United States v. Middleton
| Decision Date | 30 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION FILE NO. 3:21-cr-6-TCB |
| Citation | 595 F.Supp.3d 1277 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. India MIDDLETON, Nikia Wakefield, Katrina Lawson, and James McFarland, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Miguel R. Acosta, Christopher J. Huber, Radka T. Nations, DOJ-USAO, Atlanta, GA, for United States of America.
Amanda R. Clark Palmer, Garland, Samuel & Loeb, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Katrina Lawson.
Max Charles Richardson, Jr., Office of Max C. Richardson, Jr., Norcross, GA, for Defendant Alicia Quarterman.
Saraliene Durrett, Saraliene Smith Durrett, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Nikia Wakefield.
Thomas Colin Wooldridge, Wooldridge & Jezek, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Darryl Washington.
Eileen Nicole Moorman, Moorman Law Firm, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Michael E. Russ, Jr., The Russ Firm, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Adarin Jones.
Daniel Crumby, Law Office of Daniel Crumby, Atlanta, GA, Nicole Massiah, Massiah Law & Associates Massiah Law & Associates, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant James McFarland.
Michael Tyler Ross, The Law Office of Michael Ross, LLC, Marietta, GA, for Defendant Katie Quarterman.
Leigh Ann Webster, Strickland Webster, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant India Middleton.
Mark A. Campbell, Mark A. Campbell, Attorney-at-Law, Buford, GA, for Defendant Victor Montgomery.
Timothy C. Batten, Sr., Chief United States District Judge This case comes before the Court on the objections [303, 304, 305] of Defendants India Middleton, Nikia Wakefield, and Katrina Lawson to Magistrate Judge Russell G. Vineyard's order and report and recommendation ("the R&R") [300]. The R&R denied Middleton and Wakefield's motions [229, 234] for a bill of particulars. It recommended denying Middleton, Wakefield, and Defendant James McFarland's motions [230, 232, 239] to sever and Lawson's motion [221] to suppress evidence, as supplemented [272].
Defendants, along with seven others, are charged with wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with applications for funds made available through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security ("CARES") Act, including loans under the Payroll Protection Program ("PPP").
On August 23, 2021, Lawson filed a motion [221] to suppress evidence, arguing that the Court should suppress all evidence found on or derived from her cell phone. Specifically, she argues suppression is warranted because of the delay between the warrantless seizure of her phone, the warrant application, and the search itself. On November 17, Lawson filed a supplemental suppression motion [272], arguing that the same evidence should be suppressed because the information in the warrant itself was "too stale" to justify the issuance of a search warrant. [272] at 1.
On September 7, Middleton and Wakefield filed substantially identical motions [229, 234] for a bill of particulars, contending that the "superseding indictment ‘alleges one large conspiracy among all defendants to commit wire fraud,’ but ‘then alleges 13 substantive counts outlining conduct specific to 1-4 individual defendants.’ " [300] at 10 (quoting [229] at 3; [234] at 3). They further assert that the indictment "does not explain how each of the ten named defendants worked together to accomplish the single conspiracy charged." Id. (quoting [229] at 3; [234] at 3).
On the same day, Middleton, Wakefield, and McFarland all filed nearly identical motions [230, 232, 239] to sever, each seeking a separate trial from their co-defendants.
They specifically argue that " ‘admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay would violate their due process rights’; that admission of co-conspirator Quarterman's drug crimes would violate their due process rights; and that a joint trial in this case would be unfair due to the danger of the ‘spill over’ effect." [300] at 17 ().
On February 2, 2022, Judge Vineyard issued the R&R, which denied the motions for a bill of particulars and recommended denying the motions to sever and suppress. Middleton and Wakefield filed objections [303, 304] to both the order and recommendation portions of the R&R. Lawson filed objections [305] to the report and recommendation portion. McFarland did not file objections.
The Court must apply three different legal standards in reviewing the R&R and Defendants’ objections thereto. The standard varies depending on whether the magistrate judge issued an "order" or a "report and recommendation" on the outstanding motions. Further, the standard varies depending on whether Defendants objected to the magistrate judge's rulings.
"A district judge may refer to a magistrate judge for determination any matter that does not dispose of a charge or defense." FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(a). Once a magistrate judge issues an order, Id.
"A district judge may refer to a magistrate judge for recommendation a defendant's ... motion to suppress evidence ... or any matter that may dispose of a charge or defense." FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(1) (emphasis added). "Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition ... a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(2).
A district judge has a duty to conduct a "careful and complete" review of a magistrate judge's R&R. Williams v. Wainwright , 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright , 677 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) ). This review may take different forms, however, depending on whether there are objections to the R&R. The district judge must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In contrast, those portions of the R&R to which no objection is made need only be reviewed for "clear error." Macort v. Prem, Inc. , 208 F. App'x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. , 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) ).2
As an initial matter, McFarland did not file objections to the R&R. Thus, the Court reviews the R&R as to his motion [239] to sever for clear error. Finding no clear error, the Court will adopt the R&R as to McFarland's motion and will deny his motion [239] to sever.
Additionally, the Court will overrule Middleton and Wakefield's objections to the denial of their motions to sever. Middleton and Wakefield filed perfunctory objections, incorporating their prior briefing, and identifying no specific findings to which they object.
"[A] party that wishes to preserve its objection must clearly advise the district court and pinpoint the specific findings that the party disagrees with." United States v. Schultz , 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009). "Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district court." Marsden v. Moore , 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Nettles , 677 F.2d at 410 n.8 ). Further, "a party does not state a valid objection to an R&R by merely incorporating by reference previous filings." Hammonds v. Jackson , No. 1:13-cv-711-MHS, 2015 WL 12866453, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2015). "This rule facilitates the opportunity for district judges to spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act." Nettles , 677 F.2d at 410.
Because Middleton and Wakefield's objections were general and merely incorporated their prior briefing, the Court will overrule them. Accordingly, it will adopt the R&R as to its denial of the motions [230, 232] to sever.
The R&R denied Middleton and Wakefield's request for a bill of particulars, finding that the indictment contains "sufficient information about the nature of the charges to enable [Middleton and Wakefield] to prepare for trial, to avoid unfair surprise, and to enable [them] to plead double jeopardy in the event of a later prosecution for the same offense." [300] at 16 ().
Middleton and Wakefield object to this finding, arguing that their requests for information are limited in scope and are necessary to prepare a defense for trial. They assert that the indictment fails to allege how there was a "single conspiracy between all of the charged codefendants, or how that alleged single conspiracy was effectuated." [303] at 5.
A district court is vested with broad discretion in deciding whether a bill of particulars should be granted. United States v. Cole , 755 F.2d 748, 760 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit has noted that a bill of particulars serves three purposes: "to inform the defendant of the charge against him with sufficient precision to allow him to prepare his defense, to minimize surprise at trial, and to enable him to plead double jeopardy in the event of a later prosecution for the same offense." United States v. Warren , 772 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
However, a defendant cannot successfully move for a bill of particulars in order "to force the government into divulging its prosecution strategy." United States v. Maurya , 25 F.4th 829, 838 (11th Cir. 2022). Nor should a bill of particulars "be used to...
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