United States v. Milam
Decision Date | 01 June 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 15-cr-20091,15-cr-20091 |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. TERRENCE MILAM, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
On January 26, 2016, Defendant Terrence Milam filed a Motion to Suppress. (Motion to Suppress, ECF No. 36.) The government responded in opposition to the Motion to Suppress on February 5, 2016. (Response, ECF No. 37.) On February 29, 2016, the Magistrate Judge held a suppression hearing (the "Suppression Hearing"). (R&R, ECF No. 49 at 1.) The government filed a post-hearing brief on March 4, 2016. (Gov. Post-Hearing Brief, ECF No. 47.) Milam filed a post-hearing brief on March 7, 2016. (Milam Post-Hearing Brief, ECF No. 48.)
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge's March 18, 2016 Report and Recommendation recommending denial of the Motion to Suppress (the "R&R"). (R&R, ECF No. 49.) On March 25, 2016, Milam filed objections to the R&R and requested a de novo suppression hearing (the "Objections"). (Obj., ECF No. 50.) The government responded on April 15, 2016. (Response to Obj., ECF No. 55.)
For the following reasons, the request for a de novo suppression hearing is DENIED, the Objections are OVERRULED, the R&R is ADOPTED, and the Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
The R&R sets forth the factual and procedural background of this case in detail. (R&R, ECF No. 49.) Unless otherwise stated, the Court adopts the R&R's defined terms. The following facts are pertinent to the Objections and were not set forth in the R&R.
At the Suppression Hearing, Officer Zachary Apel testified that on January 21, 2015, he first developed reasonable suspicion that Milam was engaged in illegal activity when he saw Milam and the victim "wiggling" to pull their pants up in Milam's car. (Hearing Tr., ECF No. 46 at 20-21,31.) He testified that he first saw them wiggling while he was driving toward Milam's car and before blocking Milam in Milam's parking space. (Id. at 20-21,31,37.) Defense counsel requested that an audio recording of Officer Apel's testimony from the June 5, 2015 preliminary hearing in state court (the "Preliminary Hearing") be played in open court to impeach Officer Apel about when he first developed reasonable suspicion that Milam was engaged in illegal activity. (Id. at 22-23.) Defense counselsaid he was not moving to admit the audio recording into evidence. (Id. at 26.) The government objected to defense counsel's playing the recording for purposes of impeachment. (Id. at 22-23,25.) The Magistrate Judge denied the request to play the audio recording. (Id. at 26-27.) She allowed Officer Apel to listen to the recording alone to see if it would refresh his recollection. (Id.)
The audio recording refreshed Officer Apel's recollection. (Id. at 28.) Officer Apel's testimony at the Preliminary Hearing was that he saw Milam and the victim wiggling in Milam's car as Officer Apel exited his police car, which occurred after Milam's car had been blocked. Officer Apel explained that he did not testify at the Preliminary Hearing about first seeing Milam and the victim wiggling in Milam's car before blocking the car because he was asked to give a "vague statement" instead of a "more detailed description". (Id. at 29.) He said "I believe if I had been asked a little differently, I may have said it that way." (Id. at 31.)
Based on Officer Apel's belief that he was asked about the incident in a different way at the Preliminary Hearing than at the Suppression Hearing, defense counsel again asked the Magistrate Judge to play the audio recording. (Id. at 32.) Defense counsel sought to show that the question Officer Apel had been asked at the Preliminary Hearing was not sufficientlydifferent to justify inconsistencies in Officer Apel's testimony about when he first saw Milam and the victim wiggling in Milam's car. The government objected to admitting the recording into evidence. (Id.) The following exchange occurred between defense counsel, the government, and the Magistrate Judge:
The audio recording was not admitted into evidence. It was admitted for identification purposes only. (Exh. & Witness List, ECF No. 45.) The Magistrate Judge requested post-hearing briefs on the admissibility of the audio recording. (Hearing Tr., ECF No. 46 at 47.) In Milam's post-hearing brief, he informed the Magistrate Judge that the part he wanted her to listen to was from 1:50 to 3:00 on the disk. (Milam Post-Hearing Brief, ECF No. 48 at 2.) He argued that the entire audio recording should be admitted into evidence because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at suppression hearings. (Id.) The government argued that the audio recording should not be admitted into evidence because it is not inconsistent with Officer Apel's Suppression Hearing testimony. (Gov. Post-Hearing Brief, ECF No. 47 at 2.) The government "acknowledge[d]" that the entire recording might be helpful to the Magistrate Judge in deciding whether Officer Apel's statements were inconsistent. (Id. at 3.) Each party cited to the audio recording in support of its position on whether a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.
The R&R recommends that the Motion to Suppress be denied because Officer Apel developed the reasonable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment to detain Milam before blocking Milam's car in its parking space. (R&R, ECF No. 49 at 6.) Even if Officer Apel violated Milam's Fourth Amendment right, the R&R recommends that the violation does not "rise[] to a level to warrant suppression of evidence." (Id. at 7.) The R&R's factual findings and conclusions of law are based in part on the audio recording of Officer Apel's Preliminary Hearing testimony. (R&R, ECF No. 49.) The R&R does not address the admissibility of the audio recording.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of district court duties to Magistrate Judges. See United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869-70 (1989)); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App'x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). If theMagistrate Judge holds a suppression hearing, the district court may reopen the...
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