United States v. Milliken Imprinting Company
| Decision Date | 30 April 1906 |
| Docket Number | No. 227,227 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES, Appt. , v. MILLIKEN IMPRINTING COMPANY |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Louis A. Pradt and Solicitor General Hoyt for appellant.
[Argument of Counsel from page 169 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Malcolm Lloyd, Jr., and David Milliken for appellee.
[Argument of Counsel from page 170 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a petition praying for the reformation of a contract and for damages for breach of the same as reformed. The court of claims granted the prayer and made a decree for damages (40 Ct. Cl. 81), whereupon the United States appealed to this court.
The contract is an elaborate and formal instrument, dated June 19, 1899, under the seal of the petitioner, and executed on behalf of the United States by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is unnecessary to state its terms. Members of a partnership subsequently incorporated as the petitioner had a contract of like sort expiring July 1, 1899. On or about April 25, 1899, they received from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the following communication, bearing that date:
To contractors for imprinting stamps:
In awarding contracts for imprinting stamps on checks, drafts, and other instruments for the year commencing July 1st, 1899, it has been determined to add the following provisions to contracts in addition to those now contained in the existing contracts for imprinting stamps.
Each contractor will be required to pay salaries aggregat- ing thirty-four hundred dollars ($3,400) per annum for one government stamp agent and two counters, payable monthly.
As compensation in full for imprinting stamps, the contractor shall charge all persons requiring the same the sum of 80 cents per thousand stamps imprinted, when imprinted upon sheets containing five or more stamps, and $1 per thousand stamps when imprinted upon sheets containing less than five stamps to the sheet. In order to secure absolute uniformity in price these charges shall be rigidly adhered to, and any evasion or attempted evasion of the express terms hereof shall be deemed a violation of the terms of the contract.
No application for contract to imprint stamps for period named will be considered from any person, firm, or corporation not now engaged in imprinting stamps under contract with the government.
Each application for contract must be accompanied by the guaranty of at least two responsible persons, that in case contract is entered into and accepted, bond will be furnished in the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) for the faithful performance thereof.
The Commissioner reserves the right to reject any or all applications and to cancel any contract wherever and whenever it shall appear to the interests of the public and the government to do so.
Applications will be received at the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Washington, District of Columbia, until 12 m., May 25, 1890, such applications to be carefully sealed and marked 'Applications for contract for imprinting internal revenue stamps,' and addressed to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
On May 25, 1899, the firm wrote to the Commissioner stating that they then had the privilege to imprint stamps, etc and 'would most respectfully make application to you for a contract to continue the same for the period of one year, commencing July 1, 1899, and in accordance with your official communication, dated April 25, 1899, we to pay salaries aggregating $3,400 for one government stamp agent and two counters, and to receive as compensation for imprinting stamps the sum of 80 cents per thousand when imprinted upon sheets containing five or more stamps, and $1 per thousand when imprinted upon sheets containing less than five stamps per sheet.' They added that they attached a guaranty to furnish the required bond, and referred to letters accompanying the original application. This letter now is denominated an acceptance of what is called the offer of April 25, above set forth. The alleged mistake is the omission, from the formal contract, of the paragraph in that communication, to the effect that no application will be considered from any person not now engaged in printing stamps under contract with the government, and the following one, limiting the time for applying to May 25. After May 25 an application was accepted from the American Imprinting Company, a corporation not engaged in imprinting stamps under contract with the government on April 25. The damages awarded were the profits which would have been made by the petitioner had it not lost the customers who went to the corporation last named.
The government objects at the outset that the court of claims has no jurisdiction in equity, and that, although the petitioner's demand is for money under a contract as it should have been drawn, yet, in this suit, that demand is incident to the reformation asked, which certainly is true. Reformation is not an incident to an action at law, but can be granted only in equity. When relief is granted also on the contract as reformed, it means only that the court of equity sees fit to go on and finish the whole case. But we are of opinion that the court was warranted in taking jurisdiction under a fairly liberal interpretation of the act of March 3, 1887, chap. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. at L. 505, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 752. That section gives the court of claims jurisdiction of 'all claims founded . . . upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States were suable.' A claim for money upon a contract, which would be like a right of action at common law but for the need of helf from equity to establish the contract, weems to us to fall within these words, in their obvious, literal sense. District of Columbia v. Barnes, 197 U. S. 146, 150, 152, 49 L. ed. 699-701, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 401; South Boston Iron Works v. United States, 34 Ct. Cl. 174, 200.
We come, then, to the merits. It is unnecessary to...
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Medina v. United States
...v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589-591, 61 S.Ct. 767, 771-772, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). But see United States v. Milliken Imprinting Co., 202 U.S. 168, 173-174, 26 S.Ct. 572, 573-574, 50 L.Ed. 280 (1906). Jurisdiction against the United States for nonmonetary relief, however, has been found to exi......
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Mitchell v. United States, 772-71 to 775-71.
...meaning. That would have been an unlikely thing for the Court of those days to do. The defendant in United States v. Milliken Imprinting Co., 202 U.S. 168, 26 S.Ct. 572, 50 L.Ed. 980 (1906) made the same mistaken argument made here, that the Court of Claims had no equity jurisdiction, citin......
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Larionoff v. U.S.
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