United States v. Merrill

• Decision Date: 20 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72-1707.,72-1707.
• Citation: 484 F.2d 168
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Clifford Keith MERRILL, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

484 F.2d 168 (1973)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Clifford Keith MERRILL, Appellant.

No. 72-1707.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 12, 1973.

Decided July 20, 1973.

Certiorari Denied December 3, 1973.

Donald R. Shultz, Rapid City, S. D., for appellant.

William F. Clayton, U. S. Atty., Sioux Falls, S. D., for appellee.

Before Mr. Justice CLARK,^* and HEANEY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

Certiorari Denied December 3, 1973. See 94 S.Ct. 594.

PER CURIAM:

Clifford Keith Merrill, Jr. was found guilty by a jury on three substantive counts of robbery of a federally insured bank and a fourth count of conspiracy to commit such robbery. Merrill challenges his conviction on six points: (1) the Government's alleged failure to establish the District Court's jurisdiction, i. e., that the bank was federally insured; (2) use of a transcript of Merrill's testimony at a previous removal proceeding infringed his privilege against incrimination; (3) the introduction of a spontaneous statement made by the robbery victim at the scene as part of the res gestae; (4) the admission into evidence of a motel registration card bearing Merrill's fingerprint; (5) the denial of Merrill's protective motion that in the event he testified, inquiries as to prior convictions would not be permissible; and (6) the Government's alleged failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the robbery victim's death was caused by the injuries received in the robbery. We find no merit in any of these contentions and, therefore, affirm the judgment.

1. Proof of F.D.I.C. Coverage:

The federally insured status of the Blackpipe State Bank of Martin, South Dakota, was proved by the certificate of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued to the bank in the regular course of business. This, together with testimony that the insurance premium was paid, was quite sufficient proof that the bank was federally insured under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(f). Scruggs v. United States, 450 F.2d 359 (8 Cir. 1971), cert. denied, Chambers et al. v. United States, 405 U.S. 1071, 92 S.Ct. 1521, 31 L.Ed.2d 804 (1972).

2. Use of Merrill's Testimony at Removal Hearing:

Portions of Merrill's testimony at his removal hearing held in Chicago in which he said that he had never been to Martin, South Dakota, and did not "ever remember going to South or North Dakota" were admitted at his trial. Merrill was represented by counsel at the removal hearing and he does not claim that he was not fully and adequately warned of his rights. In fact he was clearly warned at the hearing that his testimony there might be used against him at any future trial. Merrill cites Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 247 (1968), as authority for excluding his prior testimony. There the Court held that Simmon's testimony at a motion to suppress was not admissible at his trial on the merits. This holding protects a defendant from the necessity of foregoing one constitutional right (privilege against self-incrimination) in order to exercise another one (right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure). In the present case, however, only the privilege against self-incrimination was involved; the exercise of no other constitutional privilege was dependent on Merrill's decision to testify at the removal hearing. Merrill's decision was entirely one of trial strategy. The general evidentiary rule is controlling, i. e., that one's testimony at a prior hearing is admissible in evidence against him at subsequent proceedings. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968). A long line of cases holds that false exculpatory statements are properly admissible as substantive evidence as tending to show guilt. E. g., Rizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 810, 830 (8 Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890, 83 S.Ct. 188, 9 L.Ed.2d 123 (1962).

3. Introduction of Spontaneous Statement of O. A. Hodson:

The record indicates that in the early morning of Monday, October 26, 1970 O. A. Hodson, the 88 year old President of the Blackpipe State Bank at Martin, South Dakota, and his son Richard, an officer of the bank, had breakfast at a local hotel in Martin. O. A. Hodson left the cafe before his son and proceeded to the bank.

Merrill and his stepson, Robert J. Bruce, had driven to the bank earlier in a rented car and had parked near the rear entrance of the bank. Merrill and Bruce had not expected Hodson to appear so early. When the latter had reached the entry way of the bank, Merrill, armed with a pistol, and his stepson ran up to Hodson and demanded that he open the bank door. When he refused, Merrill hit him on the head with the pistol and Hodson began to bleed profusely, whereupon Merrill took the bank keys from him, opened the door and dragged Hodson into the posting room behind the tellers' section. He then tied Hodson's hands behind his back and taped his feet and his mouth. When Hodson refused to give the combination of the safe to Merrill, the latter searched through the teller's cage and drawers and took the bait money. Merrill again demanded the combination and when Hodson refused, kicked him on the buttocks, ribs, belly and back near the left hip. Hodson's wallet was taken from him and his body was thrown in the corner against a wastepaper basket.

Merrill removed approximately $100 from the wallet and then threw it in the wastebasket. Hodson's eyeglasses were also found in the wastebasket. Bruce and Merrill were in the bank about half an hour when Bruce became alarmed and fled the bank at the sight of Richard Hodson outside the bank. The father signalled to Richard and he, along with his brother Bruce Hodson, also a bank officer, came running up. When the tape was removed from the elder Hodson's mouth and his hands were untied, he told his son Bruce:

"He could not believe that somebody would tie and gag another human being and then stomp him. He said, `Son, I didn\'t think anybody would do that to a dog.\'"

This conversation was admitted into evidence as res gestae. The record shows that the elder Hodson was nervous, apprehensive and in a state of emotional shock. He was bleeding actively from headwounds. The statements were made under the stress and strain of the moment. Because of these circumstances and the close proximity of the utterances to the event, the trial judge determined that Hodson's statement was admissible. Such a determination rests with the sound discretion of the trial court, to be disturbed only when clearly erroneous. Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892, 898 (8 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980, 85 S.Ct. 1344, 14 L. Ed.2d 274 (1965). A careful study of the record supports the District Court's determination.

4. Admission of Motel Registration into Evidence:

There is no merit to the contention that Merrill's registration card with the Hot Springs, South Dakota, motel, where he and Bruce spent the night the day before the robbery, was improperly admitted into evidence. It was identified by the motel's manager, who had personally prepared it when Merrill registered and who testified that such registration cards were kept in the ordinary course of business. A motel clerk testified that at the request of the F.B.I. she had searched the motel's business records for the card. The cards were indexed alphabetically and Merrill's card was found in its proper place. The card was examined by experts at the F.B.I., who were able to develop Merrill's latent fingerprint. This proof met the test of 28 U.S.C. § 1732. See United States v. Anderson, 447 F.2d 833, 838 (8 Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918, 92 S. Ct. 943, 30 L.Ed.2d 788 (1972). In addition, Bruce testified for the Government that he and Merrill spent the night at the motel as shown on the registration card.

5. Merrill's Protective Motion Concerning the Use of Former Convictions:

Merrill moved for a protective order prohibiting the Government from...