1234, 1236 (10th Cir. 2013). Petitioner failed to file income tax returns after 1986 and failed to pay any federal income taxes since 1984, despite having received substantial income from his various businesses and rental properties in the same years. Id. at 1236-37, 1239. Overwhelming evidence demonstrated that Petitioner's behavior was willful. Id. at 1241. Moreover, between 1996 and 2009, Petitioner falsified applications for farm subsidies to the U.S. Department of Agriculture4 ("USDA") to obtain money to which he was not entitled. Id. at 1239.
On August 11, 2009, Petitioner was charged by indictment for corruptly endeavoring to impede the administration of the Internal Revenue Code, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (Count 1); willfully attempting to evade or defeat tax, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (Count 2); willfully failing to file a tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (Counts 3-8); and making a false statements to the USDA, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 714m(a) (Counts 9-15). Indictment [CR Doc. 2]. Petitioner pleaded not guilty on all charges. Melot, 732 F.3d at 1236.
A 4-day jury trial was held before the Chief Judge Armijo in April of 2010. Id. The jury found Petitioner guilty on all fifteen counts. Redacted Jury Verdict [CR Doc. 79].
Chief Judge Armijo sentenced Petitioner to a term of 60 months' imprisonment, a significant downward variance from the advisory guidelines range of 210-262 months. Melot, 732 F.3d at 1240. Petitioner was also ordered to pay $18,493,098.51 in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), as well as $226,526 in restitution to the USDA. Judgment [CR Doc. 208] at 6.
Petitioner appealed on various grounds,5 and the United States cross-appealed, [CR Doc. 217]. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing because it found that Petitioner had not been entitled to the acceptance-of-responsibility sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Melot, 732 F.3d at 1245. The Tenth Circuit found that, at trial, Petitioner Id. at 1244-45. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit found that Petitioner had not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct, and thus application of the § E1.1 downward adjustment was clearly erroneous. Id. at 1245.
On February 7, 2014, Chief Judge Armijo resentenced Petitioner to a total of 14 years' (168 months') imprisonment. Amended Judgment [CR Doc. 310] at 3. Further, Chief Judge Armijo ordered restitution in the amounts of $18,469,988.51 to the IRS and $226,526.00 to the USDA. Id. at 6. Petitioner filed no appeal as to his resentencing.
Petitioner timely filed the instant Motion on September 23, 2014. [CV Docs. 1, 2, CR Docs. 316, 317]. Petitioner was represented by counsel at the time of filing his original Motion, but he has proceeded pro se since September 30, 2014.
Petitioner alleges an exhaustive list of constitutional violations concerning all aspects of his criminal proceedings, from indictment to resentencing. I have reviewed his claims thoroughly and find each meritless. I address the claims below in order of analytical convenience.
Petitioner brings two claims concerning the statute of limitations. First, Petitioner claims that the District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the indictment because they occurred beyond the statute of limitations period.6 [CV Doc. 19] at 5-7. Petitioner contends that the Government's criminal prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations, and that the Government's argued exceptions—specifically, the "affirmative act theory"—are unavailing. Id. at 5. He argues that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offenses and, accordingly, his conviction and sentence are invalid under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 5-7.
Petitioner brings a related claim based on the statute of limitations alone (rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Id. at 17-18. He contends that the prosecution of Counts 1and 2 was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and the resulting judgments and sentence were therefore unconstitutional.7 Id.
"Challenges to a district court's subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including in a § 2255 motion for collateral review of a federal conviction." United States v. Burch, 169 F.3d 666, 668 (10th Cir. 1999). Subject matter jurisdiction may not be conferred on a district court by stipulation, estoppel, or waiver. Id. Whether the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional bar to Counts 1, 2, and 3-8 is unclear. See United States v. Madsen, No. 2:09-CR-00808, 2013 WL 1284331, at *2 and n.7 (D. Utah Mar. 26, 2013) (). However, I need not determine whether the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional bar here because I find that the statute of limitations does not bar the criminal indictment.
The charge of corruptly impeding the due administration of the IRS under 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (Count I) was timely. The statute of limitations for such offenses is six years. 26 U.S.C. § 6531(6) (). The Court instructed the jury to consider the statute of limitations when considering Count 1. Jury Instruction No. 6 [CR Doc. 82] at 16 ("You must also find that at least one of the acts that makes up the wrongful endeavor occurred on or after August 11, 2003 . . . ."). In finding Petitionerguilty of Count I, the jury found that at least one act that was part of the wrongful conduct alleged in Count 1 occurred on or after August 11, 2003. See id. Accordingly, prosecution of Count 1 was timely.
The charge of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (Count 2) was timely. The statute of limitations is six years. 26 U.S.C. § 6531(2) (). Generally, the limitations period begins to run from the latter of the due date of the tax return or the last affirmative act of evasion. See United States v. Payne, 978 F.2d 1177, 1179 n.2 (10th Cir. 1992). In cases in which the defendant commits an affirmative act of evasion after the statutory due date, the limitations period begins to run from the date of the last such act of evasion. United States v. Anderson, 319 F.3d 1218, 1219 (10th Cir. 2003). Thus, the limitations period may be extended beyond six years from the time filing was required (or unpaid taxes were due). See id. Here, the Government claimed that Petitioner committed affirmative acts of evasion well within the six years preceding the criminal indictment. See [CR Doc. 2] at 7-8. Additionally, the Court instructed the jury to consider the statute of limitations when considering the charge of tax evasion. Jury Instruction No. 11 [CR Doc. 82] at 23 ("As with Count 1, you must also find that at least one of the acts that makes up the wrongful endeavor occurred on or after August 11, 2003 . . . ."). In finding Petitioner guilty, the jury found that at least one act of evasion occurred on or after August 11, 2003. See id. Accordingly, prosecution of Count 2 was timely.
The charges of failure to file personal income tax returns under 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (Counts 3-8) were timely. The statue of limitations is six years. 26 U.S.C. § 6531(4) (). The statute of limitations begins to run on the date the tax return is due. Id; see United States v. Phillips, 843 F.2d 438, 443 (11th Cir. 1988). The indictment charged Petitioner with failing to file his 2003 through 2008 tax returns (corresponding with Counts 3 through 8, respectively). [CR Doc. 2] at 9-10. Petitioner's 2003 tax return was due April 15, 2004, so the statute of...
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