United States v. Merriweather
| Decision Date | 25 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:07-cr-00243-RDP-JEO |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. WILLIAM MERRIWEATHER, JR., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Presently before the court are five pretrial criminal motions filed by Defendant William Merriweather contending that the intent and aggravating factors identified in the Government's Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty fail to meet constitutional and statutory requirements. Specifically, Defendant moves to strike the Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty because he alleges that: (1) it includes four separate theories of intent without specifying which mental state Government will rely upon at trial (Doc. 232)1; (2) the Government's allegation of future dangerousness is unconstitutionally speculative and arbitrary (Doc. 233)2; 3) the future dangerousness non-statutory aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague, confusing to the jury, and duplicative (Doc. 234)3; and (4) the non-statutory aggravating factor of victim impactis overly broad and vague (Doc. 240).4 Defendant also requests that the court order the Government to provide additional information about the proposed aggravating factors of future dangerousness and victim impact aggravating factor. (Doc. 237).5 The Government opposes Defendant's motions and responds that the Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty and the proffered aggravating factors are not constitutionally or statutorily defective. See Government's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike Victim Impact Information, or, alternatively, to Limit Such Information to the Penalty Phase (Doc. 377, in response to Doc. 240).
The court has reviewed the indictment, the notice of intent, and the parties' submissions. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motions Docs. 232, 233, 234, and 240 are due to be denied. The court defers ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Direct Government Disclosure of Evidence it Intends to Rely (Doc. 237) until after the parties have had an opportunity to exchange discovery.
The court incorporates by reference its prior rulings that set forth the case's procedural history,6 and will only reference those case events that are particularly relevant to the particular motions currently before the court.
Merriweather is charged by indictment with the following: Count One - armed bank robbery by force or violence resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d) and (e); Count Two - armed robbery with forced accompaniment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (e); Count Three - using or carrying a firearm "during and in relation to [a] crime of violence" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A); Count Four - violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and (j) by using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence resulting in the death of Eva Hudson; and Count Five - violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and (j) by using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence resulting in the death of Sheila Prevo.
The Indictment contained a Notice of Special Findings alleging that Merriweather possessed the four mens rea factors described in 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)7 (Doc. 1 at 5-6) and had committed four of the sixteen aggravating factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c).8 (Doc. 1 at 5-6).
Based upon the charges in Counts One, Four, and Five of the indictment, the Government filed a Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty against Merriweather. (Doc. 29 at 1-2). The Government's Notice of Intent set out the four statutory intent factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) as well as four statutory aggravating factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) which were found by the grand jury in the Notice of Special Findings. (Doc. 29 at 2-4). Additionally, theGovernment's Notice identified the non-statutory aggravating factors of future dangerousness and victim impact evidence that it plans to rely upon to support a death sentence.9 See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(2). (Doc. 29 at 5-6). The Government alleged that the future dangerousness aggravating factor applied because "the defendant has engaged in a continuing pattern of violence" and because Defendant is an escape risk. (Doc. 29 at 5-6).10 To support the victim impact evidence factor, the Government plans to present evidence about the victims' characteristics and the offenses' impact on the victims' families and colleagues. (Doc. 29 at 6-7).
The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 ("FDPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598, establishes the procedures for imposing the death penalty for certain federal offenses. Before a trial under the FDPA, the Government must serve a defendant with a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty, listing the statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors that it intends to prove if thedefendant is convicted. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). The Government must also allege in the indictment at least one threshold (or "gateway") intent factor enumerated by Congress under 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A)-(D).11
If a defendant is convicted of a qualifying offense for which a sentence of death is provided, a sentencing hearing will be conducted before a jury (or, if the defendant requests and the Government agrees, it may be conducted before the court.) 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b). A defendant becomes eligible for the death penalty only if the jury finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant was 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a); 2) that the defendant acted with at least one of the statutorily-required intent under 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2), and 3) that at least one of sixteen statutory "aggravating" factors under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c) exists. This determination is commonly referred to as the "eligibility" stage of the FDPA process. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1999).
If the jury makes those threshold eligibility findings, it then proceeds to the selection stage during which it decides the appropriate sentence by determining the existence of any non-statutory aggravating factors submitted to it for consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c), as well as any mitigating factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a). The jury "consider[s] whether all theaggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death" and then decides whether a defendant should be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release, or some other lesser sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (d), (e).12 A jury's recommendation of a sentence of death or life imprisonment without possibility of release is binding on the sentencing judge. 18 U.S.C. § 3594.
Merriweather moves to strike the gateway intent factors in the Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. First, he argues that the FDPA's gateway intent factors fail to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants as required by the Constitution. (Doc. 232 at 2). See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (). Defendant further asks the court to force the Government to choose one of the mental states and dismiss the other three because the aggravating factors mirror elements of the gateway intent factors. (Doc. 232 at 2). Finally, the Defendant argues that the Government's alleging all four factors denies him reasonable notice of the elements against which he must defend. (Doc. 232 at 8). The court discusses these contentions below.
1. The FDPA Intent Factors' Narrowing Function
Defendant's first argument is that the gateway intent factors in § 3591(a) must be struck from the Notice of Intent because they are cumulative, fail to narrow the class of defendants whoare eligible for the death penalty generally, and are duplicative of the charged aggravating factors. (Doc. 232 at 8). In this case, the government included all four of the gateway intent factors in the indictment. The Constitution requires that a capital sentencing scheme perform "a narrowing function with respect to the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must also ensure that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry." Jones, 527 U.S. at 381. A death penalty statute such as the FDPA is constitutional only if it "genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and reasonably justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1092 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988)).
Defendant's narrowing function argument is one that numerous federal courts have considered and resolved. Without question, the offense elements and the intent factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A)-(D) serve to narrow defendants' eligibility for the death penalty. In United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1108 (10th Cir. 1996) the Tenth Circuit analyzed a similar argument in a federal death penalty prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 848. The Tenth Circuit found that the requirement that the jury must convict the defendant of a drug-related homicide committed with a firearm and find the existence of at least one threshold intent factor for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty separated the case from the universe of all murder cases. The narrowing function in the federal death penalty scheme, the Tenth Circuit noted, occurs through an offense's statutory definition, not simply by the jury finding an aggravating factor. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1108 (...
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